A NATION AT BAY

Waikato Times, Volume 127, Issue 21183, 5 August 1940, Page 11

A NATION AT BAY

THREAT TO BRITAIN j I DEFENCE AT HOME ATTACKS MADE ABROAD | In all the accounts of British war | activities since the collapse of France ■ and the withdrawal to the British ] ! Isles two features are emphasised— j I the intensive preparations for defence ; ! against an attempted invasion, and ! j the continuous air raids into Ger- , ’ many and occupied territory. This j j course has been summed up by a j ! military expert in a phrase, the | , strategic defensive and the tactical < j offensive. | The German plan has been that of i ! the strategic offensive, pressed with ] i particular vigour and success in Po- 1 I land and France. Great Britain, it has been pointed out, has been forced into the position of the strategic defensive under present conditions. Everything has combined to create the The withdrawal ■- m Norway was a starting point, while the evacuation of the Channel lauuius removed tne last distraction i from the essential task of defending j the British Isles. j To this, the theory proceeds, has | been added the notion of the tactical j offensive—a concentration of air atI tack on specific objectives in Germany and German-occupied terri- ! lory. Ail tits into a general scheme. |As the German idea is a lightning | mobile offensive the British strategy jis to resist such an attack when I launched, while tactics are devoted | to reducing its efficiency by a policy j of attrition at its source. Historic Plan Followed | In this view the persistent raids ' into Germany are proceeding according to a defined plan. Fuel depots, marshalling yards, canals, barge conj centrations, docks and aerodromes are I all the targets lor bombing attack. In a word, they are directed at the source of German activities. | To this view can be added the reflection that the plan followed is the i historic, indeed the classical method I of facing a threat from the Continent. , One example seems particularly api posite. Toward the end of the sixi teenth century Tudor England—not then Britain—was menaced by the | power of Spain. King Philip was as- | sembling the great fleet which afterward sailed as the Armada. While ! the English people lay behind their i sea rampants awaiting the attack, | the Elizabethan seamen carried on a j tactical offensive against the ports I and ships of Spain. Drake’s exploit ' at Cadiz, when he “singed the King j of Spain’s beard,” is the best known of these operations. When, after | being seriously delayed by such j tactics, the attack was finally launchj ed, the Armada was defeated and ! scattered, the threat of invasion was | dissipated. ‘ Sea and Air Power j Similar conditions existed when Napoleon was laying his plans to InI vade the shores of England. Here j again the tactical offensive was 1 prosecuted at sea, the hostile fleets ! being bottled up at their bases, their effective assembly prevented, and every possible measure taken to scotch the offensive at its source. Finally, Nelson destroyed Napoleon’s ; ambition at Trafalgar, and the hope | of a successful invasion died, j In the px-esent situation the comi bination of sea power and air power is being utilised to prosecute the tactical offensive, while in the gathering of a mighty army in the British Isles the strategic defensive is being ; carefully fostered. New methods, ! new equipment and a vastly greater i scale of operations make conditions | differ in detail, but in broad prinj ciple there reappears the historic i situation, the nation at bay in its ! island home, yet striking swiftly, boldly and effectively against the preparations for attack.