31

A.-6.

The Managers, being unable to agree upon the question j whether clause 3 of the Bill is or is not an appropriation j clause, recommend that the amendments made in the said j clause be omitted; and that the Ministry should advise His Excellency tho Governor to avail himself of the powers conferred by the 56th section of the Constitution Act by transmitting the following amendments for the consideration of the Legislative Council and House of Representatives, instead of those that the Legislative Council proposed : — " Provided always that no contract shall be entered into for the construction of any railway or any portion thereof unless— " (1.) In the ease of each line to be constructed plans and estimates shall be laid before the Governor in Council, with a certificate from the Chief Engineer that the route chosen for the railway is the best available one. " (2.) Such plans and estimates be approved by the Governor in Council. " And it is hereby declared that, within thirty days after the commencement of the then next session of Parliament, such plans and estimates shall be laid before both Houses of Parliament, together with a copy of any contract which may have been entered into with respect to the railway to which such plans and estimates refer." I now move the following resolution : That, upon considering the report of the Managers for the Legislative Council of the second Free Conference on the Railways Construction Bill, this Council entirely approve the course which their said Managers have taken, and agree to the said report; and —relying upon the assurance given by the House of Representatives, through its Managers, that, upon His Excellency the Governor being advised to send down a message recommending the amendment to which the Conference have agreed, the House of Representatives will concur in the same — the Council will not insist further upon their amendments in clause 3 of the said Bill. The Hon. Colonel Whitmobje.— On behalf of the Government, I agree that that advice shall be given.

APPENDIX No. 8. Mr. Speakbk.—l think if the Premier had known the view I entertain on this point he would scarcely have appealed to me on the subject; but, an appeal having been made, I may state at once that I hold a counter-opinion to that entertained by the honourable gentleman. I had occasion to look into a matter of this nature yesterday. Being desirous of supporting views taken by the honourable member for Wanganui (Mr. Ballance) in reference to the Bill that was before the House for the consolidation of the law relating to the privileges of Parliament, I referred to the latest work on the subject. lam quite aware that there are numerous references to the point in May, but I will not allude to them in the first instance, but will read to the House a few extracts from the latest work on Parliamentary Government in the British Colonies, by Mr. Todd, published last year. Alluding to the fact that in the Colonies of Canada and New Zealand certain Acts were passed respecting the powers and privileges of the two branches of their Legislatures, he says, speaking of the general powers of the two Houses of Parliament, the constitutional powers of the Upper House are defined as " established for the sole purpose of fulfilling therein ' the legislative functions of the House of Lords,' whilst the Lower House exercises within the same sphere ' the rights and powers of the House of Commons.'" (P. 475.) Alluding, then, to the circumstance that the Imperial Parliament in the British North America Act pointed to the House of Commons " as being equally the example to the Senate or Legislative Council, as well as to the Representative Assembly, of the proper extent and limitation of the privileges, immunities, and powers to be defined on behalf of each House by a

j statute to be locally passed for that purpose," he j says, — But neither the New Zealand nor the Canadian laws can be so construed as to warrant a claim by the Upper Chambers of either Parliament to " equal rights in matters of aid and supply, to those which are enjoyed and exercised by the Commons' House of Parliament of the United Kingdom ; " for such a claim, if insisted upon, would, to a great extent, derogate from and diminish the constitutional rights of the representative Chamber." (Pp. 476-7.) And, then, remarking upon the relative powers of the two branches of the Legislature, he says constitutional practice— . . . . justifies the claim of the Imperial House of Commons (and, by parity of reasoning, of all representative Chambers framed after the model of that House) to a general control over public revenue and expenditure—a control which has been authoritatively defined in the following words: " All aids and supplies, and aids to his Majesty in Parliament, are the sole gift of the Commons; and it is the'undoubted and sole right of the Commons to direct, limit, and appoint in such Bills the ends, purposes, considerations, conditions, limitations, and qualifications of such grants, which ought not to be changed or altered by the House of Lords." This parliamentary principle, moreover, has been generally, if not universally, admitted in all selfgoverning British colonies by the adoption in both Legislative Chambers of Standing Orders which refer to the rules, forms, usages, and practices of the Imperial Parliament as the guide to each House in cases unprovided for by local regulations. Then, referring to the dispute that occurred in 1871 between this House and the Legislative Council as to the statutory right of the Legislative Council to amend Bills of Supply, he quotes the opinion of the Law Officers of the Crown, Coleridge and Jessel, given upon a case stated, as follows: — (1.) We are of opinion that, independently of " The Parliamentary Privileges Act, 1865," the Legislative Council was not constitutionally justified in amending " The Payments to Provinces Bill, 1871," by striking out the disputed clause 28. We think the Bill was a money Bill, and such a Bill as the House of Commons in this country would not have allowed to be amended by the House of Lords; and that the limitation proposed to be placed by the Legislative Council on Bills of aid or supply is too narrow, and would not bo recognized by the House of Commons in England. (2.) We are of opinion that "The Parliamentary Privileges Act, 1865," does not confer on the Legislative Council any larger powers in this respect than it would otherwise have possessed. We think that this Act was not intended to affect, and did not affect, the legislative powers of either House of the Legislature in New Zealand. (3.) We think that the claims of the House of Representatives contained in the message to the Legislative Council are well founded, subject, of course, to the limitation that the Legislative Council have a perfect right to reject any Bill passed by the House of Representatives having for its object to vary the management or appropriation of money prescribed by an Act of the previous session. (Pp. 478-9.) Which opinion is characterized by Todd in these words:— This opinion is a direct and unimpeachable settlement of the point at issue. . . . The relative rights of both Houses in matters of aid and supply must be determined in every British eclony by the ascertained rules of British constitutional practice. The local Acts upon the subject must be construed in conformity with that practice wherever the Imperial policy is the accepted guide. A claim on the part of a colonial Upper Chamber to the possession of equal rights with the Assembly to amend a money Bill would be inconsistent with the ancient and undeniable control which is exercised by tho Imperial House of Commons over all financial measures. It is therefore impossible to concede to an Upper Chamber the right of amending a money Bill upon the mere authority of a local statute, when such Act admits of being construed in accordance with the wellunderstood laws and usages of the Imperial Parliament. The point has been suggested to me whether this Bill comes within what is understood to be a money Bill. To my mind this Bill deals with nothing but money, and therefore I am of opinion that, as a whole, it is a money Bill. In the _nd clause it says that, after the passing of this Bill, pensions are not to be paid except in accordance with provisions therein contained, one provision