A.—s

9

Power, or to take back into its fighting fleet any capital ship destined for destruction by the Treaty. These provisions presumably apply not merely to war between a contracting and a non-contracting Power, but also to a war between two of the contracting Powers themselves. Such are the chief provisions of a treaty which will hold an important place in the history of international relations. Its primary purpose and significance is financial. It is designed to put an end to the ruinous cost of competition in naval armaments. Even before the war this cost was serious, but since the war it has become intolerable. The experiences of the war, and particularly the lessons learned at the Battle of Jutland, have shown the need of very important and very expensive changes in naval architecture in order to give adequate protection against gun-lire, torpedoes, mines, and aerial bombs. To meet these new requirements the British (Government was preparing, before the Washington Conference, to build four new battleships which would have been the most powerful vessels in the world. Each of these would have had a tonnage approaching 50,000 tons, and would have cost about £10,000,000. Similarly, the American Government was at the date of the Conference building no less than fifteen capital ships of the latest type ; while Japan was building, or Was ready to build, no less than fourteen of these formidable engines of destruction. No sooner are such ships built than they begin to grow obsolete by the advance of scientific invention and by the building of more powerful vessels by rival States, and this process of ruinous competitive expenditure goes on indefinitely. The Washington Treaty has put a happy end to it. The Powers have agreed that the, competitive building of battle fleets in time of peace is to cease once for all. Their battle fleets are to be of a fixed size, and to bear an agreed proportion to each other. This agreed proportion might have been based on various considerations. It might have been based on the relative needs of the rival Powers for naval defence and naval strength. Such a scheme of limitation would doubtless have allowed a larger navy to Great Britain than to the United States. Alternatively, the agreed proportion might have been based on the relative financial capacities of the rival Powers. Such a scheme, having regard to the financial position' created by the war, would have allowed a larger navy to the United States than to Great Britain. Neither of these principles was adopted, and" the agreed proportion was based on an approximate estimate of the actual strength of the existing navies at the date of the Conference. The result is an agreement for the, permanent equality of the battle fleets of the British Empire and the United. States, while the battle fleet of Japan is equal to three-fifths of that scale. As 1 have said, the primary importance and significance ol the Naval Treaty is to be found in its financial aspect. It relates to times of peace and to expenditure in preparation for a time of war. It is not an agreement to preserve the peace, nor is it designed for that end. Nations are not prevented or even discouraged from going to war with each other by a mutual and proportionate reduction in the scale of their armaments. Nor would the Treaty, save in respect of certain minor details, have any continuing operation in the event of an outbreak of war. In such a case there is nothing in the Treaty to prevent each belligerent State from fighting at sea with all the instruments which its power and wealth place within its reach. The Treaty in no way limits the weapons with which States may fight and defend themselves ; it merely limits the weapons which they may prepare for that purpose in time of peace. Still less may the Treaty be properly regarded as a step towards total naval disarmament. No such impracticable idealism inspired the Washington Conference. The agreement of the great Powers to destroy a large part of their existing fleets and to impose strict limitations on the building of new ships-of-war is not a confession of wrongdoing or a promise of amendment. It has no ethical significance. The right and the duty of every State to make proper provision for its national safety by land and sea remain as undisputed and as imperative as before. The Washington Naval Treaty doubtless has behind it, more especially in the United States of America, a considerable volume of pacifist public opinion which regards that Treaty as a step towards the total repudiation of any such right or duty of national defence, and as a practical recognition of the wrongfulness of military and naval preparations in time of peace. It is not on any such ground as this.

2—A. 5.