HOW WILL SPAIN’S WAR END?

Western Star, 1 March 1938, Page 3

HOW WILL SPAIN’S WAR END?

By Lawrenco A. Ferns worth. Is final victory within the,, grasp of General Franco’s rebels in Spain? There have been many conjectures to that effect—but there remain many factors .of doubt. Except perhaps for the southern area north-eastward of Malaga, the fighting vv e ather is over, the cold has set in, and the prospects, barring a surprise, are of a stalemate until the spring or early summer. Insurgent headquarters say that several factors ar© expected to pave the way for an early Franco victory. The chief items cited are an unorganised Loyalist army, dissension in Government ranks, demoralisation among the rearguard population, and lack of food. To these also have been added the blockade of tlie Spanish Mediterranean coast just announced by Franco. A similar blockade was proclaimed in October of last year, and in theory is still existent. Does the new proclamation mean that Franco intends to challenge the rights of British and other foreign ships on the high seas ? He has not yet been recognised as a. belligerent, and it is therefore difficult to se© how be can veiy well do that.

GOVERNMENT NOT CRUMBLING. When this coirespondent left Spain a short time ago the Government was building up a huge new disciplined army under a unified command, welt supplied with arms and munitions, and confidence in it wn s high. This army has been holding the eastern front all summer and autumn, and reports coming from the Government side do not indicate any development within its ranks, such as a lack of morale, which would vitally change the situation. Regarding the dissensions which are expected to cause a final crumbling of the Government resistance, the facts again do not warrant such an assumption. The dissension, was at ite peak in May, just before the fall of the Caballero Government and the coming into power of the present Government headed by Negrin. Since that time the Governmenthas worked steadfastly to put an end. to that situation, and the Popular Front may be considered more solid thau ever. , The Catalan Separatists, for instance, have been definitely put in their place, th© Republican Government itself has made Barcelona its capital and rules with a firm hand there. / Indeed, at the time 1 left Barcelona, some time before the removal of tlie capital to that place, the Government seemed to be ruling there with such a firm hand that law alid order were more surely prevailing than at any •time I had known since the proclamation of the republic in 1931. Other force s of dissension wei'e the Caballero political cabal and the extremism of the Anarcho-Syndicalists Caballero’s activities would seein to have been virtually nullified and the Syndicalists are ■ assuming a far more moderate attitude, going so far as having a political spokesman to represent them at the •last meeting of the Cortes. That was the first time in the history of the Syndicalists, whose prime doctrine lias always been violence, that they have aocepted political representation in a Parliament. ' , Another source of dissension sometimes indicated has been the opposed divergencies of views between the Communist party and the rest of the Government, of which it forms a part. Tlje policy of the Negrin Government ha* been to keep the Communist party in its place, as a member of the Popular Front, and to prevent at all costs its gaining undue prominence. The Government’s position has been that it. itself was strictly Republican, not to be dominated 1 by any particular party. Tho Communists seem to have accepted this. No doubt they would like to impose theii views if they could, hut the fact is that they have assumed a sensible position throughout all the Spanish turmoil and the indications are that their own good sense causes them to realise the impossibility of imposing Communism upon Spain,

NO VOICE FOR COMMUNISM. If one went through , Governmental territory as II have, trying to obtain, the views of the masses on the question of Communism, one. would find no voice raised in its favour, except perhaps 'the voice of official party members. But however that may be, one thing can be stated with certainty, namely, that the Communists place the winning of the win- before all other considerations and may not be expected to do anything which would jeopardise the attainment of that goal. j Demoralisation in the rear guard is also frequently mentioned. In most of Government Spain I have found little 1 or no evidence of that. Indeed; tlie stolidity and fortitude with which the common people and particularly the women bear up under the devastating effects of warfare seem almost a miracle. None the less, a certain amount of nioralisation.may be considered to exist, particularly in Catalonia. The stamina of the Catalans is not very high and they are prone to temporise in the face of difficult situations; wherefore considerable evidence of low morale may be found in this region. The food situation is painted us difficult. No doubt it is, but there is nothing which may bo described as a regime of starvation. Field s everywhere, except when actually occupied by fighting troops, have been intensively cultivated, and never looked better than when 1 saw them this year. The Government claimed to have reaped a harvest at least 10 per cent, greater titan in normal times.

True, much of the food is sent to the armies so that the rations in the rearguard arc sometimes short. The most serious menace to the supply would be a blockade so effective as to prevent the entry of British and other food ships, but such effectiveness remains yet to be demonstrated.

As to certain reported peace negotiations, all advices in the possession of the writer indicate that the Government neither has made, nor is desirous of making tiny peace overtures to Franco or even of recognising his competency to receive them. However, as long, ago as July responsible leaders in the Republican Government felt that an appeal might be made to certain leaders on the other side.

Recent developments, such the new hope raised on the Franco side by changes in the international order move favourable to it, would seem to make such a course less probable. 'Jle- Government is still playing for time, which may Iniinr on a stalemate and thus render some other kind of agreement p s.-.ible. T learn that high men in the Govi-rnmenl who more than n t-onlh or so ago scouted the idea of ;i divided Spain arc now seriously considering; that solution in view of tho newest Thcrt? JWgfrfc b&

such a solution, they point out, providing for two Goveniments ) as in Ireland. Spaniards would bp. permitted freely to choose one Government or tho ! other as their own in accordance with their political sentiments. COULD DOOM GOVERNMENT. Under s uch a. scheme the international personalities of Spain might be maintained under some kind of superior council in which both sides would bo represented, and which would in no degree affect the internal Governments. At this time no more can be done than to point out that such a plan is being seriously pondered by men whose opinions count. It i s quilt* conceivable that England and France, perhaps in unison with other countries, would offer a mediation along lines which would take into account such a possible solution. Tlie question i s frequently asked: What i s the end of all this? And the obvious answer is: It depends entirely on the international situation. As yet there are no that either Germany or Italy, particularly the latter, has been induced to pull punches with respect to Spain. Should these two countries make up their minds to take the aggressive on a more intensive scale than heretofore, the situation would be bad for the Government unless they were stopped. For instance, if their fleets were to bombard Valencia and Barcelona. a,s Almeria was bombarded, on their air squadrons to descend upon the cities in major operations, the doom of the Government would probably be sealed. In such case only the aimed intervention of England and France could avert disaster for the Government. Barring this procedure, however, the probabilities are that there will be no smashing Franco victory and that there may be some solution which would involve peace without victory.