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ILLUSION OF DEFENCE

Collective Security Myth : Challenge to Good Faith.

Dr. L. P. Jacka in Spectator]

HERE IS A PATHE’J‘IG BELIEF, highly active in the waiting rooms of peace doctors that the cure of disease requires nothing more than the prescrip—tion of an appropriate bottle of physio—so many diseases, and for each an infallible bottle, Needless to say, the belief is a delusion, highly profitable to the \eni ours or patent medicines, but attended with disastrous effects to many of their clients. Unfortunately the delusion has a counterpart, attended with results iar mare disas—trous in the field of political conceptions. ilcre \\'e unit the belief prevalent not ohly among the masses of the electorate but widely shared by the eminent SOClal tiOCIOI‘S who solicit their votes, that every Social Disease Can Be Cured by the simple process of making a law to cure it. \Vlren war, or war-making, is the malady to be cured our faith takes the form of believing that peace ‘can be kept by the equally simple process of making a sufficien; treaty to keep lt—that, no matter how war—minded and heavily armed for war the nations may be, all will be well if they solemnly covenant together not to right. Undaunted by the manifest fact that for a couple 'of centuries or more a war-sick Europe has been dosed with this peace-keeping pllySle and never so heavily dosed as of late, with the result that assured peace was never further oil‘ than now—undaunted by that, the quest for the infallible war»remed,\' shows no sign of slackening; treaties and rumours of treaties follow in quick succession and, though the master—treaty delays its coming, our faith that it will come remains unsliaken. In all this we are witnessing a phenomenon admirably described in a phrase 01 Sir Arthur Saltcr‘s “Beccvery", ”the umvilled accompaniments of our willing, the unpurposed effects of our purpose“—a phenomenon familiar to most of us, though often overlooked by our physic—ians, when the first bottle of their physio has been duly emptied and a new bottle needed to counter the reactions consequent on the first, and so on ad infliiitum. As a summary explanation of the miscarriages that have overtaken the course of international politics and the Intolerable Confusion Into Which They Have Fallen it would be hard to find a better than Sir Arthur’s phrase. For long past, peace has been the increasing purpose of the civilised world and treaty after treaty has been made—the Covenant, Locarno, the Kellogg Pact, Stresa and now the Franco—Russian alliance, each, after the Covenant—which surely ought to have been suilicicnt by itself—throwing doubt on the value of its predecessor. All this for the purpose of making peace secure. But the unwiiled accompaniments of this willing, the unpurposetl effects of this purposing, have brought it to pass that peace, the purpose throughout, was never more insecure than it now is. Hence the strange spectacle we are now witnessing of great nations professing their devotion to collective security and yet having so little faith in it for their own pro—tection that their first. care is to arm themselves to the utmost for single—handed defence. And now the whole nation is to be "organised for self defence," and re-armed accordingly at a cost estimated at, $300,000,000. Great Britain, says Mr Garvin, must he placed in a ’ Position to Fear no Foo. —just as she would have to be if she had nothing to hope for from collective security and the Covenant. and all the others had never been heard or. A Minister, acting presumably under the advice from military headquarters. is to control the vast operation, which is to include nothing less than the: mobilisation of the nation's resources in men, money and materials, so that in case of necessity and at short notice the entire force of our factories, transport, shipping and food supply can be “switched over" (a phrase used by Major-General Sir Frederick Sykes in The Times of February 24) to production of the commissariat of war, and co-ordinate as a fourth arm the service with the Army, the Navy and the Air Force. For what purpose is all this to be done? In order, we 8“! told, that we may be able, in the first place, to “con—tribute our due share to collective security" and inspire other MUDHS. our partners in that enterprise, with con-fidence-that we are competent to luliil our obligations to

thelcommon cause; and, in the second fileaceefidtgftfiv“ienntfiz he in a posture to defend ouiselses in p hat, “5 to event 01‘ our partners failing,r to fulfil their ohllca ‘0 050 combine for our defence. Such is the axowed purp it no doubt sincerely held by ”1053 who profess 1“ thougcont‘usedlv, for the two parts of it are not easy to 1209"] rile. \\‘hlat, then, are likely to be ."5 ”unpuxposef effects“? By what “unwillcd accompaniments is all this vigorous "willing" likely~ lo be attended? i To a large extent they are hidden from us, for .1??? will be determined by the general course 01 events. “_ill‘i. i no man can foresee, and over which the Bt'itlsh COW-‘l“ ment has little control. But some are less obs Cure and may be Anticipated Wlth Tolerable GartalnwTo begin with, the attempt to make ourselves safe. In the event of collective security failing to protect 115, Will surely suggest to the partner nations that we have no great confidence in their good faith, nor in the general value of the collective security we profess to be supporting And among those nations (and there are more than one) wiio regard the British Empire, not at its own valuation as a benevolent institution, but as a. mighty and selfish Power sitting tight on its great possessions, the spectacle of Great Britain armed to the teeth is far more likely to increase old misgivings than to inspire new con—fidence. Indeed it may he laid clown as a general rule that the more heavily armed a nation is when it comes to the common Council table, the more inclined the others are to be suspicious of its Dona tides as a messenger of peace and good will. if such are likely to be the ”unpurposed attests" abroad, what are they likely to be at home? In general, there can be no doubt that. tho “mobilisation of our entire resources,“ industrial, financial and military, for national defence. on _the scale advocated by Sir Frederick Sykes in The Times, by Mr Garvin in the Observer, and many other eminent soldiers, publicists and orators, will have profound repercussions on the whole structure and quality of our national life. It would be a Novel Exporlonoo In Peace-time for the British people, though we had a good taste of it during the Great War. A nation so thoroughly organised for self-defence will not find it easy to organise itself for anything else—which seems a pity, since there are so many things, besides self-defence. that are worth organising 't’or. From one source only could the ultimate marching orders of the national life then be derived—from military head—quarters—however these might be designated, disguised. kept in «the background or mediated; by Itransmission. through this Minister or that Committee. All must be in readiness for the moment when military headquarters say “go," from high finance down to the gauge and tools in the workshops; and how can that be if military authority has no control, through channels direct or indirect, over the operations of the factories and the bankers‘ ofllces? And what would it avail us to have our industrial and financial forces in readiness to be switched over from peace to war unless our young men, in their multitudes, were in equal readiness to be switched over in the same way? Will the Minister of Defence have nothing to say to them? Will his military advisers have no word to whisper in his ear on that topic? And how will the young men take it? Is milltarisation the less military when national self-defence is the motive for it? For defence. or for attack, must we not learn to fight, meet the aggressor with arms and ferocity equal to his own, be ready to use our weapons with the skill of trained warriors, and use them to the utmost. extremity, so that, as Mr Garvin says, there will be as little left of our antagonist as may remain of ourselves"? A Ghoutu‘l Prospect. for tho Self-detention! We are treading a dangerous road where the unwilicd accompaniments of our willing will bring us to strange issues. What same of them are likely to be we can dimly discern, but that lasting peace will not be one of them we may be absolutely certain. Every step along that road which we entered in the name or peace, is a step further away from the peace that we propose. '

Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/WT19360530.2.142.4

Bibliographic details

Waikato Times, Volume 119, Issue 19899, 30 May 1936, Page 15 (Supplement)

Word Count
1,475

ILLUSION OF DEFENCE Waikato Times, Volume 119, Issue 19899, 30 May 1936, Page 15 (Supplement)

ILLUSION OF DEFENCE Waikato Times, Volume 119, Issue 19899, 30 May 1936, Page 15 (Supplement)

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