A.—No 5

addressed to me by Sir D. Cameron, which I think he is likely to transmit to the Secretary of State for "War. This letter contains very serious misrepresentations which I am desirous should be corrected, and I beg you will therefore be good enough to bring them under the notice of Earl de Grey. 2. Sir D. Cameron says : —" If however the continued occupation of that position by the rebels really involves all the serious consequences represented by your Excellency, which I am very far from believing, your Excellency must bo held responsible for them. For in the first place, the three best months of the year for operations in the field were lost, in consequence of the postponement of hostilities by your Excellency until after the meeting of the General Assembly, a delay which would seem to have been unnecessary, if you had at that time determined under any circumstances, and whoever your Excellency's Eesponsible Advisers might be, to transfer the war to "Wauganui for the confiscation and occupation of territory; and in the next place, your Excellency's instructions to occupy the sea coast between Taranaki and Wanganui rendered an attack on the position impossible unless I had immediately abandoned the posts established in pursuance of those instructions. It was not until the middle of May, after having more than once applied to your Excellency for instructions, and after having been informed by your Excellency in reply that the services of the regular troops were not likely to be required, that I received your sanction to abandon any of the posts, but it was then too late. But for these circumstances the "Weraroa position might ere now have been in our possession." 3. In the first place, Sir D. Cameron was well aware that the war was not transfered to "Wanganui for the confiscation and occupation of territory, but that the object was the protection of British settlements, and the punishment of tribes who had been guilty of serious crimes, and were constantly fomenting disturbances in the country. 4. In the second place, Sir D. Cameron was perfectly aware that I did not postpone hostilities in the Taranaki country until after the meeting of the General Assembly, and that the delay in those operations was not unnecessary, and that it had nothing whatever to do with the question of who my Eesponsible Advisers might be. The question that I wished not to decide without the advice of a Eesponsible Ministry was, what the extent of those operations should be, as the Colony would to a great extent be liable for the cost of those operations. I was anxious that their extent, and the precise object to be aimed at should bo settled with the advice and concurrence of a Eesponsible Ministry. But this question of acting under responsible advice was in no way connected with that of whether or not operations were to be undertaken between Taranaki and "Wanganui, which had long previously openly been determined on ; or with the delay in September in carrying on those operations, which arose from a different cause. Sir D. Cameron knew that I had long previously determined that those operations should be undertaken, that the first preparations for them began in August, 1864, or early in September, and that the interruption in them from that date to the 16th of December arose from a great peril which suddenly and unexpectedly threatened Auckland. This lam fortunately able to show from Earl de Grey having been kind enough to send me a copy of the report of the Deputy-Quartermaster-General in New Zealand from the Bth of September to the 7th November, 1864, from which I extract the following statements: — " Head Quarters, Auckland, 7th November, 1864. "Immediately after the despatch of the last journal (7 th September) a very unexpected occurrence took place —the escape (on 10th September) of the whole of the Maori prisoners from Kawau, which has had a very important bearing on the political aspects, and may possibly have a serious effect on the military operations of the war. # # # # # * * * " Happily as yet no disaster has resulted from the escape of the prisoners, but as they are still at large, and have established themselves (though with professedly peaceable intentions) on. the Omaha Mountain, where they have been joined by a few other Natives, it is still quite impossible to conjecture what the result will be. "It is however satisfactory that the Northern Natives have as a rule disowned any sympathies with the escaped prisoners. " The country between New Plymouth (Taranaki) and "Wanganui was at the date of my last report the contemplated scene of the next operations to be undertaken. The escape of the prisoners, and the possible complications it might lead to in the North, would of course reduce the number of troops to be available for operations in the South, and might possibly, when the time for action came, forbid the removal of any troops whatever from the Province (Auckland). " Preparations for the intended move of troops to "Wanganui and Taranaki were commenced in the way of Commissariat arrangements, and the embarkation of the first detachment of the Transport Corps/when further progress was ordered to be suspended. 1 * 1* # # r # # # * " Now though the time favorable for active operations has arrived none can be undertaken for a month; but until the danger in the North has passed the large number of troops at present at Otahuhu, near Auckland, though inactive, are in the most convenient position, and ready for any emergency that may arise." 5. I feel satisfied that the foregoing statements made by the Doputy-Quartermaster-General from Head Quarters must satisfy everyone that Sir D. Cameron not only knew, at least in August, 1864, that I had determined that operations should be undertaken in the country between Taranaki and "Wanganui, but that the movement of troops for that purpose was commenced before the 7th September, 1864, when the operations were interrupted by a serious danger which suddenly and unexpectedly threatened the Province of Auckland. 6. But in truth Sir D. Cameron's own letters also conclusively shew that the delay of three months in the intended operations had nothing whatever to do with his not attacking the "Weraroa Pa, Many passages could be cited to prove this, but one will probably suffice taken from his letter to me of the 17th of March: — " On that occasion I explained to you why I had refrained from attacking the "Weraroa Pa when n

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ZEALAKD TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE.