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was to be avoided, then action must be taken readily and without delay. In this sense they declared themselves ready to receive a personage appointed by the Polish Government up to the evening of the 30th August, with the proviso that the latter was in fact empowered not only to discuss but to conduct and conclude negotiations. Further, the German Government pointed out that they felt able to make the basic points regarding the offer of an understanding available to the British Government by the time the Polish negotiator arrived in Berlin. Instead of a statement regarding the arrival of an authorized Polish personage, the first answer the Government of the Reich received to their readiness for an understanding was the news of the Polish mobilization, and only towards 12 o'clock on the night of the 30th August, 1939, did they receive a somewhat general assurance of British readiness to help towards the commencement of negotiations. Although the fact that the Polish negotiator expected by the Government of the Reich did not arrive removed the necessary condition for informing His Majesty's Government of the views of the German Government as regards possible bases of negotiation, since His Majesty's Government themselves had pleaded for direct negotiations between Germany and Poland, the German Minister for Foreign Affairs, Herr Von Ribbentrop, gave the British Ambassador on the occasion of the presentation of the last British Note precise information as to the text of the German proposals which would be regarded as a basis of negotiation in the event of the arrival of the Polish plenipotentiary. The Government of the German Reich considered themselves entitled to claim that in these circumstances a Polish personage would immediately be nominated, at any rate retroactively. For the Reich Government cannot be expected for their part continually not only to emphasize their willingness to start negotiations, but actually to be ready to do so, while being from the Polish side merely put off with empty subterfuges and meaningless declarations. It has once more been made clear, as a result of a demarche which has meanwhile been made by the Polish Ambassador, that the latter himself has no plenary powers either to enter into any discussion or even to negotiate. The Fuhrer and the German Government have thus waited two days in vain for the arrival of a Polish negotiator with plenary powers. In these circumstances the German Government regard their proposals as having this time, too, been to all intents and purposes rejected, although they considered that these proposals, in the form in which they were made known to the British Government also, were more than loyal, fair, and practicable. The Reich Government consider it timely to inform the public of the bases for negotiation which were communicated to the British Ambassador by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Herr Von Ribbentrop. The situation existing between the German Reich and Poland is at the moment of such a kind that any further incident can lead to an explosion on the part of the military forces which have taken up their position on both sides. Any peaceful solution must be framed in such a way as to ensure that the events which lie at the root of this situation cannot be repeated on the next occasion offered, and that thus not only the east of Europe but also other territories shall not be brought into such a state of tension. The cause of this development lie in (1) the impossible delineation of frontiers as fixed by the Versailles Dictate, (2) the* impossible treatment of the minority in the ceded territories. In making these proposals the Reich Government are, therefore, actuated by the idea of finding a lasting solution which will remove the impossible situation created by frontier delineation, which may assure to both parties their vitally important line of communication, which may as far as it is at all possible remove the minority problem, and, in so far as this is not possible, may give the minorities the assurance of a tolerable future by means of a reliable guarantee of their rights. The Reich Government are content that in so doing it is essential that economic and physical damage done since 1938 should be exposed and repaired in its entirety. They, of course, regard this obligation as being binding for both parties. These considerations lead to the following practical proposals :— (1) The Free City of Danzig shall return to the German Reich, in view of its purely German character as well as of the unanimous will of its population. (2) The territory of the so-called corridor, which extends from the Baltic Sea to the line Marienwerde-Graudenz-Kulm-Bromberg (inclusive), and thence may run in a westerly direction to Schonlanke, shall itself decide as to whether it shall belong to Germany or Poland.

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