NEW ZEALAND TO THE SECRETARY OE STATE.

13

A.—No. 1:

execution of martial law, so that the question of the Governor's responsibility for acts done in exercise of martial law was raised. The indictment contained twenty counts. It is not easy in a few words to convey the rule laid down. It is sufficient for the present purpose to sa}', that if the Governor, in what he himself does or orders, is actuated by honesty of purpose, and there appears to him to be, —exercising his judgment conscientiously, —cause under the circumstances for what he does or orders, he commits no offence. He is not responsible for mere errors of judgment; and as to acts done under his orders, but in excess of his orders and in excess of what is reasonable, the Governor is not responsible. The Lord Chief Justice assented to so much of the charge of Mr. Justice Blackburn. Referring to the charge of the Puisne Judge, ho said as follows : —" There was a proposition of law which seemed " to be sufficient for the guidance of tho Jury, and which we understood was to form (if I may so " express myself) the basis of the charge, on which proposition we were all agreed, namely, that " assuming the Governor of a Colony had, by virtue of authority delegated to him by the Crown or " conferred upou him by local legislation, the power to put martial law in force, all that could be required " of him, so far as affects his responsibility in a Court of Criminal Law, was, that in judging of the " necessity which it is admitted on all hands affords the sole justification for resorting to martial law, " either for putting this exceptional law in force or prolonging its duration, he should not only act " with an honest intention to discharge a public duty, but should bring to the consideration of the " course to be pursued, the careful, conscientious, and considerate judgment which may reasonably be " expected from one invested with authority, and which, in our opinion, a Governor so circumstanced " is bound to exercise before he places the Queen's subjects committed to his government beyond the " pale of the protection of the law. Having done this, he would not be liable for error of judgment, " and still less for excesses or irregularities committed by subordinates whom ho is under the necessity "of employing, if committed without his sanction or knowledge. Eurthermore, wo consider that a " Governor sworn to execute the laws of a Colony, if advised, by those competent to advise him, that " those laws justify him in proclaiming martial law in the manner in which Governor Eyre understood " it, cannot be held criminally responsible if the circumstances call for its exercise, and though it " should afterwards turn out that the received opinion as to the law was erroneous. On the other " hand, in the absence of such careful and conscientious exercise of judgment, mere honesty of " intention would be no excuse for a reckless, precipitate, and inconsiderate exercise of so formidable " a power, still less for any abuse of it in regard to the lives and persons of Her Majesty's subjects, or " in the application of immoderate severity in excess of what the exigencies of the occasion impcra- " lively called for. Neither could the continuance of martial law be excused, even as regards criminal " responsibility, when the necessity which can alone justify it had ceased by the entire suppression of " all insurrection, either for the purpose of punishing those who were suspected of having been " concerned in it, or of striking terror into the minds of men for the time to come." With reference to this subject, namely, the responsibility of Governors for their acts or orders, when such acts arc done or orders are given under the advice of their Ministers, tho fact that such advice is given, though it does not of itself exculpate a Governor, yet is no doubt a most material matter for consideration, when the question is whether the Governor acted with honesty of intention and with reasonable cause. An illustration of this principle may be found in the action for malicious arrest or prosecution: if he who causes the arrest of another on some criminal charge is not actuated by malice in fact, and has reasonable cause for what he did, he is excused, though in fact he who suffered the injury by having been arrested on tho charge is in fact entirely innocent. Information received and believed is good evidence in support of the allegation that the act done was not without reasonable cause. It is to be observed that the Chief Justice says that a Governor, if advised by competent authority that the laws of his Colony justify him in proclaiming martial law, would not be responsible if such advice were in fact erroneous. The Chief Justice probably means that the fact that such advice was given was, in the absence of other evidence, sufficient to found an honest belief that he had legal power to proclaim martial law, and from that honest belief it would result that he would not be responsible for the errors in law.

No. 5. Copy of a DESPATCH from Governor Sir G. E. Bowen, G.C.M.G., to the Right Hon. Earl Granville, K.G. (No. 74.) Government House, Wellington, My Lord, — New Zealand, 25th June, 1869. I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's Despatch No. 43, of the 20th April ultimo, commenting —(on the authority of statements which have appeared in a letter addressed to a provincial newspaper published in this Colony) —on certain alleged acts of the Hon. J. C. Richmond, Minister for Native Affairs, while accompanying the Colonial Eorces at the capture of the rebel stronghold at Ngatapa. 2. The first intimation of charges of this nature having been made, reached me, and also Mr. Richmond, through your Despatch now under acknowledges