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gained a reputation for overcharging and their businesses were damaged. In self-defence they recommended to the public lines in substitution of those which were being cut and upon which they could make their usual profit. One of the strongest arguments relied upon by counsel for the P.A.T.A. was the " Findings and Decisions of the Sub-committee appointed in Great Britain by a Standing Committee on Trusts to inquire into the Principle of Fixed Retail Prices," and referred to in paragraph 6 of this report. These findings and decisions are quoted in full in the opening address of Mr. M. Myers, K.C. (pages 4 to 8). Other instances relied upon by P.A.T.A. counsel for support were— (a) The New Zealand case of The Crown v. Distributors Ltd. and the millers associated with that company. In this case the judgment of Mr. Justice Sim was upheld by the Privy Council. The following is an extract from this judgment:— These, then, are the circumstances in which the company was formed and commenced its operations. There does not appear to be any reason for thinking that it was established with any sinister design, or that its main purpose was other than that of stabilizing the flour-milling industry by eliminating unrestrained competition, with its attendant evils. The case for the Crown seemed to be based largely on the view that unfettered competition is in itself a good thing, and that any agreement which interferes with such competition, unless justified by some cogent reason, must be contrary to the public interest; but unfettered competition is not always a blessing, and in considering the interests of consumers it is impossible to disregard the interests of those who are engaged in the production and distribution of the articles of consumption. The consumer may derive benefit for a time from cut-throat competition, but in the long-run it is not in the public interest to have such competition. (b) In Ware and De Freville v. The Motors Traders' Association reported in [1921] 3 K.B. 40, Lord Justice Scrutton said, —• While low prices may be good for the public for the time, they are not a benefit if all suppliers are thereby ruined. A steady level price may have considerable advantages over violent fluctuations from very high prices in times of scarcity and fierce competition, and unremunerative prices in times of plenty or financial pressure. (c) In the Coal Vend case, before the Privy Council, reported in 1913 Appeal Cases, at page 796, Lord Parker says,— The chief evil thought to be entailed by a monopoly, whether in its strict or popular sense, was the rise in prices which such monopoly might entail. The idea that the public are injuriously affected by high prices has played no inconsiderable part in our legal history. It led, no doubt, to the enactment of most, if not all, of the penal statutes repealed by 12 Geo. 111, c. 71. It also lay at the root of the common-law offence of engrossing, which, according to Hawkins's " Pleas of the Crown," vol. 11, Book 1, ch. 79, consisted in buying up large quantities of wares with intent to resell at unreasonable prices. It influenced the Courts in their attitude towards contracts in restraint of trade. Although, therefore, the whole subject may some day have to be reconsidered, there is at present ground for assuming that a contract in restraint of trade, though reasonable in the interests of the parties, may be unreasonable in the interests of the public if calculated to produce that state of things which is referred to by Lindley and Bo wen, L.J J., as a pernicious monopoly—that is to say, a monopoly calculated to enhance prices to an unreasonable extent. At page 797, Lord Parker says,— The right of the individual to carry on his trade or business in a manner he considers best in his own interests involves the combining with others in a common cause of action, provided such common cause of action is undertaken with a single view to the interests of the combining parties and not with a view to injuring others. Then, at page 800, Lord Parker says,— It was strongly urged by counsel for the Crown that all contracts in restraint of trade or commerce which are enforceable at common law, and of combinations in restraint of trade or commerce which if embodied in a contract would be enforceable at common law, must be detrimental to the public within the meaning of the Act, and that those concerned in such contracts or combinations must be taken to have intended this detriment. Their Lordships cannot accept this proposition. On page 801, Lord Parker says,— It was also strongly urged that in the term " detriment to the public " the public means the consuming public, and that the Legislature was not contemplating the interest of any person engaged in the production or distribution of articles of consumption. Their Lordships do not take this view ; but the matter is really of little importance, for in considering the interests of consumers it is impossible to disregard the interests of those who are engaged in the production and distribution. It can never be in the interests of consumers that any article of consumption should cease to be produced and distributed, as it certainly would be unless those engaged in its production or distribution obtained a fair remuneration for the capital employed and the labour expended.

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