KRIM'S SURRENDER.

Waikato Times, Volume 100, Issue 16813, 3 June 1926, Page 4

KRIM'S SURRENDER.

The end of the Moroccan war came with almost dramatic suddenness. There can be no doubt tho Hiffian Chieftain put up a great light against very great odds. The Moors had long been a thorn in the side of the Spanish, who had been operating against them for a very long period. When, however, France entered the lists it was expected that tho end would not be long delayed, but the weary war waged on, the resourcefulness and tenacity of the Moors being remarkable. They established a great reputation for military prowess. It was not, of course, within the range of probabilities that Krim and his tribesmen could wear down two European nations, but they fought while there was a vestige of hope, and they certainly were not disgraced. Krim's appeal to the French to permit his household ami entourage to go free, and to let flic full punishment fall upon himself personally, as he was the commander, stamps him as a brave man, worthy of Itio honours of an honourable enemy, and the hope will he wide thai he will lie treated with all possible magnaminity. Apart from all political considerations he has earned the respect of even his enemies for tho wonderful fight he has made against two powerful European countries. Willi resources almost exhausted and the end inevitable, lie gave his remaining followers the option of surrendering to their enemies or of fighting to the death, but. the hopelessness of the struggle forced a decision of expediency and an appeal was made to the clemency

of France. Viewed in retrospect, the Moroccan war lias been dramatic in its characteristics. It lias been carPied on by Spain at an enormous cost in blood and treasure. In 1021, it may be recalled, the scco.nd of Spain's long wars against Raisuli was Hearing its close. Then came news that ilic Riffs bad ibe great Spanish army of the East, and burled the remnants of it back !o the coast. The rout was so complete, and the losses so appalling, that General Silvcslre blew out his brains. The Riffs, under Abd-el-Krim's brother, look about 20,000 prisoners, including General Novarro, and captured a vast booty in military supplies. By September, 192.'!, the Spanish Government had so disgraced itself that a clique of officers under General dc Rivera was able to set up a military dictatorship. Peace bad been made with Raisuli in 1022, a peace born of necessities on both sides, naisuli, old and sick, managed none the less to keep the Jcbala tribes out of Abd-el-Krim's camp. Spain's final withdrawal from the Jebala country, not accomplished without a disaster with enormous losses in men and materials due to Riff pressure in the summer of 1925, was hardly completed ere Abd-c&Krim swept down upon Raisuli, as it is recorded, like a hawk upon a mouse. After this new victory, Riffiau prestige, numbers, stores, and wcahh were even equal to a contest with France. Abd-cl-Krim, the son of a petty chief had now consolidated the self-governing clans in Morocco into a single nation, armed llicm by capturing the guns, rifles, stores and clothing of their foes, and financed them by seizing the person and hoards of his principal rival at the moment when Raisuli had received the latest Spanish subsidy. Fortune was no doubt kind to' Abd-cl-Krim at that stage. A curious light is thrown upon certain aspects of the Moroccan struggle in the following passage from an article by Sir Charles Hobhouse: "It is not given to every patriot to be opposed to a foe at once so venal and so stupid as to sell wholesale to their opponents the very weapons by which they themselves will shorty be opposed and destroyed.

. . . It was •reserved to the Spanish soldier to devise a system of bartering his own weapons with bis opponent in the held. Abd-cl-Krim was also fortunate in finding to two great European nations with depleted treasuries and bulging arsenals, ready to supply for cash all that he needed to make war on their co-signatories to the partition of bis country, and Hamburg and Marseilles can alike claim the honour and profit of keeping alight the torch of patriotism in Northern Africa." Prior to being involved herself in the Moroccan struggle, France had ridiculed the Spanish army, and attributed Ab-cl-Krim's victories entirely to its shortcomings. The French were not long in discovering, to their owti cost, the quality of their Riff opponents. The decision of the French and Spanish Governments to co-operate against Abd-el-Krim indicated their realisation of the seriousness of the situation. And, in the hour of victory, the shadow of the enormous costs of their Moroccan campaigns cannot be lifted.