THE WAIKATO TRIBE. IS IT TO BE PEACE OR WAR?

Wellington Independent, Volume XVI, Issue 1598, 9 July 1861, Page 2

THE WAIKATO TRIBE. IS IT TO BE PEACE OR WAR?

Uneasy state of the North. The Governor's l , Terms' to the Waikatos. Are J they only a political ruse ? The Wai- ; hato country described. Its difficult nature admitted by all. Cfeneral Cameron's original vieivs] modified; The ' Road' and ' Rifle' policies. As complete military success cannot be looked for, the 0-overnment Organ, being thoroughly convinced of the losses and sacrifices which war must entail on all in the colony, proposes to cut the Crordian hiot by opening up the Waikato district by means cf a military road. 1 The pick and shovel to do tJie work of the rifle. Further difficulties — in the • way of conciliaton, arising out of the ■ numerous tribes to negotiate with ; in the way of hostilities, arising from the Waikato tribes being partly loyal and partly disloyal. Inadequacy of present military force. Pervading the Auckland Newspapers received during the middle of last month there was, despite the attempt, to ' make the best of it/ an evident feeling of uneasiness. Just as when a heavy long dated bill is first given, its having to be paid months hence causes little or no immediate trouble ; yet as it approaches the day of maturity, the necessity for providing the funds to meet it becomes a source of constant .anxiety — so the once distantly contem- : plated period when the King Movement Srould be put down by force is now, to all appearances* approaching; and as the day draws near, the serious character of the consequences involved becomes apparent. Just as the many sources from which the bill was to be readily met . dwindle away, and the easy task its liquidation once seemed taxes every energy to accomplish, if indeed a compromise is not at last made by a partial ;' renewal — so the ease with which it used to be said war could be carried into the Waikato country, and the certainty of speedy victory which the mass of troops now concentrated on its borders, led by such an officer as General Cameron, ■would achieve, are looked upon in a greatly modified view ; indeed the Wai-kato-Country is nofc only pronounced to be most difficult, and one in which it is barely possible to bring the natives to bay, but the number of troops is still felt to be inadequate ; even the General hesitates, and the ministerial organ (once go ready to urge the attack) suggests a compromise-- suggests that the troops should be turned into navvies, and bring the natives to subjection by showing "them how increasedly valuable civilisation renders their property, instead of by following oukthe ordinary method in use among soldiflrs.: 1 '.'.,,.. The l terms,' or declaration, or ulfcir matum, issued by the Governor to the Waikatos on the 21st May, (and published below) have certainly broughtthe Government and the King Movemeni * face to face.' These c terms ' are boldly /written, and calculated to bring matters to an issue. The natives have since rejected them. What His Excellency will now do none of us can pretend to say. He i has made threats equally as strong before, and. failed to execute them. Remembering how the public avowal at Taranaki of his intention to place the Southern rebels in General Cameron's hands, was followed t>y the withdrawal of the troops, we may be excused from implicitly pinning our faith to that which he now makes in reference to the Waikatos. He may bs, sincere; but having deceived us by liis cry of 'wolf before, we cannot be sure that he will not do so again ; and we must be pardoned the suspicion that HOt. unnaturally asks* whether the issue of this declaration a few days before the meeting of the Assembly, after having so long postponed it, is not after all limply a ruse of the Stafford Ministry; aiK^cy W<& they only put forth for 'Art I' I -":- ' ■:•'- :' -' '■''-:,. ' .

the sake of popularity — as they did that of ' vigorous prosecution ' last session — a policy which they do not intend to carry out any more than they vigorously prosecuted matters at Taranaki. • We make very fall quotations from the Auckland press in support of the statements above made— that the Waikato Country is now looked upon at Auckland a3 a most difficult _ one; that the number of troops is considered to be still inadequate ; that the General hesitates; and that a compromise is proposed, the making of roads being substituted for actual fighting. While quoting proof from the Auckland press we are- not to be understood as assenting |or dissenting from their views. Our object is simply to show to our readers the present phase of the constantly shifting aspect which the state of Northern 'native matters assume. Another summary maylpresent a totally different phase, our duty, however, requires that meanwhile we should present things as they are, not as they may be. A writer under the signature ' Fabius in the New Zealander thus alludes to the nature of the Waikato Country, and the possiblity of the natives descending upon other settlements — all of which are in- ' sufficiently protected.^ The Government now stands face to face with the MaoriKing.anditis generally acknowledger! to be for the interest of botlWaces that the latter should be put down. There are two modes in which it is thought that this object can be accomplished ; some advocate physical force , others a policy of conciliation. As it is impossible that any active measures can be taken, for some months, time is allowed for reflection. It appears to me highly important that in this interval the advantages and disadvantages of both these methods should be temperately discussed. In this letter I purpose to offer a few observations on the method of physical furce : should you deem them worthy of iusertiou in your paper I shall hope to continue the 'subject hereafter. i r oi\r own sentiments on this subject are expressed in these words :— " If a blow is to be .struck in Waikato, it must bo made, and it will be made, final and crushing." That the blow, if struck shall be final and crushing, is demanded by humanity. I inrite your attention to some of the difficulties that must be overcome in order that it may be made so. In the first place, the locality where the blow must be struck is at a great distance. Ngarua- ( wahia is more than 80 miles from Auckland. Should the enemy retire southwards towards the Taupo. allies, they cati eery greatly iuerease this distance r for no final or crushing blow can be struck till the enemy is overtaken. There is little to destroy at Ngaruawubia beyond the flagstaff and the King's house, which is not a very sumptuous edifice ; the burning of standing ciops ami raupo houses may exasperate but j will scarcely crush the enemy. Thus the troops will have to advance at least 80 miles, and probably much more, in order tv reach the scene of action. Your readers are acquainted with the nature of the country they must traverse; the dense bush from 8 to 15 miles wide beyond Drury and Mauku ; the rapid river filled with shallows, sand-banks, and tree stumps ; the banks in some places swampy, in others covered with bush, iutersected by deep muddy tributaries, and nearer the supposed scene of action consisting of hills difficult of access and densely covered with trees. Military and Commissariat Officers will be able to ' tell what facilities such a route oilers for the i conveyance of guns und other " materiel," aud , of food for the men, who will find small raeaus of subsistence in the enemy's country ; what danger there may be moreover of ambuscades in the forest beyond Drury or in the swamps and bush on the river banks. Attacks on the communications seem very probable from the great mobility of the euemy. The Maori warriors having few accoutrements and no baggage, train can move about with great rapidity through swamps and forests unknown and inaccessible to us. Driven from Waikato, they may reappear on the Thames, or united as they will probably be to nearly all the natives in the interior of the island, they may descend upon whatever settlement they choose. It is therefore obvious that all the settlements in the Northern Island will have to be secured against attack. For this the colonists must make very great personal sacrifices, the militia and volunteers in every settlement must be carefully organised and prepared for active service. It will be remembered how difficult the previous Generals found it to defend the town of New Plymouth and at the same time conduct war even at Waitava. The colonists repose groat confidence in the military talents of the new General: he will need them, if he have to defend five or six settlements, and at the same time conduct operations at a distance of 100 miles. But supposing all these new difficulties overcome and the soldiers brought face to face with the, Maories, there remain still all the old difficulties experienced at Waitara. The pro--grcsyrirere-was-sJowr-what ground is there for supposing that in Waikato it will he more rapid ? We have more troops, it is true,-bnt-irr VVaikato it is not unlikely that the enemy will be more than proportionately increased. We have a new. Geneva!, so have the Maories ; and their faith in Wm. Thompson is as strong as ours in General Cameron. Lastly, the time for operations is short ; tut Maories must not ouly be crushed, but crushed within 7or 8 months. For military operations Waikato is now considered closeu ; we may therefore assume that at this time next year it will be closed again ; if the operations against the enemy are notby that time brought to a successful issue, they must be recommenced afresh in the following spring. The Southern Gross, the organ be it remembered of the Stafford Government, confirms the account (to a great extent) of the writer in the New Zealander, and ioforms us that in the Waikato country, - the difficulty which it is so desirable to overcome — that of bringing the Natives to bay — presents itself equally as elsewhere. If any portion of the press maybe supposed to know the General's views it is the Southern Cross, and that paper it will be seen states that he has * not yet decided ' We had heard that the Go'neral's views had become considerably modified since his residence in. Nw

Zealand, and such, is no"\Y known to be the case. There has been much discussiou of late as to the best manner of dealing with the natives, should strong measures become necessary. A raid into Waikato has been urged, aud tbe question openly discussed, whether such a step would be likelj to be attended with succes. The Doctors differ, and General Cameron has not yet decided. Tho difficulties which must be encountered in such an invasion are on the one -hand spoken of so lightly that one woald imagine the speakers and the writers were talking of a military march through an open civilized country ; whilst, on the other, they are exaggerated to such an extent as to appear insurmountable, even to men who 4mve surmounted difficulties by flood and field in every part of the world. Truth, of course, lies in the middle. The Waikato presents formidable difficulties, no doubt, to an invader; but not, we think, so great as some imagine. They are to be overcome, but they must be faced warily. It is a country in which it would be almost impossible to folloio up an enemy and briny j them to a decisive engagement. Traversed by i bush, swamps, and mountain ranges, a native enemy, with their local knowledge and their individual independence in action, might for months, if not years, harass and evade their pursuers, and retreat from fastness to fastness, leaving 1 nothing behind them worth taking but' deserted camping places. The Government organ commenting i on Fabius's ' very able letter ' above quoted from the Hew Zealanchr^ thus advocates the 'road' in preference . to the ' rifle ' policy. New Zealand it mint be allowed is a difli cult country to govern. Our peculiar relations to the native population, and their peculiar character vendor it the easiest thing in the world ti commence a quarrel \yjth thorn, or rather the most difficult thing to avoid being drawn into one; jthe nature of the country is such, that few anticipate great results when at last hostilities become inevitable, and many good judges believe that complete military success is not In be looked for; and finally as we see ;it the present time a most anomalous state of things may be the result of hostilities. We have neither peace nor war: the country is full of soldiers, and the natives have returned to their peaceful avocations for the winter months, are possible sorry for what they have done, but certainly do not act us if they were, and at all events show very few signs of fear. Subdued they are not. A very able letter appeared on this subject iv a letter addressed to our cotemporary, the New Zealander, which was published iv Saturday's number of that journal. It bears the signature, JTabius. Tne writer's object appears to be to point out tho difficulties to be encountered, if hostilities ate ever commenced in the enemy's country, and the great sacrifices which must be made if they are to be eifectually surmounted. At the same time he refrains from hazirding a suggestion as to the best manner of facing the present crisis, a line in which we shall follow his example; but thoroughly convinced though we are with many others in the commnuiiy holding- similar opinions to those of Fabius, that the work of subduing the native race by force of arms is one not lightly or thoughtlessly to he entered upon, nor toilhout a perfect, recognition of the losses and sacrifices which it mnst entail on all in the country, we hold it useful to analyse the true nature of the circumstances which enable a population of some u'fty thousand souls to bid defiance for so long a time to the British Govern tneut. It is not the high fern, nor the snags in the rivers, nor the bushes, nor the gullies, nor the lauges merely which we have ty contend with ; it would be an insult to our soldiers to allege that they could not soon overcome these. It is ' not the indomitable courage and determination of the native, which some say would cause him to die rather than surrender an inch of land : for we believe that there is no great difference between him and any other human being ; that he is a brave man enough, but like our Celtic and Saxon ancestors to be beaten, and to be forced to give in — and yet able to survive such au event without any suicidal temptations. Tbe real obstacle in our way is a different one. It is simply to bo found in the Maori system of tenure of land. It is oommuuism in land amongst the natives, which enables them to carry the hold front which they do. *** * . * We might possibly shoot the natives all down in a few years,— but it is only in English newspapers that we find men discussing the possibility of an English community being desirous of seeing such a consummation brought ab.out: the only real hold we shall ever have on the Maori race will be through their lands. We do not suggest such v thing us general confiscation, but meiely say that the Government, has a right to demand who are the real posses- \ sois of land from which we have been threatened; i and to impound il like unclaimed cattle till the real owner shows himself, who should then be made to put his own brand upon it before it is returned to him. We may then consider him — and he will be— personally responsible for any further damage, so far as that land is concerned. In short, we shall have no hold ou the natives till they individualise their pro-, perty ; tili they have Crown Grants given them for what is justly their own ;— till their property is branded. It will be said that this is the very thing-, which it is-so difficult to do, and jt_is_ so : but still it is a definite object to work for, and one which may be attained by means even fiom'a military point of view most judicious. A road! through the country — no mere track we mean,', — would soon serve to individualize the owner-' i ship of the land abutting on it. As mile after) mile was completed, the natives would begin to I appreciate the increased value of their properly, and become anxious to have their titles to portions recognized. They would receive Crown Grants, aud every man with one would be a man lost to the enemy. It will take much time and labour to bring about such a result, but we are not safe in trusting to any half measures, and should never be deterred by difficulties from doing what must sooner or later be done, but rather study how host to surmouut them effectually. And in another article the same policy is more pithily expressed thus — The pick and shovel must do the work of the j rifle. The country must be sapped with a high j road, and if they wish to light, the eucmy must come out from their sirougholds and fight round tho working parties. When they are beaten back there will he no necessity for, following thera up; the road will gradually penetrate the counlvy, and wheie there is a- road, British soldiers,, properly commanded, ought to be able to hold their own. Law and the rights ,of property would soon follow, the steady advance of British arms would soon '>ecoma the highway of civilization.

Without pausing to point out the dif " ficulties which this method of cutting the the Gordian Knot, and indeed any method of doing it, presents, these quotations suffice to prove that the difficulties of the Governor's position arc not overlooked by the Auckland public^ and that the course to be pursued is a , most difficult one.' Here we might stop, but the view presented to our readers would be incomplete without the following from the 'New Zealander. The one great difficulty of the Waikalo question is a difficulty which, although most certainly visible and appreciable, is so subtle and so intangible us almost to (lefyany grappling with it. It will elude the keen" edge of the sword as it floes the sharp wit of diplomacy. The gallant General who brings us a- name belonging to an illustrious band of heroes, Woukfrio move he able to get hold of it than i the ablest of Governors, or the most experienced of Secretaries in the Naiivo Office, or j I the most self-sufficient of Maori Doctors in the House; to say nothing of the most splenetic of Archdeacons in the Church. It lies simply here : you have nvt any one to deal with. When we make a demand on any people with a recognised Government, we know from whom we arc to get an answer. Even at the Waitara we were dealing specifically \yilh one tribe. Yet what happened there ? The Ng'atiawa insurrection broke to pieces, and we were fain to receive the separate submission of Hapurona and Patukakariki, letting William Kin«? go off with his tail between his legs. At Waikalo this difficulty is indefinitely multiplied. Mr. Fencon's list of 150 tribes and hapus, in the Appendix to the Waikato Committee's report, is of itself sufficient to negative the expectation of being able to get a categorical answer there from any one to whom we may apply at first. Suppose negotiation is tried : what Chief or Chiefs of Waikato can at the present moment bind the tribes, or give vis any veal security for their submission to the Qiieen ? We know that Tamati Ngapora, that Wiremu Nera, with many others of nearly equal rank, have always been, on the Queen's sidrr; but their loyalty is no guarantee against the designs of the land iea-niers, nor the slightest hostage for the con tinuance of peace. We know that even Thompson professes loyalty and a desire for law, and that King Matutaero himself "is to his people no gre.rt sovereign ; yet it would bo nonsense to call these men good subjects. , Or suppose the matter is handed over to the General; whom is he to attack? No one in his senses supposes that a movement of the troops upon Wrukato can be made without occupying the country of friends as well as foes, and without therefore making it quite uncertain whether the blow would first fall on the beads of rebels. We may find ourselves commencing the establishment of the Queen's supremacy, by destroying those who have all along been most desirous of it. Now fully understanding the Auckland estimation of the difficulties of the present position of native affairs, our readers will, perhaps, be somewhat inclined to doubt the sincerity of the Governors's ' terms ' to the Waikato, boforo alluded to as published below, and disposed to look- upon that document more as one issued under the advice of the Ministry for clap trap speeches in the Assembly, than as exhibiting any fixed intention of His Excellency. • All we here say is, that if he be sincere — if war is to be pushed into the Waikato Country, we hope Very large reinforcements for the protection'of all the Northern Island provinces have been applied for. Lord Palmerston is stated by the Southern Cross to have said that the King Movement must be put down 'even if it should take 20,000 men to brjjag about .that result' We trust that the Governor has drawn largely upon this promise of the English Premier, since his Excellency is firmly persuaded that a very much greater force than New Zealand yet possesses, will be necessary to carry on t such a war as that which the invasion of Waikafco may necessitate. Mr. Fitzherbert once said that a general war would necessitate the borrowing &of the whole British Army, "and the quotations we have just brought under the notice of our readers, from the best informed Northern journals,, lead to the belief that the difficulty which Mr. Fitzherbert's figure of speech was intended to indicate, is now being at last appreciated even by the Ministry who at that time so greatly underrated jit.