13

A.—6.

by itself. I refer to the assistance which this colony and the trade of this colony may expect to receive from the Imperial navy in the event of war occurring between England and one of the Great European Bowers. The area included within your Excellency's command is very extensive, and the numerical strength of your squadron is not large for the duties which, under such an eventuality as war, they would be called upon to perform, while the requirements of the more distant parts of your command might further reduce the strength of the squadron in the immediate vicinity of Australia, and, moreover, the first line of defence may lead to the concentration of your squadron at some distance from the shores of these colonies. Under these circumstances, I should be extremely obliged for your Excellency's views upon the general question, that I may submit the same to my Ministers for consideration. The principal points to which I would venture to draw your Excellency's attention are —(1) the importance of having a certain number of vessels which could not be withdrawn from Australian waters; (2) that? these vessels shall be the best of their several classes; (3) that the officers and men shall be acquainted with and well-drilled in the knowledge of the most modern gunnery and torpedo practice; (4) That during war, while placed under the command of the senior naval officer on the station, their first duty shall be the protection of the Australian Colonies. Your Excellency will also, perhaps, favour me with your views with respect to the number of vessels that, in your opinion, would suffice for this special service. In seeking for your Excellency's advice on this important subject, I trust it may not be understood as intended to lessen in any way the Imperial responsibility for the external defence of these colonies or for the protection of the commercial trade of the Empire in Australasian waters, in connection with which Imperial and colonial interests are both so closely and largely concerned; but that anything done in the direction I have indicated should be in addition to, and not in exchange for, any protection now provided for these purposes by Her Majesty's squadron in these seas. I have, &c, His Excellency Bear-Admiral Tryon, C.8., &c, Heney B. Loch. Commander-in-Chief, Australia.

Bear-Admiral Teyon, C.8., to the Governor, Victoria. Sib,— H.M.S. " Nelson," at Melbourne, 27th March, 1885. In reply to your Excellency's letter, received on the 24th instant, a copy of which I attach, I beg to forward a reply in the form of a memorandum. I have, &c, G. Tryon, Bear-Admiral and Commander-in-Chief. His Excellency Sir Henry Loch, K.C.8., &c, Governor and Commander-in-Chief, Victoria.

Memoeandum. Considerations of defence naturally involve an estimate of what they are to be prepared against. History is apt to repeat itself: squadrons and fleets have escaped the most vigilant admirals, and the most skilful strategists failed in days of old so to order our fleets as to prevent this. Since those days the composition of the navies of the world has greatly altered, and at this time it is far easier for an admiral to avoid notice and conceal destination. It is possible that an attack may be delivered by a small squadron of ironclads of a type that does not entitle them to a place in the first rank : they would be very formidable if employed to attack our colonies. And still more possibly a hostile squadron might contain vessels of the fast partially-armoured class that are now much in fashion, and the construction of them is on the increase. It is well to consider what such a squadron could do, supposing it had arrived off our coast, having avoided detection, the admiral in command, deceived by false reports, gone to New Zealand, with the telegraphs cut. If there is a determination to resist, such a squadron, even should it force a channel or the line of defence, unless it is accompanied by a considerable land force, cannot do much against a large population if there is a resolute determination to resist at all costs. It could effect a certain amount of harm by bombardment; but to such towns as' Melbourne and Sydney the injury would not be very great, even if the fleet expended all its ammunition. The more lasting effect would be the destruction of trade, and with it the recuperative power of the country, for years. If, in lieu of resistance, there was hesitation, followed by a decision to yield—a condition I hardly can contemplate—trade and commerce will be equally destroyed ; and if there is one thing more certain than another, it is that demands, if yielded to, would have a more disastrous effect on the welfare of the country than ever could be produced by the heaviest bombardment. History is replete with instances of the successful resistances that can be improvised by large towns against even a very considerable force. * The destruction of trade and commerce, and, with it, the infliction of long and lasting injury, could be also effected by an enemy who sent fast cruisers off our ports to capture our vessels. To render an attack from the first-named futile, and, if possible, to render the task so improbable of success that no one would contemplate the undertaking, a local defence is called into existence ; but, while it is not very costly to protect our homes with the aid of local forces, they do not, and they could not, help to drive off cruisers such as could prey upon us. We must, therefore, provide the means whereby they may be captured, if possible ; if not, at all events, driven off our own coasts.