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THE Wellington Independent "Nothing extenuate; Nor set down aught in malice." THURSDAY MORNING, 2nd JULY. MR CROSBIE WARD'S PAMPHLET.

Op what may hare been Mr Crosbie Ward's success with regard to the Panama route, the last mail has brought us no intelligence ; but we shall doubtless learn it from private sources in due time. Meanwhile we have beeu favored, with a copy of a pamphlet that gentleman has published on another subject, being a ♦• letter to Lord .Lyttelton, on the relations of Great Britain with the colonists and aborigines of New Zealand." , Mr Ward appears to have found that a very strong current of feeling had set in against New Zealand. In influential circles the genera] opinion was : — . . (1.) " That the colonists are responsible for the origin of the native disturbances in New Zealand. < - . (2.) " That the hostilities which began in the year 1860, and in which a large fo/ce of British troops haye been employed, were com* menced for the purpose of obtaining laud for the benefit of the colonists. (3.) " That the troops now quartered in the colony are maintained there for the protection of the settlers. (4.) " That the settlers, being protected by others, are unwilling to exert themselves in their own defence, but desire to. throw the i whole burden of military operations, conducted, for their benefit, on the mother country. (5.) " That a state of war is encouraged by the colonists for the sake of the expenditure from the Imperial Treasury which attends it. (6.j " That so long as Great Britain at its sole expense supplies the colonies with -troopsthe sa*ue causes will be iv operation and similar effects produced, in the constant outbreak of little wars, to be carried ou at the expense of British taxpayers, (7.) " That with such an association of fuots before it, it is the duty of the Imperial Government, in justice both to itself and the colony, to remove its troops as quickly as possible." Eeadily acknowledging that if the premises are true the conclusion must be admitted, Mr Ward proceeds to show that the' premises cannot be supported for a moment by any one who will consider the facts, and that as the eon_. elusion is therefore not fairly arrived at, it must be mischievous to all the interests concerned. In refutation of the propositions 1 and 2, Mr Ward enters very fully and clearly into the mode of government adopted for the natives. He points out that up to the introduction of the Constitution (1853) there can be no question that the colonists had nothing whatever to do with the government of the natives — that whether the treatment of the natives was good • or . bad a subject for praise oi censure,, the Governor < and the Governor only was the authority responsible for that treatment. This Mr Ward finds is in a great measure admitted, but he alsa finds that among tbose who agree with him up to this point, a very strong impression prevails that since, the introduction of the constitution, since the government of the colony by a responsible ministry, the colonists have influenced the policy pursued towards the natives, and influenced it for evil. With very great precision, and considering the mass of materials at band to work from, with remarkable brevity, Mr Ward points out that Governor Browne, when he consented to be advised by a representative Ministry, expressly excepted native affairs. This exception was distinctly ratified by the Imperial Government, and from the first was never in the slightest degree abandoned. Governor Browne regarded the Native Secretary and Land Purchase Departments as bis special native advisers, and never acted upon other advice if contrary thereto. He acted throughout on this principle with. an unwavering firmness, and never gave way to pressure from bis representative advisers, in any-: thing affecting native policy. " That Governor Browne (says Mr Ward) took every -step with' deliberate reference to the rule which he had laid down, is quite evident from the facts. He had fortified himself with the opinions of a large number of clergymen and others long resident among the Maoris, to the .effect that it was not safe to trust the • Government of the race to a changing aud indifferent body of men. Indeed, all through the negotiations witi^jthe" Legislature,- as well as in the practical

administration of affairs, he exhibited a firmness of purpose, a careful adherence to his plan } and a consistent reliance, in native affairs, on his own opinion and on that of his chosen advisers in preference to that of his responsible Ministers, which contrasts remarkably with his complete acceptance of a constitutional position in all matters relating to the colonists. That Governor Browne planned and carried out most exactly, for several years, this most difficult system of a double government, ought to be a complete refutation of the assertion which has been made, that after all, in the serious matter of going to war, he weakly departed from his principles, and yielded to the solicitations of interested colonists. He listened to the advice of his Executive Council, as he was bound to do, but never deferred to it in native matters. Here he held himself alone respon- ' sible, and never sought to throw that responsi- 1 bility on any other person. He had the firmness which springs from a clear perception of duty." j

Having thus pointed out the incorrectness of supposing that the colonists were responsible for anything in connexion with native affairs, and supported his argument by a reference to numerous official papers, Mr Ward shows that a policy was sometimes pursued by the Governor exactly opposite to that which the colonists approved and recommended through their representative ministry. The opposition of the Governor to the " Territorial Eights Bill, 1858," is quoted as an instance. With reference to the conflict that took place between the Legislature and the Governor on that measure, it is clearly shown that the Governor, by his power of veto, was able to defeat all attempts of the colonists to act in native matters iv any way that wus objectionable to himself, and that lie did not scruple to make use of his power when he thought it necessary. The manner in which the King movement was treated is also quoted to prove that the power of Governor Browne in native matters was supreme, and that he refused to defer to ministerial advice when he disagreed with it. " The King movement (says Mr Ward) was regarded by the Colonial Ministry of the time as indicatiog a desire for law and order, that is for a stronger government than then ruled those tribes: The Governor's special advisers in native affairs, on the ether baud, considered the movement to be merely one of trifling local and evanescent consequence, originating in the ambition and restlessness of the young men who desired to rival the older chiefs. At a later date, the movement either assumed or was recognised for the first time as possessing the character of a wide spread organisation for procuring 1 the absolute independence of the Maori race. But in 1858, though there had been already much ieason for studying the symptoms of the move, ment, politicians bad not advanced beyond the first two opinions, between which they were divided — the representatives of the colony on oue side of tboseand ibe Imperial Governtnenton the other. The Resident Magistrate at the headquarters of the movement, Mr Fenton, held the first opinion, and was energetic in his attempts to guide what he thought a movement in favor of law and order to a safe and legitimate result, by bringing English Government within reach of the natives in a shape adapted to their customs. v In these efforts he was supported by the Ministry, who tendered their advice to his Excellency accordingly. The Governor, however, true to his rule, did not suffer himself to be guided by this advice, even though he might at first approve of it. He sought counsel fiom the beads of the native department, whom he was justified in assuming to have a more exact knowledge of the history, and a more intimate understanding of the designs of the Maori people. Ke acted upon the opinion entertained by these gentlemen, that Mr Fenton's policy was alienating the old chiefs, iv whom confidence ought to be placed ; that to treat the movement as important was to make it so ; and that to neglect it was the only safe treatment. Mr Fentou was therefore Tecalled from the Waikato : the work that he had begun was undone, and the King Movement was left to itself. It is of no importance for the present argument, whether the colonial policy were right or wrong ; possibly neither may have been the right oue. But every one must confess that no more important question than this could have been presented for solution to those holding the reins of government, even though peace had never afterwards been broken ; and that the positive rejection of the advice tendered on the part of the colony on this occasion, and the deliberate uudoing of the work of which the Ministry approved, remove from the latter any sort of responsibility for whatever consequences may be traceable to the progress of the King Movement. It must now be conceded that both in the theory of native government and in the administration of its functions, as well legislative as executive, the Imperial Government has rigidly reserved from the Colony, and to itself, all real power."

At this point we must stop for the present. Mr Ward bas we think conclusively shown that the colonists had not been responsible theoretically, technically, or legally" for the conduct of the policy puisued towards the natives. He wishes it had been otherwise. " I am bound to express (he says) my conviction, one in which a great number if not all of the colonists have agreed, both before and since the war, that this reservation was a most unfortunate act, highly injurious to all the three par ties to it. The action of the Colonial Ministry has been all along a standing protest against its adoption and continuance."

In our next, we shall see how he clears the colonists from all moral complicity.

Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/WI18630702.2.10

Bibliographic details

Wellington Independent, Volume XVIII, Issue 1889, 2 July 1863, Page 2

Word Count
1,709

THE Wellington Independent "Nothing extenuate; Nor set down aught in malice." THURSDAY MORNING, 2nd JULY. MR CROSBIE WARD'S PAMPHLET. Wellington Independent, Volume XVIII, Issue 1889, 2 July 1863, Page 2

THE Wellington Independent "Nothing extenuate; Nor set down aught in malice." THURSDAY MORNING, 2nd JULY. MR CROSBIE WARD'S PAMPHLET. Wellington Independent, Volume XVIII, Issue 1889, 2 July 1863, Page 2

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