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In the course of the ensuing debate the relation between Senator Vandenberg's amendment and paragraph 1 then under discussion were considered. The new proposal was warmly welcomed by many members as a desirable enlargement of the powers of the General Assembly, and undoubtedly the concessions it contained went a long way towards meeting the New Zealand point of view, although the essential differences between the two viewpoints remained — namely, the desire on the part of the sponsoring Powers to eliminate any possibility of decisions of the General Assembly conflicting with those of the Security Council. The introduction of the Vandenberg Amendment to paragraph 6 led the New Zealand delegate to suggest, for the purpose of hastening discussion, a postponement of further consideration on his own first amendment to paragraph 1. Eventually the Committee agreed to vote on Senator Vandenberg's proposal, and it was agreed, further, that he should take the sponsoring Powers draft of paragraph 1, Section B, after having also taken into account other proposals put forward during the discussion, and bring it back to the Committee, with possible amendments, for final approval. While this redraft was being prepared discussion continued on the other United Nations amendments to paragraph 1. The subcommittee charged on 10 May with correlating the various proposals relating to Chapter V brought forward for consideration nine questions of which the third New Zealand amendment—namely, the deletion of the last sentence of paragraph 1- -was first on the list, as being the most radical departure from Dumbarton Oaks. This was expressed by the sub-committee in the following terms:— " Should the General Assembly be enabled to make on its own initiative recommendations on any matter relating to the maintenance of international peace and security which is being dealt with by the Security Council ?" In support of the amendment urging that the Assembly should have the right to discuss anything and everything within the sphere of international relations, the New Zealand delegate had declared earlier in the debate that if this were not accorded formally the ultimate result would be the same, since the Assembly could in fact discuss anything and, further, that it could make declarations which would probably be just as effective as recommendations. The arguments put forward on the other side were based on the grounds that the Assembly should not make recommendations on matters being actively dealt with by the Security Council, otherwise jurisdictional conflicts might arise at times of crisis. It was suggested that the division of functions between the Security Council and the General Assembly provided in the Dumbarton Oaks text was fundamental to the whole conception. In supporting the principle of non-limitation on the Assembly's powers, and its status as the forum of world public opinion, the New Zealand delegate emphasized that the problem confronting the meeting was one of reconciling democracy and efficiency. He expressed his firm opposition to any arrangement which would diminish the powers of the General Assembly and at the same time result in the virtual dictatorship of the Big Powers. In particular, he stressed the desirability of effecting changes in the Charter to enable the Assembly to check any dilatoriness, evasion, unreasonable veto, or obstruction on the part of the Security Council. In his concluding remarks he made a plea for recognition of the fact that just as the smaller Powers had contributed readily and usefully towards the successful conclusion of the war, so they should be given the opportunity to participate fully in the machinery for the prevention of future wars,
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