LOSS OF ISLANDS

Waikato Times, Volume 193, Issue 22204, 25 November 1943, Page 5

LOSS OF ISLANDS

ACTIVITIES IN AEGEAN ATTLEE’S EXPLANATION DEFENCE OF OPERATIONS (Official Wireless) (Received Ncv. 25, 1 p.m.) RUGBY, Nov. 24 Mr C. R. Attlee, deputy-Prime Minister, in a debate in the Address-m-Reply in the House of Commons, made a statement on the Aegean operations, which he said should be considered in the light of the general strategy of the war week by week. The Allied armies had moved forward in Italy, though the country was mountainous and ways of approach narrow and winding. The toll of U-boats had maintained a high level. A heavier and heavier weight of bombs had been dropped on Germany from west and south, with a growing effect on war industry and morale. Tne enemy must divert a large part of his air force to purely defensive operations, which also made heavy demands on manpower. Guerilla activities in the Balkans and Greece had steadily increased and in all the occupied countries resistance grew.

The Russian summer campaign had passed without pause into an autumn and also a winter war, with no slackening of the offensive. These operations, sustained with great valour and skill by our own and Allied forces, were not disconnected efforts but each had a bearing and effect on the others. Hitler must see them as part of a concentric attack and dispose his forces to try to parry the blows. If he sent more aircraft to Western Europe, Italy or the Aegean, he would have so much less on the Russian front, and to the extent that he would have to keep extra divisions in occupied Europe he would have so much less on the fighting fronts. Every commitment was an added weight against his forces, which were already taxed and strained. Hazardous Enterprises Coming to the Mediterranean Mr Atfi.ee recalled that the hazardous enterprises in Salerno, Cardmia and Corsica were undertaken beyond tne range of fighter protection, and said thar risks must be run to obtain commensurate advantages. The Aegean actions had a two-fold objects6—O) To help the attack on Italy by causing the Germans to disperse torces; (2) to take advantage of the fleeting opportunities which the collapse of Italy brought. Early in September Crete was held by 55,000 troops, including 30,000 Germans, and Rhodes by 9000 Germans and 40,000 Italians. There were Germans on the other Aegean islands, but only Italians in the Dodecanese group except Rhodes and Scarpanto. Here was an opportunity to extend and harass the •Germans and obtain strategic gains of great value. On the night when General Alexander landed at Salerno General Wilson despatched a small party to Rhodes. Despite overwheiming numerical strength the Italians made no effort to deal with the Germans and nothing could be accomplished.

Attention was then given to Kos and Leros, though they were well within range of enemy fighter activity. Kos was important for its airfield and Leros as a naval base. Very good work was d me by the Navy in running in troops and transport in the heavy disadvantages of the narrow waters. Its work was augmented by transport aircraft. The immediate result was to attract the enemy’s air resources. Lost by Narrow Margin The first line aircraft which might have been used in Italy, Sardinia and Corsica were retained in the Aegean area, where some 35 per cent of the German air force, including some brought from the Eastern front, had been used. Kos was lost by only a narrow margin, but the loss affected the defence of Leros, which might have been evacuated, but with a knowledge of the effect of such a course the Commander-in-Chief in the Middle East, with the support and approval of the Government, decided to hold the island. Unfortunately unfavourable weather curtailed air attacks by heavy bombers.

Mr Attlee said the British garrison of Leros was 40U0, and counterattacks, which at first succeeded, later failed in the face cf constant air attacks, and incessant attacks by German troops landed at night created a weariness too gbeat for the garrison to resist.

The loss of Leros was a matter of profound regret, but the operation contained the enemy forces during a critical period of the invasion of Italy and inflicted serious losses on the enemy. Had the attack not been made we should have been blamed for lack of enterprise in not trying to exploit a situation which offered opportunities- Arguments against operating beyond the range of really effective air cover were considered but were disregarded because other considerations and hopes were held to outweigh them.