MARS LA TOUR.

Wellington Independent, Volume XXVI, Issue 3119, 9 February 1871, Page 3

MARS LA TOUR.

The " Times" correspondent gives the following particulars regarding the battle of Mars- la- Tour, the most sanguinary of the war, fought on August 16 ; — lt was a disagreeable discovery to make for the Prussians. They were about 37,000 strong ; the force which they had challenged counted between 80,000 and 90,000, and had about 30,000 more within the walls of the adjoining stronghold. With his guns and mitrailleuses posted on the hills commanding the plain on which the Prussians were, the enemy presented an aspect which might well have staggered the stoutest heart. But the Prussians knew their duty, and in their business-like matter-of-course way determined to do it. Finding them selves* pitted against such superior numbers, they easily discerned that if they had any prospect of escaping destruction it lay in boldly assuming the offensive. If they could but put themselves in possession of the rising ground on which the enemy had placed bis camp, they might, perhaps, be able ta hold out until the heads of their main body arrived. Accordingly they at once fell to, stormed the camp, took it, and with it captured 600 Zouaves and Turcos. Then establishing themselves in the enemy's quarters, and judiciously making use of every advantage offered by the configuration of the ground, they stood on the defensive against nearly three times their number. Thus they stood and battled for nearly eight hours. Six times they were charged by the Imperial Guard, six times they repulsed the attack, and, pursuing the enemy in their turn, drove him from position to position. One after the other the corps of Generals Frossard, Canrobert, Decean Ladmirault and the Second Division of General Failly were forced to give way before the Prussian onslaught. But their triumph was dearly bought by the gallant baud. Under the telling fire of the enemy they had suffered grieviously fro A the first. Gradually their numbers'were more and more reduced ; at last they were so few, ■ and those so tired, that the French could venture to attack their guns. Once more they ■warded off the charge, knowing they could not do so again. Yet they saw the enemy massing his columns in the distance lor a last, a decisive attempt. It was three o'clock in the afternoon, and they had been under fire from

eight in the morning. What was to be done ? In this critical emergency there seemed nothing left but to loose the cavalry and send it right into the jaws of the hostile battalions. To be sure, to let cavalry charge against the chassepot, and that at a distance permitting of several rounds being fired against them, would be to sacrifice vast numbers without, perhaps, producing anything like an adequate result. In point of fact, it would be doing a thing regarded as absurd, if not as absolutely imsible, by modern military science. But necessity knows no law. The attack was ordered and executed. Two regiments of Dragoon Guards and one regiment of Cuirassiers, the whole forming a column of 1900, rode against the enemy, a thundering block of steel. Decimated long before they could flash their swords, their shattered remnants sufficed to cut down or disperse whole battulions. Then altacked'in their turn by Chasseurs d'AFrique, and immediately rescued by their own swift Hussars, they again cut a path for themselves into the enemy's ranks, and actually succeeded in preventing his contemplated assault. Shortly after this repetition of the Balaklava exploit, Prince Frederick Charles appeared on the battle field, and assumed the command. Eager to share the dangers, and, if possible, the laurels of his troops, he hai ridden the eighteen miles from Point-a-Mousson in an hour. He was just giving orders to his brother-in-law, Duke Wilhelm of Mecklenburg, who had led the cavalry charge, when the long-ex-pected succour at last made its appearance. It was the head of the Hanover Corps d'Armee, under General Von Voigt Rhetz, which, after a forced march on the plateau rising from the bed of the river, now fell upon the enemy's right flank. To assist their onward march the cavalry were sent round. But, although the Hanoverians advanced with a perfect gallantry, worthy of the military renown of their race, and were commanded by a most able general, the battle remained stationary for two more hours. Not until after 6 o'clock, when, some Rhenish regiments coining up, the Germans were no longer so very much outnumbered, and the scale of victory began to incline in their /avor. Eventually, a general charge forced the enemy to fall back, hotly pursued by the Hanoverian horse and artillery. As usual in a French retreat, confusion now ensued, and rapidly assumed a degree out of proportion to the defeat sustained. But for the vicinity of AJetz, ,and the protection it afforded, to the discomfited troops, there might have been another disaster like that of Woerth. This was avoided by the nearness of the detached forts, but from a military point of view retreat to Metz, whence there is no escape, was perhaps even less eligible than flight to Paris, however precipitate and calamitous.