Miscellaneous Information.

New Zealand Police Gazette, Volume XXIII, Issue 25, 6 December 1899, Page 260

Miscellaneous Information.

Appointment as Constable. Willcocks, James Sellers, No. 936, 2nd instant.

Resignation. Constable Lomax, Henry Perry, No. 877, 30th ultimo

Rewards. Constable H. W. Williams, No. 909, has been awarded £6 for services in obtaining convictions for sly-grog selling at Otorobanga and Te Kuiti. (99/2004.) Native Constable J. Beazley, Rawene, has been awarded £8 for obtaining a conviction against Waata Taiawhio for sly-grog selling at Rakauwahi. (99/2026.) Constable P. J. Dunn, No. 127, Mangonui police, has been awarded £3 for obtaining the conviction of J. Kralavich for sly-grog selling. (99/2029.) Fire-brigades. (Circular No. 36/99.) Inspectors in charge of districts are requested to furnish the following information for the Registrar-General 1. Place where brigade is situated. 2. Number of officers, as on 31st December, 1899. 3. Number of men. J. B. Tunbridge, Commissioner of Police. Wellington, 4th December, 1899.

“ Arms Act, 1880.” —Expiration of Dealers' Licenses

Licensing Officers are reminded that dealers’ licenses are in force for only one year from the date specified on each license, and if the persons to whom they were issued continue to deal in arms, gunpowder, &c., after the expiration of that period they must obtain new licenses.

General attention is also directed to the Order in Council and instructions, vide Police Gazette, 1898, pages 164 and 172.

Summary Jurisdiction in Indictable Offences. Regina v

Anderson.

The following decision of His Honour Mr. Justice Edwards, taken from the Wellington Evening Post of Ist June, 1899, is published for general information : The question for determination, His Honour said, was whether the jurisdiction of the superior Courts over certain indictable offences mentioned in “The Indictable Offences Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1894,” was taken away by that Act, which gave a summary jurisdiction over such offences to two Justices or a Magistrate. There could be no doubt that the general rule, as laid down by Tindall, C.J., was that “ the jurisdiction of the superior Courts was not taken away except by express words or necessary implication.” Lord Campbell had laid down a similar rule. It was true, however, that jurisdiction might be taken away by implication as well as by express words, but the intention must in that case be necessarily implied. Applying the general rules laid down to the question now under consideration, there was, in his Honour’s opinion, no difficulty in arriving at the conclusion that the jurisdiction of the superior Courts was not, by “The Indictable Offences Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1894,” taken away with respect to the offences therein mentioned. Prior to this enactment the Justices had, under sections 176-194 of “ The Justices of the Peace Act, 1882,” power to deal summarily with certain indictable offenoes. This power was in all cases to be exeroised at their discretion, and in most cases only with the consent of the person charged. Those provisions were repealed by the Act of 1894. To support the contention of the prisoner’s counsel it would be necessary to read section 4 of the Act as though it ran : “ The offences mentioned in this Act which were heretofore indictable shall cease to be indictable, and any two or more Justices and a Magistrate shall have summary jurisdiction and authority in respect of such offences.” No change in the language less violent would support the contention advanced, and his Honour thought that it was plain that such a change could not upon any principle be made. There was nothing in the Act which, in bis opinion, led to the inference that this was the intention of the Legislature. On the contrary, some of the offences mentioned in the Act were of so shocking a character that it was impossible to suppose that it was intended that they should in all cases be dealt with summarily, or that if the offenders could escape prosecution for six months they should evade all punishment for their crimes. The result, in his Honour’s opinion, was that an offender who may under the Act be dealt with summarily by Justices may yet at their discretion be committed by them for trial by a superior Court, and that such an offender who has evaded prosecution for six months must be so committed for trial. It was contended by counsel for the prisoner that if the jurisdiction of the superior Courts was not taken away, the limitation of time within which prosecutions under the Act of 1894 must be begun applied to prosecutions under the provisions of the Criminal Code Act for the same offences, and that consequently offenders who may be summarily dealt with under the Act of 1894 cannot after the expiration of six months from the date of their offences be prosecuted under the Criminal Code Act. No authority was cited in support of that contention, and it was sufficient to say that it appeared to be quite untenable. No costs were allowed.