DEFENCE IN DEPTH

Camp News, Volume 3, Issue 113, 13 March 1942, Page 6

DEFENCE IN DEPTH

HOME GUARD PROVIDES VITAL ANSWER TO NEW METHODS OF GERMAN ATTACK TRIED. IN FRANCE

By

Tactics, that, is the movement of any number of ’ soldiers in the presence of the enemy, is of immediate concern to every volunteer in the Home Guard. Strategy or generalship ds quite a different matter and is the business of our leaders, for strategy is the science of combining and employing military resources in the operation of war. The art of war is subject to rapid change, a fact that will have been impressed on all those who' fought in the war of 1914-18, for the methods used in 1940 were certainly not recognized by the commanders of 1914. The changes that have taken place in the last few hundred years are due solely to the improvement in weapons and facilities for transport.

There is no doubt that at all times in the past when troops were led into bat Lie by their kings and commanders, that almost every engagement was won by those with superior tactical ability. This account's, for the Norman success at Hastings, and the English victories at Crecy and Agincourt, to name just three of the innumerable battles of the past. Frederick the Great, however, was definitely the first general to realize that war was a science. In his days the rival armies would march and manoeuvre for a whole summer without one side being fortunate enough

to obtain a position in the field that would give them superiority. After months of marching the armies would go intq winter quarters without having met. A point that should be remembered, however, is that Frederick and other commanders of his period were solely responsible for the movements of their armies. That is to say, in the year 1750 an army of perhaps 50,000 men had only one officer who was allowed to make tactical decisions.

Compare this with the end of the 1914-18 war where non-commissioned officers on both sides had the same power over the men in their charge. In the year 1941 even private soldiers are expected to act on their own in- • itiative, which gives them, under certain conditions, exactly the same power. The soldier of to-day is an intelligent man whose training fits him to fight the enemy, advance, retreat or stay put as he thinks best in the absence of a superior, t • As every one knows, during the trench warfare of 1914-1917, neither side found it possible to advance with any large degree of success. Increased fire power had made the frontal at-

tack suicidally expensive in lives and money. A flank attack was absolutely impossible, as the opposing armies stretched from the Swiss Frontier to the sea. For most of the time the German armies were on the defensive, and huge numbers of French and British troops were flung against them time and again in an attempt to drive them back. Incredible losses and small gains for a long time failed to convince our leaders that “it was magni-

i ficent but it was not war.” 1 The end of the war of 1914-18 still ; seemed very far away when the Ger- . mans broke through in March, 1918, j and almost won the war! They were ■ able to do this because a new tactic ■ had been discovered,, not by a German : but by a Frenchman! This tactic (now known as infiltra- ■: tion) was also the means of the Ger•l man success in France during the pre- ■ sent war. In 1915 a young French ■ officer, Captain Laffargue, published a book in which he stated his opinion : that the frontal attack was no longer useful. He showed, in fact, that the rigid front line could be broken without the enemy gaining a great advantage.

Bodies of troops passed and almost cut off, could fire effectively at the enemies’ flanks, resisting until counter attacks had slowed up or cut off the spearheads of the enemy. This theory, passed over by the French Command and entirely ignored by the British, proved to be the germ of the new German method. This method was to attack the weakest parts of the defence, ignore entirely the stronger parts of the line and penetrate rapidly the weak, at-

most undefended rear. In fact, in was | “infiltration.” These new German doctrines were not unknown to the Allies, and early in 1918 the British Army adopted a system of “defence in depth,” the only answer to infiltration. Unfortunately, though many strong points and pillboxes were built behind the lines, no provision was made for counter-attack. After the break through, British soldiers in isolated groups fought and died where they stood, but the enemy found a way round. It is known now that a retiring defence would have saved these brave men for the counter-attack that would have stopped the advance much sooner. With these new theories in mind, the French and German Governments built the Maginot and Siegfried Lines. Strictly speaking, these were not lines but fortifications in depth, and if the Maginot Line had been built along the Belgian Frontier it is almost certain I that the Germans would not have defeated the French Aamy.

In fact, it is likely that both frontiers would still be intact and that the' war would have been confined to the air or have developed on other fronts. The unfortified end of the line was cut by the German forces with their mechanized troops, who penetrated to the

comparatively undefended back areas and swept on sometimes at the rate of forty miles a day. The town of Abbeville was captured by a couple of dozen motor cyclists! A small, half-trained and partly equipped Home Guard section could have held this town until relieved by regular troops. A successful German Army following these small motorized detachments swept into France, ignoring the expensive fortifications,

and the front of the Maginot Line was the last to fall! There is no doubt whatever that if the French had organized a Home Guard Army on the lines now developed in Great Britain, the Germans could have been held. These volunteers would not have had to face. large bodies of troops better trained and equipped than themselves. Their auty would have been to wipe out the very small numbers of mechanized troops in the first break through. Official opinion in this country now holds that but for the formation of the Home Guard, a large-scale invasion would ; have taken place. The methods of landing troops in Great Britain are known. Parachutes, gliders and transport planes can bring over a comparatively small number of men.

These, well armed with automatic weapons could be expected to make easier the way for’ larger bodies of troops. Nine-ton tanks can be landed from the air and normally their occupants could be expected in an area more or less undefended, to capture suitable landing fields. Defence in depth by the organization of the Home Guard is therefore an accomplished fact and the stronger, more trained, and better equipped the Home Guard becomes, so much more help will be given to our other fighting forces. Eventually it may become necessary to invade Germany. Can Hitler adopt this regional defence? Certainly not by the formation of a Home Guard in any of the occupied countries, and not even in Germany. Eatery man in Britain may be trusted with a rifle and ammunition for use against his country’s enemies. This is not so in the Nazi slave states. Millions of the people of Europe are praying for the day when they can oust the Nazis. Hitler dare not arm them!