STALINS PLANS

Waikato Times, Volume 127, Issue 21160, 9 July 1940, Page 7

STALINS PLANS

AGAINST DARDANELLES POINTS OF POLICY SPOILS FROM NAZIS •United Tress Assn. —Elec. Tel. Copyright) NEW YORK, July 8 When opportunity offers, after Hitler has become deeply involved in his campaign against England, M. Stalin may move against the Dardanelles—the strait that unites the Sea of Marmora with the Aegean Sea. This is the opinion of a high American authority who is exceedingly well informed on Russian affairs, and who has recently returned to the United States from Moscow. With its centre pivoting on the River Bug and the right flank protected by the incursion into the Baltic, Russia is protecting her left flank in Bessarabia, according to the American authority, who will shortly return to Moscow.

Although these are the spoils guaranteed to Russia by the Russo-

German understanding, he states, they are defensive, and not offensive. This and the probable move against the Dardanelles are the essential points of Russia’s present policy. Free From Wishful Thinking “M. Stalin is a realist,” the authority stated, “and his thinking, like that of Hitler and Mussolini, is free from wishful thinking. He was surprised by the rapid disintegration of France and hence decided to obtain very quickly what was promised to him by the Russo-German agreement. •< » , “Since he s6es the need for a cushioning of his territories against the time when Hitler may turn against him, Stalin feels that the Baltic and the Balkans would be sufficient ground on which to hold off the Germans for probably two months, and since little more than two months’ good weather exists in these areas for a large-scale military attack, the winter weather would also work for the Russians. “It is a mistake to under-estimate Russia’s military power. It is the strongest after that of Germany. The Finnish campaign was composed of six weeks of mistakes due to Starnoff’s decision that Leningrad’s garrison of 270,000 men could handle the Finns, and another six weeks in which Russia concentrated her mechanised forces in a manner demonstrating their true strength, and easily defeating the Finns. A Colossal Struggle “The Russians would give the Germans a colossal struggle. It is essential not to put the military pattern of the last war over this war. There is no graft in Russia now. Its supplies are abundant and most efficient. There would be no Tannenbergs. , . “Three things might bring a conflict between Russia and Germany. First, a Russian incursion into the Carpathians, which is not provided for in the Russo-German agreement, and which Stalin thinks he needs to round of the left flanks of his cushioning territory. “Secondly, Germany’s need for food. It is an open secret, and the Department of State’s foreign service authorities all agree, that, no matter what happens in the contest between Britain and Germany this winter, the Continent of Europe is going to be desperately hungry. “jn spite of Germany’s victories, the German populace is being progressively starved. Experts agree that the best crops of all in Europe are available in the Ukraine. The Balkan crops, incidentally, be mg. failures, hard need may drive Hitler to seek food in the Ukraine which he is unable to get elsewhere. “Thirdly, while the position or Russia at the mouth o£ the Danube is also provided for in the RussoGerman agreement, any interfeience by Russia with Germany’s vital supplies that way would compe. German military remonstrance. Suspicions of Germans “Recarding supplies, it is a myth that German technicians are going in large numbers into Russia to exploit the natural resources. The Russians are most suspicious of all foreigners, particularly Germans. Russia s promise ot supplies -in the RussoGerman agreement was 950,000 tons of petrol, 1,000,000 tons of cattle fodder, 200,000 tons of cotton, and 100,000 tons of manganese. These are being delivered, but with reluctant slowness, because Russia is reluct- , ant to arm an ally who overmgnt , might change to an enemy. ’ -One ot the most remarkable ’ things about Russian policy today is , its enoimous flexibility. Stalin is ' prepared lor anything.”