Wellington Independent MONDAY, JULY 31, 1871.

Wellington Independent, Volume XXVI, Issue XXVI, 31 July 1871, Page 2

Wellington Independent MONDAY, JULY 31, 1871.

It is usually the best course to let every body wash their dirty linen at home ; but the maxim may be carried too far ; when your neighbor's house is on fire it is time for you to look out. The manner in which the electoral rolls are revised in one district, and the practice adopted in one revising court, may became precedents in others ; and we may therefore be pardoned for calling attention to late proceedings in the revision court at Motueka, in the Province of Nelson. The matter has also this ad- j ditional interest, that it affects a vote on the sufficiency of which may turn the seat in the Assembly of no less important a member than the late Speaker, Sir David Monro. It is right, therefore, that our readers should "have their eye" upon it, and no further excuse is necessary for our meddling with what, at first sight, might seem not to concern us. The case to which we refer was that of an objection taken to the vote of one James Hagan, farmer, Waimea West, No. on the roll, 363. The objection was taken by Mr Coppin, an elector, who was represented in the Court by Mr Luckie, one of the defendants in the late unsuccessful proceedings for a criminal information taken by Sir D. Monro. | The vote was supported by Mr Pitt, who was Sir D. Monro's solicitor in the criminal information. The facts of the case, as proved by ! Mr Luckie, were these: — A settler in j the Motueka Electoral District named James Hagan registered his vote in respect of a freehold property in 1865-G. His name remained on the roll unobjected to till the last sitting of the Court; but the elector died in August, 1868. He left a son, also James Hagan, who, however, wasnotof age when the roll for 1870-71 was made up, consequently not qualified as an elector, and as far as appears he did not put in any claim to be registered. But at the late general ' election he voted for Sir D. Monro, on, I as it is alleged by Mr Luckie, his de- j ceased father's registration ; and before the Court at the late sitting Mr Pitt contended that he was entitled to have his name retained on the roll, because he had voted at the last election, and therefore must be taken to be the person whose name appeared on the roll. The answer given by Mr Luckie is that if he did vote (as he undoubtedly did at 1 the general election) his doing so was personation, which could confer no right on him, but for which he is criminally liable ; and, further, he urged that by the 25 th Section of the Registration Act, any person whose vote is objected to must prove to the satisfaction of the revising officer that he was entitled to be on the roll, on the last day of April preceding. This clause, however, appears to have been entirely ignored by the revising officer, who summarily dismissed the objection, and refused to give any reason for doing so. Mr Pitt suggested that if Mr Luckie was not satisfied he might appeal to the Supreme

Court—a course whioh, as it would 1 necessarily have involved the usual ! heavy costs of such a proceeding, Mr Luckie was necessarily obliged to decline. . iMr Luckie, however, succeeded in getting at the facts, and made three things pretty clear — Ist. That the name registered as James Hagan was that of the deceased elector. 2nd. That James Hagan the younger was not of age when the electoral rollof 1870-71 was made up. 3rd. That he voted at the Motueka election on the registration of his father. If the case goes before the Election Petitions Committee on Mr Parker's petition, it can hardly be disposed of in the summary manner in which the revising officer dealt with it, nor will the technical objections urged by Mr Pitt stand him in any stead when the question is not whether Hagan is to he taken to be the person whose name is on the last roll, but whether he did or did not as a matter of fact personate his dead father. # I The revising officer having declined to give auy reason for his decision, it is not in our power to say what his reason was ; but as Mr Pitt, on behalf of the vote, only urged one er two technical quibbles, we presume it was by them that the revising barrister's judgment was swayed. But how he was able to resist the force of Mr Luckie's appeal to the 25th section of the Registration Act, we are at a loss to understand. That clause clearly throws on the person objected to the onus of proving his qualification and his right to be upon the new roll. In this case nothing of the sort was required of him ; and Air Pitt's reference to the clause which makes the presence of a man's name on the existing roll a sufficient proof that he is entitled to vote at an election, was entirely beside the question. The question was not about a vote tendered at an election, but the right to be on the electoral roll Jbr a future election, and if Mr Pitt's argument was valid, the 25 th clause has no operation at all. The case seems to us to have been altogether wrongly decided, and we should hope the point will be raised when Hagan's vote is again brought in question, as it no doubt will be on Parker's petition against Sir David's return. We have j no wish to prejudice Sir David's case, but the proceedings in the revising court at Motueka are a past transaction, open to comment on their own merits, j If this decision is to become a precedent it follows that the name of John Smith being entered in 1805 on any roll, and we presume on any list recognised by law, will confer on his son, John Smith, in 1871, other important rights and privileges, and, therefore, impose responsibilities and penalties determined by the death of his father in 1808! It would also follow that a person need not register who can discover a dead namesake on the roll. He has only to follow James Hagan's example, and the letter reprinted elsewhere in an interesting article on this subject from the " Colonist ; " will bo found a useful form applicable, mutatis mutandis, in all such cases. This letter constitutes all the proof required by the act, accordiug to this decision, that the John Smith, say of Wellington, was the John Smith of Nelson, " entitled to have his name inserted in the list of voters in respect of the qualification objected to as described." It is the first time we have ever heavd the bare assertion of a right admitted as a conclusive proof of its existence. How foolish on this showing must those judges be at home who are trying the Tichborne case! There the claimant to a right, which, unlike Hagan's, is a hereditary one, is stupidly compelled to furnish a laborious proof that he is the person he professes to be : whereas in Nelson all he would have to do would be to get his lawyer to draw up a letter a la Hagan, and be very careful to have a witness to prove his signature to it. Yes, he must be very careful about that. He must prove that he signed it. He has a right because he affirms he has a right, and he proves his right by proving that he has so affirmed it ! We know there are names on the Wellington roll in the same position as were the names of Hagan pereetjlls at this Motueka election. It does not matter, so far as we can see, whether a person be dead for a short or a long time, if only his son, grandson, or cousin of the same name (or anyone who chooses to take the name) comes into possession of the property which gave the qualification : the vote recorded in name of the dead man will be accepted as a valid vote from his otherwise unregistered and disqualified Jiving representative ! We throw this out as a hint to the Reform Association in Wellington, believing that the Hagan vote may, with a little management on their part, be useful in the election to take place after, on their petition, the present city members are unseated ; but, as a knight claims precedence, we suppose Sir D. Munro's case will be taken first, and the decision on it will settle for ever, whether electioneering agents are entitled to go " down among the dead men !"