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an idea of collective national independence, than a desire of the different sections of population to be let alone as they are, to manage their own affairs after their own fashion : and if, as between them and us, they should achieve the independence they aim at, its immediate result would be a struggle for supremacy and intertribal hostilities among the several sections of which the confederacy is made up. They further imagine, that while they suffer from interference with their liberty of action on the part of our government, they derive no substantial benefit or protection from its paternal care. The Government, they say, does not suppress crime exoepfc where a European is concerned. On the other hini, they point to the result of their own rude efforts at the establishment of institutions, including in many places judicial tribunals, as having already produced practical fruits of better government than our institutions, as hitherto worked, have conferred on them. How the Runanga has worked, see Mr. Fenton's journal of 1857, the Report of the Waikato committee and letter from Waikato settler, s appended. In addition to this desire for law, order, and social elevation, jealousy on the subject of their lands has been a very strong motive in creating this movement. They are dissatisfied with the present system of land purchasing, and suspicious that the sole aim of the Government is to induce them to sell their land ; and whatsoever may be the merits of the Taranaki case, there is no doubt it has contributed very greatly to the growth of this feeling. The foundations of the King movement may then be summmed up in a few words. They are a desire for good Government, a conviction that our rule does not give it, jealousy on the land question, and certain crude ideas of independence. Ministers are persuaded, that had the task of patiently framing and embodying suitable institutions (commenced some four or five years ago) been persevered in, shape might have been given to the natives' confused ideas, and their acquiescence secured in some general system of government which might have strengthened the bonds of union between the two races. The lapse of time, and still more the Taranaki war, have not only rendered this task much more difficult in itself, but created or developed an inflammable and dangerous temperament in the native mind which a very small spark may at any moment cause to break out into a blaze. This, however, only makes the task more difficult, not altogether hopeless. The Natives of New Zealand are, as Sir George Grey is aware, a deliberative people. Deeply impressed with the value of the King movement, which embodies at present the one political idea of the race, they are not likely to abandon it, unless some more attractive and at the same time solid substitute is offered. To give practical effect to what is good in that movement, by institutions adapted to their habits and capacities, while at the same time we persuade the natives to reject whatever in it may be antagonistic to the authority of the British Government, ought to be our aim. To effect this, timejand forbearance and the personal action of the highest officers of the Government, are necessary conditions. It has been argued that direct communication between the Governor and the Waikatos at this crisis would not be consistent with the dignity of the Crown, that no further overtures on our side can be made, that the terms'already offered must be unconditionally accepted, or that submission must be enforced with the sword.

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If we were dealing with a civilized people, long accustomed to the usages of great nations, and versed in the rules of international law, such arguments might have weight. But when we consider that the New Zealanders are a people barely emerged from barbarism, and groping their way from darkness to light, for the most part without help, it is not towards them that such an argument should be used. Nor should it be forgotten that they are British subjects: a character which imposes upon us the obligation to win, rather than to enforce, their allegiance. They have of late years attained a remarkable appreciation of the advantages of law and order, as administered and maintained by themselves. It wants but little more to induce them to accept at our hands a better law, and more perfect order; not confined solely to their own social wants, but involving the proper regulation of those relations which spring from the juxtaposition of the two races, and which can only be harmonized under the rule of one supreme head extending its protection equally to both.

A resort to force in the case of the Waikatos will almost to a certainty involve all the tribes South of Auckland. " The first shot fired in Waikato," Governor Browne said on a late occasion, " will be the signal for a general rising." On the other hand, many of the tribes alluded to, who would make common cause with the Waikatos iv case of war, are far from being so wedded to the King movement as not to be open to be detached from it by persuasion and argument. Only a small part of the natives have been in overt insurrection ; except the Ngatiruanuis and Taranakis, no whole tribe has been committed. Such of the Waikatos as took part in the Taranaki war, did so on their own individual responsibility, and not as the result of any tribal action. Admitting that these individuals and the Ngatiruanui and Taranaki tribes have placed themselves in a position to justify severe treatment, why should the larger part of the Waikatos, and all the other tribes who have taken no part in the insurrection, be included in the same sentence ? The object of Ministers in this memorandum is not so much to suggest to Sir George Grey the course to be pursued, as to put him in possession of the facts of the case at the present moment. It may not, however, be out of place if they indicate certain courses of action which might suggest themselves as those to be pursued. Ist. There is the assumption of a position resting on the demand of unconditional submission to the terms already offered, or to any other of a similar character. It will be inferred from what has already been said, that this is not recommended. 3rd. The Governor might place himself in direct communication with the insurgent natives, condone them for their past conduct, give them assurance of a desire to meet their wishes, and yield whatever they might ask. This is a course not to be recommended. 3rd. The Governor might instal himself at Auckland without making any direct overture to the insurgents, It is pretty certain that before long he would be visited by many of the most

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