DRAKES WAY

Waikato Times, Volume 127, Issue 21243, 14 October 1940, Page 2

DRAKES WAY

DEFENCL OF BRITAIN . OFFENSIVE VERSUS DEFENSIVE ATTACK ON ENEMY’S SOIL Many people—the Government itself, to judge from some of its pronouncements —have been struck by the similarity of our situation today to that in 1587-88, that earlier and no less grave crisis in our history when we awaited the fruition of all the preparations throughout the! Spanish Empire in Europe and j America for a descent upon this is- | land, states a correspondent of the i London Spectator. At this com- ! parable moment, in the same week j as the Armada was brought to battle in the Channel, it is more than interesting, it is exciting to listen to the view's of Drake himself on the absorbing question of offensive ver- j sus defensive, whether it is better j to await the enemy’s blow in your < own waters, on your own soil, or I whether the best defence is not to carry the war into his. Here are Drake’s views, as I took them down some years ago from the actual letters he wrote from Plymouth to the Queen (now, alas, no longer to be seen, since present circumstances have closed the Public Record Office). I seem still to see in my mind’s eye the large folded pages covered with that firm, fluent, confident handwriting, the ink rather purplish in places as if some water had fallen upon it, the glisten of sand here and there as if it were not three hundred and fifty years ago that that hand scattered the sand upon the page. What memories it brings back! Memories of ceaseless watching in the channel and along the coasts, then, as now, of anxiety and courage in time of trial, of energy and spirit crowned with ultimate and deserved victory. Man of Action Drake's views are expressed at length and copiously; none of your strong«-silent-man nonsense with him; he had the superb natural eloquence of the great man of action, like Nelson, like Cromwell, and he was not afraid to let himself go. The situation, it will be remembered, was that while Philip was completing his preparations in Lisbon, the cautious Burghley and Elizabeth were playing upon their second string, peace talks with Parma in the Netherlands. At the same time they wrote to Drake for his opinion as to the best way to break up the concentration of ships at Lisbon. He declared himself in general in favour of a descent upon the enemy’s coast, a surprise attack upon his shipping and transports, breaking up and destroying them so that there would be no invasion. And he had shown with brilliant success how it could be done the year before at Cadiz, “the singeing of the King of Spain’s beard.” Now, in the spring of 1588, he urged again and again a descent upon Lisbon to break up the still greater concentrations there, before they became too vast an armada to attack with impunity. For various reasons the Government hesitated, giving Philip the opportunity to draw his forces together, made up of the contingents from different parts of Europe under his control. They hesitated until in fact the Armada was assembled; the invasion of England was possible, the issue doubtful. To the Queen’s inquiry what was now to be done, Drake replied: “Truly this point is hardly to be answered as yet, for two special causes; the first for that our intelligences are as yet uncertain. The second is the resolution of our own people, which I shall better understand when I have them at sea. . .

But if your Majesty will give present order for our proceeding to the sea, and send to the strengthening of this fleet here four more of your Majesty’s good ships and those sixteen sail of ships which are preparing in London, then shall your Majesty stand so well, with God’s assistance, that if the fleet come out of Lisbon, so long as we have victual to live withal upon that coast they shall be fought with, and I hope through the goodness of our merciful God in such sort as shall hinder his quiet passage into England ”