Law Report.

New Zealand Police Gazette, Volume XXVII, Issue 3, 28 January 1903, Page 29

Law Report.

The following decision is published for the general information of the Force :

(“ The Times Law Reports,” Vol. xix., pages 19, 20.) Tromans v. Hodkinson.

Gaming -Betting -Bar of Publichouse—Place “used” for betting “Betting Act, 1853” (16 and 17 Viet., c. 119), Section 3.

A bookmaker was in the habit of frequenting the bar of a publichouse at stated hours for the purpose of carrying on a ready-money betting business with persons resorting thereto, the carrying-on of the business being known to and pursued under some arrangement with the landlord. The bookmaker did not take any refreshment at the publichouse, nor had he any interest in the tenancy or business of the house, nor did he occupy any specific part of the bar. Held, That the bookmaker “used” the bar for the

purpose of betting with persons resorting thereto, contrary to section 3 of “ The Betting Act, 1853.” Belton v. Busby (15 The Times L.R., 458 ; [1899] 2 Q. 8., 380) approved and followed.

This was a case stated by the justices of Old Hill, Staffordshire, raising a question under “ The Betting Act, 1853,” as to whether a person who was professedly a bookmaker, going day after day to a publichouse, and there carrying on his business, could be convicted as a person using the publichouse for betting. The following facts appeared from the case stated : Informations were preferred by Hodkinson, the respondent, against the appellant, Tromans, and Insull, his clerk, for using the Railway Inn, Oradley Heath, for the purpose of betting with persons resorting thereto, contrary to section 3 of the Act. There were also informations against Thomas Scriven for permitting the inn to be used for betting. The Magistrates convicted and fined the appellant and Scriven £IOO each and Insull £25. Scriven was the licensed occupier of the inn, the appellant was a professional bookmaker, and Insull was a clerk employed by the appellant in his business. The appellant was in the habit of frequenting the inn for the purpose of there carrying on, and he carried on in the bar or tap-room at stated hours, a ready-money betting business with persons resorting thereto, the carrying-on of which in the bar or tap-room was known to such persons and was known to and pursued under some arrangement or understanding come to with Thomas Scriven, the landlord. At the hearing no evidence was given that the appellant when at the inn obtained refreshments or used the house for that purpose or was a customer thereof, nor did it appear that the appellant had any interest in the tenancy or the business of the inn, or that in the betting business he occupied any specific part of the bar or tap-room. The Lord Chief Justice, in delivering judgment, said that Mr. Stutfield had admitted that the bar of the publichouse was a place within the meaning of the Act, but his point was that, because it was not shown that there was a distinct licence from the landlord, the appellant ought not to be convicted, as it was not shown that he had any interest in the house. The findings of fact by the Magistrates brought the case within the rule that if a man was found using a place within the meaning of the Act for the purpose of carrying on his trade the case was not within the rule laid down in the Kempton Park ease. The finding was that the appellant was in the habit of frequenting the inn fol the purpose of carrying on, and that he carried on in the bar at stated hours, a ready-money betting business with persons resorting thereto, and carried it on under some arrangement with the landlord. In his opinion that statement of facts showed that there had been a breach of the statute. The decision in Belton v. Busby was upon similar facts, and was an authority that this was the proper rule on such facts. That was decided after the Kempton Park case, and he agreed with it. The Magistrates’ decision was perfectly right, and the appeal must be dismissed. Mr. Justice Wills, in concurring, said that he agreed with Belton v. Busby, and he would like to say that in his opinion if each of the bettors had taken half a pint of beer it would not have made any difference, and the mere fact that they took no refreshment seemed to him to be by no means a cardinal fact in this case.

Mr. Justice Channell, in concurring, said that he thought that these persons used the place as if it were a bettingoffice, and that was the test laid down in the Kempton Park case.

The appeal was accordingly dismissed