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THE RETIREMENT

GERMANS ASfViG AMD ENTENTQNS

I My Colonel .1. >. I.ysbr in Urn Sydney Sun.) ; Tli" majority of people fail In dis- | ciivcr Hie cause of the German rt*liv« l- --| nii'iil i'i urn MaiKiunit'. Some say il is ! a trap. (ithers say llial il is willi a view uf ciiiiciiilratimi prior to a big i offensive. M is neither! II is a definite withdrawal mi th" lines of retreat. Diifs anyone imagine that tin 1 CnMMiian War Council desires to disclose t'Vt'tl a siiin uf weakness, and increase Hie anxiety uf the Herman people? Nu! They would not sacrilii lit' inch of : the tei'i'tory grained except under pressure. Critics are apt to overlook the value of eii-o|ieralion between the British and French armies, in penetrating the Gerlniin convex line at a point north of the Xoyon salient, and establishing an impenetrable resistance at Verdun. A dance at the war map will afford an insight as to the value of the great operation, and also disclose the fact, that it is somewhat similar to the tactical operations of the Germans which forced the Russians out of Poland. If this idea is accepted, it is clear that the Gorman War Council suspected that a double penetration of their line would be attempted by the Allies, and that the only way to avert a withdrawal from the dangerous Xoyon salient which would mean a demoralising sacrifice of territory was to smash the French at Verdun-. The failure to do so rendered invaluable assistance to tin 1 development of -the Sommc offenI sive. The Hermans are slill compelled, ! if they can, to hold the French at Veri dun until the armies within the Xoyon J salient have withdrawn to a line of ! temporary safety. The progress of the Smume offensive and the solid resistance al Verdun lias not only rendered (he Xoyon salient untenable, hut every ; mile of advance is creating another salient, between Arras anil Armentieres, ! which can only be avoided by a further •continuous withdrawal until the Ger- ' man line of resistance is straightened between Xieuport, Ypres, ami Verdun. THE ALLIES' WKDGKS. The Allies' offensive now in progress may be delayed, bul it. is certain thai the plan of driving wedges into any new line will Continue from selected points, in the hope of creating new salients in the German lines. The obj jeet of driving wedges is two-fold. If | the line is decisively broken by both wedges, ami if a direct advance is con- | tinned on Aix la Cliapelle, the German I salient line between Xieuport am! the advance of tin 1 British will be in danI ger, and inns! endeavour to keep the line of retreat mem :■> A \ la Cliapelle. I If the British ami Vi-.-ncU are eventu- | ally successful in pushing their advance i on the line of direction, and are able to resist all opposition, the whole of the ■ German armies lo Hie north of [lie British line of advance- would be pushed into Holland unless they withdrew by rail while the lines are open and the .--opportunity offers.

If Germany continues to retreat to avoid disaster, her right Hank must rest at Aix la Cliapelle, with a direct defensive to Belfort. This line, so long as Holland remains neutral, would not only be shorter, and therefore be more strongly held, bul it would release the northern armies, which originally occupied the line Nieuport-Arras.

POSITION OF HOLLAND

The German Government may, when it suits, declare war against Holland, and, if successful, extend their right flank lo Amsterdam. The line would then run from that port through Aix la Cliapelle to Belfort.

There are two reasons why such a scheme would be impracticable. To invade Holland would increase Germany's difficulties. The Dutch would join the Allies, and Germany would be forced if successful to extend her line, which would mean a further sub-divi-sion of her power at a time when the armies in the north-west and south are suffering enormous hisses. There is not the slightest chance of Germany invading Holland, either to obtain additional food or to rob Holland of the mouth of the Rhine. The German War Council is alive to the I'aot thai neutral Holland is a buttress which protects the right flank anil a portion of the northern territory of Germany.

People who imagine that peace will be proclaimed this year will, I fear, be disappointed, unless a revolution breaks out. in Germany or Austria Hungary. During the pas! fortnight events have happened which afford distinct indication as to the intention of the German War.Council. The members are thinking hard, and though forced to decide upon a retirement in the west, they are determined, if possible, lo gain even ;i temporary advantage by doing so.

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https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/WT19170419.2.34

Bibliographic details

Waikato Times, Volume 88, Issue 13464, 19 April 1917, Page 7

Word Count
790

THE RETIREMENT Waikato Times, Volume 88, Issue 13464, 19 April 1917, Page 7

THE RETIREMENT Waikato Times, Volume 88, Issue 13464, 19 April 1917, Page 7

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