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ITALIAN VERSION

REPORT BY GRAZIANI BRITISH SUPERIORITY HEROIC SACRIFICE (United Press Assn.—Elec. Tei. copyrrgrn? ROME, Dec. 22 Marshal Graziani, the Italian commander in Libya, reporting to Mussolini on the desert battle, said: “Preparations for an attack on Mersa Matruh began immediately after the capture of Sidi Barrani (on September 21). “The absence of water and the inadequacy of communications from the frontier prevented an immediate advance. A 70-mile road and a pipeline for water along it were built from Capuzzo, while troops with supplies and all services were concentrated for a resumption of the offensive. Some units, in order to economise transport, marched several hundred miles. “The preparations were almost complete at the beginning of December, when all the difficulties had been overcome. The water pipeline was an outstanding technical achievement. Built in record time, it supplied 67,000 gallons of water a day to Sidi Barrani. Military preparations were well forward, and supplies of food, munitions and fuel had been moved to advanced positions. “Our air force, meanwhile, was systematically attacking the enemy rear, while British forces attacked our rear bases, especially Benghazi. British Boldness “Advanced troops to test the British resistance swept the territory in front of our positions, engaging in skirmishes against mechanised units. Thus we noticed the increasing British aggression and boldness. “While the major units were taking up their positions for the attack on Mersa Matruh, I sent adequate supplies of artillery to bases from Hell Fire Pass to Sidi Barrani to ward off possible attacks on our southern flank. “From the beginning of October, aerial reconnaissance had revealed a continual concentration of British forces and supplies east of Mersa Matruh, which might have been attributed to an intention strongly to resist our offensive. A prisoner captured on December 7 declared the British attack would be launched in ten days. We warned our troops. “I felt during the day of December 8 that a British attack was imminent, and sent a fresh warning to the commands with orders to be prepared to withstand an attack. We took the necessary steps fully to utilise our air force. There was therefore no surprise. Everyone knew of the probability of a British attack. “At dawn on December 9, over the flat desert where advance was easy and tactical points of resistance were non-existent, the British poured masses of armoured cars, tanks and light and heavy arms, supported by mobile batteries and effective aerial forces. Positions Went Down “Bi'itish artillery and aeroplanes undertook a short preparation, and then, immediately the terrific aerial bombardment ceased, armoured units advanced from all directions, so that, in spite of the fiercest resistance, our positions went down one % after another in a few hours. j “The first attack hit General Maietti, who began to withdraw until, with the Second Libyan Division, he was overcome. “Our anti-tank guns and artillery were ineffectual, because they were forced to disperse their fire on a number of very mobile objectives of the armoured mass operating concentrically over a wide front. “The British were crushingly superior in armoured units. Our national and Libyan divisions were worthy even ir# this battle, and the courage and heroism of our army commanders and troops write pages of glory and epic grandeur in this unequal struggle. Detachments which had been isolated and encircled resisted to the last shot. “After eliminating Maletti’s force and the Second Libyans, the British hurled themselves against Sidi Barrani, where the January and Third Blackshirt Divisions, in spite of bombardment from sea and air, resisted bravely for two days. “The First Libyan Division tried to fall back on Sidi Barrani, but the road was cut by British armoured cars. It resisted for a long time, knowing its fate was sealed. “The situation threatened to overthrow even the second line divisions, and therefore no counter-attack could be launched. I advised the withdrawal of the rear divisions on a line from Hell Fire Pass to the sea, Solium and Capuzzo, where defence positions were prepared with other divisions from the rear. Heroic Sacrifice “The Cantranzaria Division retreated, and the heroic sacrifice of a few detachments, which resisted until December 12, allowed two-thirds of the division to reach Solium. “The Cirene Division extricated itself better from the British pres-

sure, but reached Hell Fire Pass verytired. “On the evening of December 12, while the last of the defenders of Sidi Barrani and Maktila, who had been encircled for three days, were making a final effort to resist, the British advanced guard tried to outflank the right wing of our troops at Hell Fire Pass. “During December 13, 14 and 15 1 there was fierce fighting in the region of Hell Fire Pass, Sidi Omar, Capuzzo and Solium, where General Berganzoli’s troops energetically counter-attacked and wiped out dangerous groups which had filtered through our lines and were attempting to cut the road to Bardia. I “On the evening of December 15, when new mechanised columns were advancing on Solium, Jarabub, Faizes and Sidi Omar, and one group was already in Sidi Azeiz, all General Berganzoli’s troops withdrew in perfect order to Bardia, where they are still heroically resisting. British Fleet and Planes “To complete the picture of the battle, I must take account of the British Fleet and aeroplanes. The fleet continually attacked our col- I umns from Bardia to Solium. . The Royal Air Force, obviously with new reinforcements, continually harassed our marching columns, centres of resistance, our rear, our bases and aerodromes. and Tobruk and Bardia. “The Italian Air Force, owing to adverse weather, was in no position to make its % full weight felt, but put up a bold 'fight, sowing death and destruction on the British columns. Fighters flew 1300 hours and bombers 900 hours, dropping 13,000 bombs totalling 2000 tons of high explosives. Their machine-guns fired 17,000 rounds. We brought down 42 British aeroplanes, and probably 20 more. “It is premature to forecast developments in such a tremendous struggle, in which the enemy has concentrated his best troops from four continents, but it can be said that, if after 12 days the British armoured columns are halted at the gates of Bardia. it is due solely to the bravery of Italian soldiers on land and in the air Every one did his duty to the limits of possibility. “Even if the number taken prisoner is large, that ought not to cause doubt of their bravery. They resisted with the determination to hold on to the end, and therfore the assertions of foreign propaganda are nothing but lies.”

Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/WT19401224.2.44

Bibliographic details

Waikato Times, Volume 127, Issue 21304, 24 December 1940, Page 5

Word Count
1,086

ITALIAN VERSION Waikato Times, Volume 127, Issue 21304, 24 December 1940, Page 5

ITALIAN VERSION Waikato Times, Volume 127, Issue 21304, 24 December 1940, Page 5

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