I.—2a.

36

election of a Licensing Committee, including charges for printing and advertising the necessary notices relating thereto, shall be paid by the controlling local authority oT the district. The subsections (a) (b) and (c) of section 16 provide for contributions by other local authorities towards the expenses; and subsection [d) provides that the controlling local authority may recover such contributions from those other local authorities. By the Act of 1893 the electoral districts for the time being for election of members of the House of Representatives are to be the'licensing districts. The term " controlling local authority," as used in the said section 16, is explained by reference to the 9th section of the Act of 1893, for thereby, where there are more'local authorities than one having jurisdiction within a licensing district, the Governor is to appoint which of such local authorities is to be deemed to have authority throughout the licensing district. That section provides that the local authority so appointed is to " make all necessary appointments and do all things required for the conduct of elections and for the general administration of the Licensing Acts within the licensing districts." Section 10 of the Act of 1893 (which section is repealed by subsection (2) of section 16 of the Act of 1895) contains a provision with the same object as section 16 of the Act of 1895. That section, however, provides that all costs and expenses incident to the election of the Licensing Committee, "and of the general administration of the Act," should be paid by the local authority having jurisdiction throughout the district. Section 10 had a somewhat similar provision as to contributions by the other local authorities and the recovery thereof by the local authority appointed to have jurisdiction throughout the district. The term " local authority " is interpreted by the Interpretation Act of 1888, section 4, to be the Council or other governing body of a county, city, town, &c, and from that interpretation, and by reference also to subsection (4) of section 5 of the Act of 1882 (repealed by the Act of 1893) and subsection (8) of section 7of the Act of 1893, and section 109 of the Act of 1881, it seems clear that the term " local authority " means such one of such governing bodies —that is, County Council, Road Boards, &c.—as the Governor appoints for the particular licensing district. In this case the Governor has appointed the County of Wairarapa South to be the local authority to have jurisdiction throughout the licensing district. In " The Counties Act, 1886," a distinction is recognised between the "local authority," meaning the Council, and the corporate body of inhabitants of the county. The incorporated body of inhabitants is, no doubt, by Act, the Council, and the Council is to exercise all powers given to the incorporated body. All moneys received by the Council under any Act are to be paid to the county fund. The license-fees are, by " The Licensing Act, 1881," section 109, to be paid to the treasurer of the county, and form part of the county fund. On the whole, therefore, I think that if any contract, or debt, or pecuniary liability has been created by section 16 of the Act of 1895, it is the contract or debt of the incorporated inhabitants of the county, and not of the members of the Council. The Council are substantially the agents of the inhabitants ; and though the local authority—that is, the Council —is mentioned as the body to pay, what is meant is that body as agents for the incorporated body. But in my opinion section 16 of the Act of 1895 does not give to the plaintiff a right of action against either the Council or the county for the recovery of costs and expenses incident to the election of the Committee, including the costs and expenses of advertising necessary notices. By the Act of 1893, section 7, Committees are to be elected in the manner for the time being by law provided for election of members of the House of Representatives. The Returning Officer for the House of Representatives elections is to be the Returning Officer for Licensing Committee elections. The plaintiff appears to be the Returning Officer. It is also clear that he has to give certain notices (see section 19 of the Act of 1895; subsection (4) of section 7of the Act of 1893 ; and, generally, subsection (3) of section 7). Returning Officers for the House of Representatives elections have to advertise "nominations and withdrawals," to cause ballot-papers to be printed, and provide polling-booths, and appoint clerks and a deputy at each booth, and other things. It is not enacted that the Returning Officer, as to the House of Representatives elections, is, in the first instance, to pay the expenses of these things, and recover or he recouped them ; though, no doubt, expense must be incurred. The Governor may authorise and direct all such moneys as may be required for paying expenses lawfully incurred, or to be incurred, to be paid out of the Public Account. The Returning Officers are to be paid such salaries as are to be appropriated by the General Assembly. I see no reason to think that the intention was that in the election for the House of Representatives Returning Officers were to enter into contracts or otherwise to render themselves personally liable in respect of any matter which could only be dono at expense. The person doing the act on faith of being paid must look, apparently, elsewhere. The Act of 1895 provides that the cost and expense of taking the "licensing polls are to be paid out of moneys to be appropriated by Parliament for the purpose." The Returning Officer, as regards such licensing poll, would not enter into any contracts, or render himself personally liable for these expenses. Nor do I think that it was intended he should with regard to Licensing Committee elections. Though the Returning Officer is to provide polling-booths and appoint deputies and poll-clerks, &c, for their Licensing Committee elections, the Legislature has not provided that he is to pay for these things or recover the expenditure from the controlling authority; though it does provide that the costs of such matters are to be paid by that authority. The provision seems to put the Returning Officer, with regard to these elections, in the same position as he is with regard to elections for the House of Representatives. What that is in practice I do not know : but the Legislature has not said, even as to the House of Representatives elections, that he is to pay out what he thinks fit, and recover his expenditure. He is probably, in practice, under the control of the Executive Government, and the Exeoutive Government pays direct to those whom the Returning Officer nominally employs, and to those who provide what is required. lam unable to conclude that the 16th section of the Act of 1895 does give to the plaintiff any right of action against either the County Council or the corporate body for the payment to him of the costs and expenses incident to the election of the Committee. A breach of a statutory duty, whether expressly or impliedly, to pay money to an individual or to a corporate body may give that individual or body a right to be enforced by action ; but here the statute does not point out the plaintiff as a person to whom any such duty is owing. With regard to members of the Committee in respect of their expenses of attending meetings, their cases may be different. There is but little authority to be found in the question as to what language in a statute gives such a right of action. In Hopkins v. Mayor of Swansea (8 L.J. Ex. 121), Lord Abinger mentions with approval a dictum by Lord Holt in Ewen v. Jones (6 Mod. 26), as cited in Comyn's Digest, title " Debt " (A. 9). In Comyn it is stated, " Debt lies upon any statute which gives an advantage to another for the receiving of it." The dictum of Lord Holt there referred to is, " For whenever a statute enacts anything or prohibits anything for the advantage of any person, that person shall have remedy to recover the advantage given him, or to have satisfaction for the injury done him, by law, contrary to the same statute, for it would be a fine thing to make a law for which one has a right, but no remedy but in equity." In Addison v. The Mayor of Preston (21 L.J., N.S., C.P. 146) it was held that the action would not lie for salary in arrear, on the ground that the mere appointment under a statutory power to appoint did not give a right of action against the corporate body, though the statute provides that salaries should be paid by the treasurer out of the borough fund. The reason of the decision was that if judgment were obtained in an action other property of the corporation beyond the borough fund might be attached; and therefore, as Jervis, C.J., in effect, says, "The officer must resort to his prerogative remedy" to reach the particular fund out. of which the Legislature had provided the salary should be paid. The Court refuses a prerogative writ of mandamus where there is another sufficient remedy. Therefore the cases where that writ has been granted to compel the payment of moneys payable by virtue of a statute by one corporate body to another, or by a corporate body to an individual, are to some extent authorities that in such a case an action does not lie. In re Birmingham (10 Q. 8.), the prerogative writ was granted to the corporate body to pay to another corporate body expenses which a statute had provided should be paid by the governing body of the other. It was not in these cases suggested by the Court or otherwise that in such cases an action would have lain. It is to be observed that in these cases the writ was addressed to the corporate body, though the statute imposed the duty on the governing body ; and also that, though the body to pay and the body to receive were expressly mentioned, an action was not brought, and the writ was not refused, on the ground that an action might have been brought.