THE Wellington Independent "NOTHING EXTENUATE; NOR SET DOWN AUGHT IN MALICE." TUESDAY MORNING, 1st AUGUST. WHY GENERAL CAMERON DID NOT TAKE THE WEREROA PA.

Wellington Independent, Volume XX, Issue 2239, 1 August 1865, Page 4

THE Wellington Independent "NOTHING EXTENUATE; NOR SET DOWN AUGHT IN MALICE." TUESDAY MORNING, Ist AUGUST. WHY GENERAL CAMERON DID NOT TAKE THE WEREROA PA.

If further proof were required of our assertion made three months ago, that General Cameron persistently opposed tho Wanganui — Taranaki campaign, and rendered its operations futile by constantly suggesting pretexts for delay, it would be found in the correspondence between him and His Excellency the Governor, recently presented to tho Assembly. These documents present tho melancholy picture of a large and well equipped Imperial army, composed of the finest soldiers in the world, rendered absolutely useless through the obstinacy of a commander who will not fight. Throughout the whole correspondence it is evident that the gallant General began tho campaign sorely against his will, and that after it had been commenced his chief object was to quarrel with the Governor and Ministry, utter slanders against the colonists, and send home despatches wilfully misrepresenting everything that was being done in the Colony in connection with the war. These are very grave charges to make against an officer, who, it is said, possessed a distinguished European reputation, and it is with regret that we again bring them forward pointedly. But whatever we have either asserted before or assert at present, is proved by hi 3 own, letters, which have now, through being laid before Parliament, become public property. We cannot on the present occasion enter at length into a consideration of these voluminous documents, and shall, therefoi'e, confine this article to ono point, viz. :— Why General Cameron did not take tho Wereroa Pa.

After many delays the troops made their first advance and encamped on the south of the Waifcotara River. The Colony is already familiar with the history of the attack which was then made by the Maoris ; how they penetrated close to the camp, and in the first surprise shot down many soldiers. In a letter to his Excellency, dated January 28th, after alluding to this, General Cameron makes his first allusion to the Wereroa pa. He writes .—

" I consider my force insufficient to attack so formidable a work as the Wereroa pa. It

Would be necessary to establish, two posts to keep our communication open with Wanga- ' nui, and we should have to furnish escorts daily for convoys. This would reduce my force to 700 or 800 men, which would not be sufficient to provide for the protection of the camp in such a country, and at the same time to carry on all the laborious operations of the siege. Instead of 1100 men, my present available force, I should require 2000. Besides, I should not have a single soldier left in reserve, and if anything should happen in any other part of the settlement, it would take a week or ten clays to remove all the stores and raise the siege. For these reasons I do not intend to attack the pa, but to cross the Waitotara and see what can be done on that side."

It is unfortunate that there is a misprint in the official documents with reference to the number of men which the General considered necessary to attack and take the Wereroa pa — the number being printed 6000 instead of 2000. We say this is unfortunate, because it was in the highest degree important that the exact truth should be stated ; and also, because an unintentional mistake of the kind may give General Cameron and his frieuda an opening to say that the facts have been grossly misrepresented. In the haste of preparing these documents for presentation to the House the mistake escaped notice, and we therefore take this, the earliest opportunity, of correcting it on ministerial authority. The fact then remains that General Cameron has placed the opinion on record that he required 2000 men to attack the Wereroa pa, which only the other day was taken by 473 men — 300 of the Native Contingent and 173 of the Colonial forces. The old proverb, " where there's a will there's a way," was aptly illustrated in this instance. General Cameron did not take the Pa, because he had no stomach for the work ; the colonists and natives did, because they were not troubled with any misgivings, and had determined that the Maori stronghold should fall into their hands. It is not surprising that the General, while holding such opinions, should afterwards consider it absolutely necessary to ask the Governor "to apply to England for a reinforcement of 2,000 men, or a still larger reinforcement — if the plans of the Ministry were to be carried out." Again and again in his letters to Sir George Grey is this demand made, till at length it is decidedly refused. The truth apparently is, that General Cameron being disgusted with the war, thought his best plan was to make the Imperial authorities disgusted also— kence his demand for reinforcements. That lie judged accurately, Mr Cardwell's recent despatches, blaming the Ministry for wishing to continue the war with an Imperial army, clearly show. But to return to the Wereroa Pa. Sir George Grey and Ministers had stated their opinion that they did not consider reinforcements necessary, and that the Pa might bo taken by the Colonial Forces and Friendly Natives, to which General Cameron replies on March 15 th : —

"I wa« very confident that the desire stated to have been entertained by the friendly natives to be allowed to attack the Wereroa pa was mere bounce ; and I waa astonished that you should have believed in it, that is to say, if yoxi really did believe in it, and yet you could hardly havo proposed that five hundred nafives should attempt what I told you I would not undertake at that time with fewer than two thousand soldiers, if you did not really believe that they "would not succeed, As to Mr Mantell, he appears to me an excitable person, entirely devoid of common sense, and I shall pay no attention whatever in future to his opinions.

" All the reasons you mention for deciding not to apply for reinforcements are, to my mind, the strongest reasons why they should be applied for.

" In my opinion, what is now taking place does not afford the most distant prospect that the natives will soon submit in nearly all parts of the island. Their submission never appeared to me so far off as at present.

" I do not agree with you that the Colony will be able to occupy the country between the Patea and Taranaki in two years ; twenty would, in my opinion, be nearer the mark.

On again being urged to attack trie pa, General Cameron writes on March 30th.

" What is it to Mr Mantell, or any other Colonial Minister, how many British officers and soldiers we lose in any operation they recommend, so long as the policy they advocate is carried out? And I confess that this is a point which, it appears to me, has never sufficiently entered into your calculations ; for I remember your wish that I should attack the pa at Paparata, and I have reason to believe that you were of opinion I ought to have attacked the pas at Meremere and Pateranga, and that you and the Colonial Government were as much disappointed on those occasions as you appear to be in respect to the Wereroa pa. For my own part, I have a grave responsibility in this matter, and having already lost a great many valuable officers and men in attacking pas, I think I may be excused if I am somewhat cautious in undertaking operations of that description without the most absoluto necessity ; at all events, I consider it my duty, whenever you propose to me an operation which I think likely to be attended with ■ssrious loss, to let you know my opinion, and leave it to you to decide whether the political object to be gained is worth the cost."

In short, General Cameron altogether shirked taking the Wereroa pa, soon after this closed the campaign and took his departure for Auckland. Snugly ensconced there, he prepares his despatches for the Imperial War Secretary, and meantime on the 20th of May, tells his Excellency that the rainy weather is a quite sufficient reason why the pa should not be laid siege to. He writes : —

"As we have now entered on the rainy season, I am not prepared to concur in your Excellency's opinion that the siege of the Wereroa Pa would, at such a time be of necessity a short operation ; and with reference to your Excellency's remark that an over-

whelming forco could be collected for redue- ! ing the pa, because I propose the immediate withdrawal of two regiments, and as you state shortly of an additional force of three other regiments, I must remind your Excellency that I have expressed no opinion as to the time at which any reduction beyond the proI posed one of two regiments can take place, ' —the consideration of any further reduction I 1 informed your Excellency, I postponed, until I was made aware what steps the Colonial Government were taking to provide for the defence of the Colony.

" Experience has shown me that it is not generally desirable to attack such positions as the Wereroa Pa in a formal manner by a large force openly assembled for the purpose . The Natives, glad of the opportunity of fighting us with all the advantages as to position on their side, assemble from all parts of the country, and having defended their position to the last moment, effect an escape into dense forest, where it is impossible to follow them. An immediate formal attack, therefore, on the Wereroa Pa, at a time the most unfavorable in point of weather, and when the Natives are in all likelihood best prepared, is, in my opinion, unadvisable."

To this Sir George Grey replies on the fol-

lowing day : —

"It appears that although we are furnished with an army so numerous that it is proposed shortly to send five regiments out of the country,' with the finest artillery in the world, and with abundance of all those appliances which science has recently added to our means of carrying on operations apainst an enemy, and with the power of embodying Native allies, there is within a few miles of the European town of Wanganui, a position occupied by between two and three hundred of the enemy,— and that it is impossible to take that position by any formal operation in such a manner as to secure a marked and decided success.

" Whilst such is the case I fear that the enemy, emboldened by what is really so great a success on his part, will become still bolder and more daring, when in the face of this a large reduction is made in the force serving in the country."

' For a time the correspondence on this subject closes, The Governor we suppose got tired of writing to a General who could on no consideration be induced to act, so the pa remained untaken, till the Bushrangers and Natives determined to do the work. But, as is well known, they were prevented from achieving a success which was almost certain, by Military interference at a critical moment. Then matters came to a crisis, and Sir George Grey himself appeared on the scene of action.' His proceedings were prompt. When the last attempt at negotiation with the Wereroa Garrison had failed — when they absolutely refused to surrender — the Governor addressed a letter to Brigadier General Waddy, requiring to know " whether the instructions under which he was acting from Lieut. General Sir D. A. Cameron, would permit of his proceeding to invest the Wereroa Pa, and to carry out operations for its immediate reduction without reference to him." To this the Brigadier General replied that he could not act without the orders of his superior, so the work was handed over to the settlers and loyal natives — a force amounting to 473 men— who took the stronghold forthwith. It is true that a swarm of Imperial soldiers came up after the pa was taken, and wantonly destroyed every animal within the place, leaving cattle, horses, pigs, geese, fowls, and turkeys, lying shot in heaps as tokens of their prowess, but such an achievement will scarcely figure well in a despatch. Colonial forces and natives did the work, and left this act of foolish and disgraceful destruction to the Imperial troops.

Nothing could be more damaging to the reputation of General Cameron, than his action with reference to this affair. From first to last during the last wretched campaign there has been an evident shirking of that work, which he was sent out here to do. Disliking the task, he sent home his resignation last February, and ever since that time his whole efforts havo been obstructive. From February to July, when the English mail brought him the glad tidings that his resignation had been accepted, he has contrived to play at soldiering. Now the real Trorlf has to commence. Wlaatever advantages have been gained during the last six months, are due not to the General and his army, but to the colonists and their native allies. They have done the fighting — they have occupied important positions — they have taken the Wereroa pa. It is a Colonial policyjcarried into effect by a Colonial Force, to which we must trust in the future for the repression of outrages and the firm establishment of peace. Of Imperial Generals, Imperial armies, and Imperial interference, the Colony has now had more than enough.