GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

Wellington Independent, Volume XVI, Issue 1605, 2 August 1861, Page 5

GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

HOUSE OF EEPBESENTATIVES. Wednesday, July 3bd, 1861. The Speaker took the Chair at 5 o'clock. WANT OF CONFIDENCE. Mr. Fox said lie had no doubt that before this debate had proceeded very fay he should hear some hon. member rise and'denounce it as a party motion— some member who, five years ago, had, by n paity vote, placed the Ministry in power, and by a succession of party votes since given, had kept them there. He hoped that when that hon. member rose, he would tell the House when in the history of responsiblt government it had ever been carried on withoue p arty organization, and how he proposed for the utuie to cany it on without. Parly was the

sinking of minor differences in order that men might combine to cany out the great principles on which they were agreed. AH government since the world began had been by party ; the only difference was, that under despotic governments the party of the minority ruled — under representative, the party of the majority. In arraigning the Ministry before the House, he did not propose to enter upon a general criticism of all their acts for the past five year?, but should confine himself to such topics as | would exhibit their unfit ness to hold the reins at the present crisis. That crisis was one unexampled in the history of any colony, ana he regarded the present Ministry as altogether unequal to it. We stood now in a position previously analogous to that in which we stood little more than a year ago, before the Taranaki war began, and by referring to the character of the government then we mightjudge what we had to had to expect from them now. Let the House go back to the first step by which the Government involved the colony in responsibility for. this war — the fatal Executive Council of the 25th of January, 1860, when they advised the ' Governor to draw the sword. What was the result of that advice? It was that the Duke of Newcastle was now in a position to treat it as a settlers' war, and charge the colony with its cost. Why did not the Ministers refer His Excellency to the arrangirents of 1856, and while they tendered him their [advice and the support of the colony, declare in unequivocal terms that they would have nothing to do with the war unless on the footing of an Imperial war ? This was their first great error. Then on the same fatal day they issued that celebrated proclamation of martial law, which they placed in the hands of a captain of a marching regiment to issue at his discretion; reudering war certain, and a peaceful termination of our difficulties, by negotiation or inquiry, absolutely impossible. Why did not the Governor himself, why did not his Ministers accompany this proclamation to Taranaki, instead of imposing on Colonel Murray the unfair responsibility of deciding when to declare war between the British Government and the native race ? And why was no warning given to the colonists of New .Zealand, particularly those between Taranaki and Wellington, where Kingi's relations lived, and where sympathy with him was certain. The inhabitants of that coast, interspersed among Natives who might have been expected to join the war, had no knowledge even of the intention of the Gorernment to go to war till many days, he belived it was weeks, after the first blow had been struck. To place so large a body of the colonists, nay all of them, in so peiiious a position was an act of recklessness, if not of cold-blooded heartless cruelty, which if it stood aloue was enough to condemn the Ministry. But not only were they unarmed, but they were utterly unprepared. We were told now that we must defend ourselves everywhere, except at the centres of population. But how could the settlers protect themselves if unarmed and unorganized? When the first blow was struck the whole Piovince of Wellington was absolutely without a weapon of defence, except the few fowling pieces with which the settlers might amuse themselves with shooting pigeons — not one arm for every twenty men. Then, not only was this war begun without arming the settlers, j but Ibis Ministry had, with an infatuation almost amounting to insanity, advised the Governor to arm the Natives to the teeth. By j repealing Sir George Grey's wise laws against the sale of arms and ammunition, they had in ' three years placed in the hands of the Natives not less than fifty thousand pounds worth of buth, according to the Government returns laid on the table of that House. But besides this, — and it was so incredible an act of folly that he would hesitate to state it as a fact did not the Government return also prove it, 1 ,000 stand of arms, good percussion muskets, had been sent out of the colony, shipped to England, after or at^the very date of issue of the proclamation of martial law, and 400 stand of pensioners' muskets had been sold by the Government in the colony and at once gone into the hands of the Natives. And yet we weie to be told that the men who had acted in this way at the commencement of the late war, — who had thrown the firebrand into the fern without a word of warning to the unprotected settlers, — who had left them without the means of defence while they provided the Natives with all the means of aggression, — were the men who were to be entrusted with the safety of the colony at the present far more threatening crisis. He (Mr. Fox) would not follow the hon. gentlemen into the conduct of the war. No doubt they would be told that notwithstanding theii interference for three months (from the sth April to the 7th July) with the Commander-in-Chief, restricting his operations to a part only of the insurgent force, they had never interfered with the conduct of the war — that it was in other hands and not theirs. But, Sir, if they are not responsible for the disasters of the war itself, what shall we say of its ignominions conclusion ; of those terms of peace disgraceful to the Government of this colony, and calculated to fill the Natives with contempt for British power. At the mom en t when some success seemed for the first time to be within their reach, when the matured plans of six months were about to be brought to a final issue, when a blow might have been struck which might have terminated the war, the Ministry rush in and prevent it, by offering terms of peace which admit that the Government was wrong from the beginning, and by which they now propose that very investigation the absence of which caused the war, and which when proposed in this House a year ago they scouted on the ground that there had been too much investigation already ! Sir, the reason of that rash conclusion of the war was evident. It was the arrival of the Duke of Newcastle's despatch recommending the Governor to ACCOMMODATE HIS QUARREL With \V. Kiugi ; declining to accept the war as one waged on account of British supremacy, and designat ing it as the ".Gorernors's quarrel with Kingi." No doubt ibe Government saw it was time to " accommodate " this little quarrel, and to find some broader ground for their appeal to arms, than this miserable land squabble about Te Teira's block. And so with indecent haste, they proposed these terms of peace. But look at them— how unfair !- imposing terms of the greatest severity on those who had least provoked the war, uud comparatively mild terms on the first aggressors. And, then, were they curried out? The Governor had publicly. told the Ngatiruanuis that unless they accepted the terms at once, he would hand them over to General Cameron. Had he done so? No; they had refused the terms unequivocally, and he had brought General Cameron and his troops away, leaving them to laugh at his threats. Then as to those who had accepted the terms— had they been required to fulfil them? Had they restored the plunder? Had they brought back a single bullock— a single sheep ? (Yes ; from Mr. C. J. Richmond.) Oh, they hud— they had brou|ht back a single sheep, and this was the extent of the restoration ol plunder ! If the terms of peace were ignoinini-

ous in themselves, the manner in which tbej were trifled with afterwards was worse. Now ; Sir, (continued the hon. member) what security have we that if those gentleman continue to be His Excellency's advisers, we shall not have a repetition of these events, only on a far larger scale ? What security have we that, after a war rashly entered upon, disasterously conducted, we shall not see it terminated by a disgraceful peace? What preparation has been made tor the defence of the colonists? The Governor has told us that, except at th,e centres of population, that is, the towns of Auckland, Wellington, and Wanganui, we must protect ourselves; that not 20,000 men would enable him to do it; and theu (with what — if it came from any other quarter — he should designate as bitter irony, which, if it had fallen from Eabelais or Swift, he should call a master-stroke of wit)— His Excellency told us that we must build block-houses and defend them, as the settlers had done at Taianaki. This was all the preparation for defence his Excellency had to offer ! For arms we had to ibis hour none sufficient for the emergency. Not 25 per cent of the adult men were armed anywhere, and large populations were absolutely without a weapon. Yet the Government had had for many years at their absolute disposal £150,000 for do other puipose than to provide arms and other means of defence, and till this hour they had not imported more than some 3000 stand of arms to arm 25,000 men capable of carrying them in this island. Was not this the very duplicate of our position before the last war, only on a larger scale ? Was it not a mockery to tell us to defend ourselves, when we had no other weapons than broomsticks ? Sir, the very first blow that was strvick the out-settlers would have no resource but to fly for relnge to the towns. And what preparation had been made, what could be made for their reception and maintenance? Picture 25,000 women and children added to the population of Auckland, Wellington, and Wanganui, absolutely without nouse accommodation, with insufficient food, with fever and other diseases raging, the husbands and fathers taken away to serve in the Militia under Martial Law, the wives and daughters left to the mercy of a garrison town ! this was what the Government, without preparation — without apparently a thought—was ready to plunge us into. But if even we were ready to face this, where were the means of providing for it ? The very first year would involve an outlay of half a million sterling for places of refuge and maintenance. Where was the money to come from ? Was it in the general balance? Was it in the Colonial chest? Where was it to be got by a Government already overwhelmed with debt and involved in war? Yet it was precisely that species of expenditure which the Home Government told us we must pay ourselves. Then when the wai was over, which he did not believe it would be for ten years if it once begaD, what provision did they propose for the ruined colonists? The member for the City West spoke of the lands of the conquered Natives as the natural fund out of which compensation should be made. But, judging by the present terms of peace, no such compensation would be provided. Compensation to ruined men in a few acres of land was a mockery. Land, without the means of cultivating or stocking it, was a mere abyss, in which more deeply to sink the already ruined colonist. Miserable then was the prospect if the present ministry retained power. No preparation — no warning — no means of defence — no place of refuge — no compensation for ruin — a disastrous war, to be followed by a disgraceful peace. The hon. member, the Colonial Treasurer, in a late speech, which smelt very much of the midnight lamp, had asked the House whether there were any who thought that their " ill success in the war was a verdict of Nature and of God against folly and injustice ; and who thought that the wasted homesteads of Taranaki and her desolated hearths were a righteous retribution for covetousness, j which in attaining its end had covered us with blood-guiltiness ?" Sir, the suggestions are those of the hon. member's own mind ; no one on this side of the house has ever intimated anything of the sort. For my part, I trust I know two well the rules of our common faith to point the edicts of the Almighty, or give a personal application to the judgments of the Great Buler of events: but, being as we are, of a nation which chants Te Deums for her great military sucsesses and proclaims for her victories days of thanksgiving to the God of Battles, I think that after the disaster which we have undergone during the last year — after the ill success to which the hon. Colonial Treasurer has alluded, we may well pause and re-consider our position before we plunge into another war of magnitude far greater than the former. Are we not bQund to look about us, and see whether we cannot find some better way of facing the present crisis than by the sword ? Is there no other means of settling our differences with the Native race then by war? Sir, his Excelleucy has spoken of negociation — his Ministers have spoken of it, am I wrong in saying that to negotiation wo may look for a solution of our dilliculties ? I like not, however, the tone in which the hon, member opposite has spoken on the subject, or the sentiments be has put into his Excellency's mouth, — expressions which led me to doubt ths sincerity of the hou. member, and the genuineness of his desire that negociation of the right sort should be resorted to. He (Mr. Bichmond) assumed that there were some who desired indefinite negocialion— protracted to any imaginable period. No such intention bad beeu expressed in that House or out of it. What was demanded was bona fide negociation, of a character likely to attain its end, and not a mere sham negociation certain to fail. We had first to ascertain with whom we were to negociate, and failing negotiation, with whom we might have to light. VVere we to treat with those few who had been in arms against us on the same footing as we should treat with the 50,000 who had committed no overt, act of. rebellion ? Were we to treat only with the rebels, and not to treat with the great bulk; of the Natives who, though favouring the King; movement, and likely to join it if war were 'precipated, might yet be detached from it, or at least from allj that was objectionable in it? Let it be clearly defined by if fight we must , for what we are gh'ing to fight- Don't let us have to defend the' ground on which we stand by reams of foolscap* and endless hair-splitting. Let all be made plain and clear, and the misunderstandings which exist on both sides, both European and Native, as to our present position, if possible be removed. I believe that the war may yet be avoided by negociation, if it be genuine and real. But not by such negociation as the Government has inagurated, nor carried on as they seem to be carrying it on. But of one thing I am certain ; it cannot succeed in their hands. What are they doing now about it— what are they capable of doing? Whc are their negotiators and where? 1 will UOl ask why does not Ins Excellency, who has re tamed the management of Native affairs iv his own hands, undertake the negotiations as hit, predecessors would have done; for the Native j

Minister had told us that his Excellency had;-/", lost the confidence of the Natives, and of course personal negociation by him wouli be useless. I will not suggest that if this statement of the Native Minsters he correct the sooner his Ext cellency notifies to her Majesty's Government at home, and leaves them to deal with it, the better But, Sir, why do not they themselves undertake it. Why do they sit in their offices at Auckland and only communicate with, the Natives by sealed letters seat through the hands of third-class clerks' ? Is it not because they know, that the Natives will not treat with them P that that they look upon them with suspicion, based upon tbeir past career? The Natives believe thereto be the authors of the Taranaki war, they know them to be the fathers of the Native Offenders Bill; and though the Ministers should wash their bunds in Lethe for a hundred years they would never wash out the stains with which in Native eyes they are imbued. It is impossible fov them to negociate, there is no resource for them but to fight. Then they have repelled from their councils and their friendship nearly every one who might have influedce with the Natives. But perhaps they propose another Kohimarama Conference.' Then itmustbea very different one from the last, which of all the farces ever enacted was the greatest fatce. A number of Chiefs, not representative men, or elected by their own people, but selected by the Native Secretary at his own caprice, presided over by that officer, like little boys at school beneath the form ot their master, euaeted the tamest of plays, not like the iree and outspoken deliberations of a Maori vunanga, nor in that war-dance style which the Colonial Secretary had so successful! / imitated in this house a few days since, bu with an air of depression and apathy which too truly indicated the true character of that most impudent sham. , Yet a repetition of this seemed to be the only machinery of negotiations which the ministers proposed. He (Mr. F.) would now state to this House the principles on which he. was prepared to act himself if called upon to advise his Excellency. He was not going enunciate a policy as the Native Minister challenged him to do, a course altogether unheard of on the part of an opposition. But the House expected, and had a sight to know, his general views of their preseut crisis. If the Ministry wanted to know more they might consult some of their whippersin, whom they had in their train; whose eye, seemed to be at every keyhole and whose ear at every partition wall, and who if they could discover by their means any fact worth carrying to their employers could invent a " peace at any^ price party," or a' convival gatheringat a tavern.' What I hold as to the present crisis then, the hon, member contiuued, is this: Ist. That it ought to be disentangled as far as possible from the Taranaki war, and the true grounds of our position distinctly defined. 2nd. I accept as the basis of negociation with all toho have been in arms, or .who openly defy the authority of the Queen, theterms offered by the Governor to the Waikatos, viz., submissiou to the Queen's authority, restoration of plunder when in possession of it, and compenatsion by those who have done injury. 3rd. That if submission be not voluntary made, it must be enforced. 4th. That if war results it should be prosecuted vigorously and not be terminated except by a lasting and honorable peace. I will not talk British Lion, because I believe that those who do so seldom have anything of the Lion about them but the Lion's skin, and that when that is stripped off, there is found beneath an animal o£ a very different sort. But I firmly believe in a vigorous war if war we are to have • at all. otb. I hold that such war, not originating as the last did in a land squabble, but for the maintenance of British Supremacy, will be an Imperial and not a settlers' war ; and that the local forces ought to be used for purposes of protection not of aggression. 6ih, That before a blow is struck the population of the provinces ought to be placed in a position to protect themselves as well as to provide refugee for their families. 7th, That before we go to war, real negotiations, carried on by parties in whom the Natives may have confidence, should be undertaken by His Excellency's Government, to induce the Natives to submit to the authority of the Crown. Bth. That such negotiations ought not to be confined to the insurgents, but extend to all the Natives; and that while submission is demanded on the one haud, we ought to offer with the other large powers of self-government in all their own affairs. As regarded the terms of peace offered to the Waikatos, while he was prepared to adopt them as a basis of negociation with actual insurgents, he by no means adopted them in their entirety. From many parts of the initiatory portiou ne entirely dissented. He did not concur in His Excellency's view of the King movement as there stated,but believed that the opposite view which had been taken by the Waikato Com mittee was the true one. Neither could he concur in the statement which the Ministers had put into His Excellency's mouth that ke was commanded by the Queen to suppress unlawful combinations, fov the despatch to which His Excellency referred would hear no such construction; at least when applied to the King movement; and the Duke of Newcastle would probably be much astonished when- made acquainted with this perversion of his instructions. The hon. member then proceeded briefly to glance at the conduct of the Ministry in other matters : their determination to destroy the Provincial element of our constitution, not hy open and candid means, but by underhand methods, by involving them in pecuniary difficulties, by witholding the government balances, . by fostering their local differences, by enhancing their deadlocks, by dismemberment and in other ways. He then analysed their character as statesmen, showing'how though they were able writers of memoranda and despatches, and acts of assembly, tkey were not men of action, wers utterly incapable in th« realities of life,- and ~ invatiably failed to carry out their-paper policy. He also denounced their want of straightforwardness, instancing a few of their triokly manoeuvres such as the disfranchisement of Wellington in 1858, then marshalling the elections of 1861 so as to take Wellington hy surprise, to enable the Attorney General to play political agitator at Auckland, and o fiord the Native Minister a refuge in the South, where he was elected by his own shepherds or his own sheep, for he (Mr. F.) was not very sure which he represented. In conclusion the crisis was one full of gloom and darkness, the direct result of the misgovernment of the present ministry ; but the darkest time of the night was that which precedes the dawn, and if there was yet a ray of hope for New Zealand, it was to. be found- m the removal of that Ministry from office. (Loud cheers ) Mr. R. Wood seconded the motion. Mr. Stafjfobd : Sir, iv rising to reply to ,the speech with which the hon. member fov Bangi* tikei has introduced his motion, I must Ask for the indulgence of the House, in consideration of the peculiar position in which the, Government is necessarily placed by a motion whrob, while it indicated no specific.point of attack, yet left to its mover the power of referring toany quegtion connected either with our administration o| the Government, or with the legislation which