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in a very open roadstead. A mere descent on the country and a early return would be of little or no effect. It would be necessary to occupy positions for some months at least. No supplies are to be obtained in the district, and the expense, risk, and difficulties, of importing everything requiretl would be very great. In all probability, the result would be very unsitisfactory. The enemy certainly would not meet the troops in the field, so that a serious impression could not be made on them : but the latter would be harassed by marching and watching in a broken and difficult country in a wet and cold winter. No doubt such an expeditiem would much harass the enemy too : but as no decided success could be reasonably hoped for, we should simply by our want of such lose a certain amount of prestige, and inspite them with some confidence and feeing of security. And, lastly, if we should meet with an unexpected success, and bring the Southern trihes into submission, it would not substantially affect the great question at issue between the Queen's Government and the Natives, viz,, the sovereignty of these islands. On the other hand, the Waikatos are the backbone of the resistance to the Queen's authority. Their country is much more easy of access—the most so probably of any in New Zealand—and is not so difficult to traverse when in it. Enforcing submission from them would, in all probability, secure, without much further trouble, the pacification of the whole country. The only remaining matter to be considered is the course of proceeding with the Waikatos. Under the present circumstances, it is indispensible that the terms upon which their submission to the Queen's authority will be accepted, should be distinctly stated to them and a reasonable time afforded for the widely scattered branches of the tribe to deliberate and resolve. There is a hope th it they may be willing to submit, and every consideration would dictate that a reasonable chance of this should not be thrown away. I consider that this would be the view of the Imperial Government, whose wishes we are bound, as far as possible, to consult ; and it would certainly save both serious expense and bloodshed. If the terns offered be not submitted to, force would become absolutely necessary, unless Maori rule be submitted to. The reduction of the Waikatos to submission by force would be an undertaking of magnitude, and involve consequences which cannot at present be wholly foreseen. It is to be feared that an attack on Waikato would place every settlement in the Northern Island in danger, and some provision should be made against this very probable contingency. It is, of course, out of the question to expect that outlying homesteads and settlements can be garrisoned and protected : but the centres of population in each Province, viz., the towns of Auckland, New Plymouth, Wanganui, Wellington, and Napier, should be placed in a position to resist any attack from the tribes in the immediate neighbourhood, and thus become places of refuge for the inhabitants of the surrounding districts. An attack on Waikato must not be an invasion only. An occupation of the country for at least some months would be absolutely essential. Anything short of this would afford no hope of securing their submission. A mere raid into the country would merely enrage without subduing them,and would no doubt produce a great amount of mischief; and little or no advantage would result. Keeping in view this object, it is a question for the General whether he possesses sufficient force for the purpose, and whether the time of year is suitable for the commencement of such operations. In considering this question, it must not be overlooked that we are now in the month of April, and that the breaking up of the autumn and the commencement of the rainy and cold season usually commences in May ; that Waikato, like the rest of New Zealand, is intersected with rivers and swamps, impassible in the winter, except with a great expenditure of time and labour, but easily traversed in the summer ; that the country itself will afford no supplies whatsoever for the troops, aud the distance of the principal Native settlements from Auckland will render a large amount of transport necessary, and a large chain of posts to secure communication through a country for the most part without roads and clothed with luxuriant vegetation. And, lastly, that the principal service to be petformed would not be meeting an enemy in the field, but carrying on a guerilla warfare of a very harassing description. Fred. Whitakeb.

Enclosure 4 in No. 8. THE GOVERNOR TO THE NATIVE SECRETARY. New Plymouth, April 13th, 1861. The Native Secretary is requested to consult such of the officers of his Department as he may think capable of assisting him by their opinions, and to advise the Governor as to the best course to pursue under present circumstances, with a view to bring about the submission of the tribes that have lately been in arms against Her Majesty's forces, and to secure the pacification of the country. The Native Secretary is requested to give his attention and advice particularly , — 1. As to the advantages to be obtained by an expedition against the Taranaki and Ngatiruanui tribes, and whether it should be undertaken at once or at a future time, and if so, when?. 2. If such an expedition be postponed, whether it would be advisable to send those tribes the specific terms which the Governor intends to propose or not ? 3. Whether it is desirable or not to open negociations at once with Waikato, or wait till the Taranaki and Ngatiruanui are settled with ? 4. If such negociations are opened and fail, whether an invasion of the Waikato is practicable? 5. What number of men it may be expected would have to be met in Waikato?. 6. Whether the Waikato country is such as will admit of an expedition in the winter, with a reasonable chance of success: if not, what are the difficulties ? T. G. B.

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DESPATCHES FROM GOVERNOR GORE BROWNE