A.—7

34

In the Act it was proposed to fix the limits within which the Imperial Reserve Force might be employed on Imperial service by subsequent Act or by resolution of both Houses of the colonial Legislature. It is now proposed that these limits should be defined by the Imperial and colonial Governments at the time such reserve is formed, and should be in accordance with any law in force for the time being respecting the same. It is no doubt necessary that the individual enrolling in the Imperial Reserve should be aware before enrolment of the extent of his liabilities ; but a geographical definition of the limits of service in a public Act will be attended with difficulty, and possibly open to objection. It would be preferable that enrolment in the Imperial Reserve should simply be for general service in the event of war with one or more European Powers. These conditions appear to be sufficiently definite for the individual, while they leave the mode of employment of the force to be settled, as already explained, between the Imperial and colonial Governments. 6. The concluding sentence of the notice of motion lays down that the cost of maintaining and equipping the Imperial Reserve Force is to be defrayed in such proportion and manner as may be agreed upon between the Imperial and colonial Governments. The New Zealand Act of 1900 was silent on this point, but it was implied that no expenditure from the British Exchequer in time of peace was involved'—a course which certainly avoided questions of divided responsibility and some other difficulties. Although the cost of the present scheme is very small compared with that already borne by the taxpayer of the United Kingdom for the defence of the Empire, the principle of Imperial subsidies for the maintenance in peace of colonial troops is a new one, and the matter is one that cannot be dealt with apart from the general question of the incidence of the cost of Imperial defence, which, the Colonial Defence Committee understand, is to be discussed in its most important aspect—viz., that of naval expenditure—at the Conference of Colonial Premiers. The Committee therefore confine themselves to expressing the hope that the present scheme, of which the initiative is due to the Government of one of the self-govern-ing colonies, will not be allowed by those colonies to fall through on financial grounds. The cost involved is small in proportion to the direct advantage to the colonies themselves of having at hand troops organized and available at short notice for expeditionary service, while the possession of such forces, which it would be impossible to supply by means of extemporised effort, would enable them to take an active share in protecting and securing their own interests, which are inseparable from the general interests of the Empire. (Signed) J. E. Clauson, Secretary, 13th June, 1902. Colonial Defence Committee.

APPENDIX. The Organization of Colonial Troops for Imperial Service. [By Lieut.-Colonel E. A. Altham, C.M.G., Assistant Quartermaster-General at Headquarters.] General Principles. Prior to the outbreak of the war in South Africa, so far as any general scheme for the defence of the Empire as a whole had been considered, it was assumed that the military responsibilities of our great self-governing colonies were limited to local defence, and that the entire burden of furnishing reinforcements to any portion of the Empire against which a hostile attack in force might be directed must fall on the regular army. There may possibly have been some pious hope that in time of need the colonies might rally to the Mother-country, but no definite arrangements were made, nor were inquiries even on foot, as to whether such aid might be expected, and, if so, iv what strength. Indeed, the necessity for it was by no means realised and its reliability was doubted. 2. The experience of the South African war has, however, established two important facts : — (a.) That the regular army, as organized before the war, was by itself inadequate in strength to the military needs of the Empire. (b.) That the self-governing colonies are willing and able to assist in making good some part of the deficiency in military strength which the war has disclosed. 3. The present war has, in fact, been a valuable illustration of the necessity for organizing the defence of the Empire against far graver contingencies; and it is essential to preparation that it should be definitely known in peace what forces can be relied on in war. Success in a great war can only be insured by a continuous policy of careful organization and preparation in peace. 4. For these reasons the definite organization in peace of the assistance which the colonies would be willing and able to place at the disposal of the Imperial military authorities in war is a vital matter. 5. Before approaching the solution of this question it is desirable to recapitulate briefly certain general principles : — (a.) The main burden of a great struggle between the British Empire and one or more States of European race or descent must be borne by the white subjects of the King. (b.) Military contingents, therefore, of other than men of European descent need not be considered with regard to this particular problem, although the great value of the Indian army and the usefulness of the African and other Native forces are fully recognised. (c.) The white population of all colonies, other than the great self-governing colonies, being very small their power of contributing substantial aid to the Empire would be insignificant, and would for practical purposes only suffice for assistance in local