FROM AUCKLAND THE WAIKATOS PEACE OR WAR?

Wellington Independent, Volume XVI, Issue 1592, 18 June 1861, Page 2

FROM AUCKLAND THE WAIKATOS PEACE OR WAR?

Pervading the Auckland Newspapers received on Friday last, there is, despite the attempt to ' make the best of it/ an j evident feeling of uneasiness. Just as when a heavy long dated bill is first given, its having to be paid months hence causes little or no immediate trouble; yet as. it approaches the day of maturity, the necessity for providing the funds to meet it becomes a source of constant anxiety — so the once distantly contemplated period when the King Movement would be put down by force is now, to all appearances, approaching ; and as the day draws near, the serious character of the consequences involved become ap£arait. Just as the many sources from which the bill was to be readily met dwindle away, and the easy task its liquidation once seemed taxes every energy to accomplish, if indeed a compromise is not at last made by a partial renewal-r-so the ease with which it used to be said war could be carried into the Waikato country, and the certainty of speedy victory which the mass of troops now concentrated on its borders, led by such an officer- as General Cameron, would achieve, are looked upon with a greatly modified view ; indeed the Waikato Country is not only pronounced to be most difficult, and one in which it is barely possible to bring the natives to bay, but the number of troops is still felt to be inadequate; even the General hesitates, and the ministerial organ suggests a partial compromise, by turning the troops into navvies, who are to bring the natives to subjection by showing them how increasedly valuable civilisation renders their property, instead of by following out the ordinary method in use among soldiers. We are not romancing but writing sober truth, as we shall presently Bhow. The * terms ' or declaration issued by the Governor to the Waikatos on the 21st May, have certainly brought the Government and the King Movement * face to face.' These * terms ' are boldly written, and calculated to bring matters to an issue. Whether His Excellency will retreat or the natives accept them, remains to be seen. That the natives will accept them we very much doubt ; though that the settlement of the Country requires that such should be the case no one can qnestion, the natives idea of peace seeming to be simply that there should be no more fighting, and that they should be allowed to do as they like. Whether His Excellency will retreat none of us can pretend to say. He has made threats equally as strong before, and failed to execute them. Remembering how his public avowal at Taranaki of his intention to place the Southern rebels in General Cameron's hands, was followed by the withdrawal of the troops, we may be excused from implicitly pinning our faith to that which he now makes in reference to the Waikatos. He may be sincere ; but having, deceived, us by his cry of 'wolf, before, we cannot be sure that he will not do so again; and we must be pardoned the suspicion that not unnaturally asks whether the issue of this declaration a few days before the

meeting of the Assembly, after having so long postponed it, is not after all simply a ruse of the Stafford Ministry ; a policy which they only put forth for the sake of popularity — as they did that of ' vigorous prosecution' last session-— a policy which they do not intend to parry but any more than they vigorously) prosecuted matters at Taranaki. .. .1 ; We have promised to produce proof in' ; support of the statements above made— that, the Waikato Country ia now looked upon at Auckland as a most difficult one ; that the number of troops is considered to be still inadequate ; that the General hesitates ; and that a compromise is proposed, the making of roads being substituted for actual fighting. While quoting proof from the Auckland press we are not to be understood as assenting or dissenting from their views. Our object is simply to show to our readers the present phase of the constantly shifting aspect which the state of Northern native matters assume. Another mail may present a totally different phase, — our duty, however requires that, meanwhile we should present things as they are, nofc as they may be. . A, writer under the signature ' Fabius ' in the New Zealander thus alludes to the nature of the Waikato Country, and, the possiblity of the natives descending upon ; other settlements — all of which are 'insufficiently protected. The Government now stands face to with the Maori King, and it is generally acknowledged to be for the interest of both races that the latter should be put down. There are two modes iv which' it is thought that this object cm be accomplished ; some advocate physical force , others a policy of conciliation. As it is impossible that any active measures can be taken for spine months, time is allowed for reflection. It appears to me highly important that in this interval the advantages and disadvantages of both these methods should be temperately discussed. In this letter I purpose to offer a few observations on the method of physical force : should you deem them worthy H)f .insertion in your paper I shall hope to continue the subject hereafter. Ifour own sentiments on this subject are expressed in. these words: — "If a blow is to be struck in Waikato, it must be made, and it will be made, final and crushing." That the blow, if struck shall be final and crushing, is de mantled l>y humanity. . I invite your attention to some of the difficulties that must be overcome in order that it may be made so. In the first place, the locality wbete the blow roust be struck is at a great distance. Ngaruawahia is more than 80 miles from Auckland. Should the enemy retire southwards towards the Taupo allies, they can very greatly increase this distance ; for no final or crushing blow can be struck till the enemy is overtaken. There is little to destroy at Ngaruawahiu beyond the flagstaff and the King's house, which is not a very sumptuous edifice ; the burning of stand* ing ctops and raupo houses may exasperate but will scarcely crush the enemy. Thus the troops will have to advance at least 80 miles, and probably much more, in order to reach the scene of action. Your readers are acquainted with the nature of the country they must traverse; the dense bush from 8 to 15 miles wide beyond Drniy and Mauku {.the rapid river filled with shallows, sand-banks, and. tree stumps ; the banks in some places swampy, in others covered with bush, intersected by deep muddy tributaries, and nearer the supposed scene of action consisting of hills difficult of access and densely covered with trees. Military and Commissariat Officers will be able to tell what facilities such a route oilers for the conveyance of guns und other " materiel," and of food for the men, who will find small means of subsistence in the enemy's country; what danger there may be moreover »>f. ambuscades in the forest beyond Drury or in the swamps and bush on the river banks. * Attacks an the communications seem very probable from the great mobility of the enemy. The Maori warriors having few accoutrements and ho baggage train can move about with great rapidity through swamps and forests unknown and inaccessible to us. Driven from .Waikato, -they may reappear on the Thames, or, united as they will probab'y he to neariy.al) the natives in the interior of the island, they may descend upon whatever settlement they choose. It is therefore <>bvioiis.t!mt all the settlements in the Northern Island will have to be secured against attack. For this the colonists must make veiy jjrea't personal sacrifices, the militia and volunteers in every settlement must be carefully organised and prepared for active service. It will be remembered how difficult the previous Generals found jt, to defend the Uown of Ne-v Plymouth and at the same time conduct war even at Waitara. The colonists repose . great confidence in the military talents, of. the new General: he will need them, if behave to defend live or six settlements, and, at the same time conduct operations at a distance of 100 miles. But supposing all these new difliciilties overcome and the soldiers brought face to face with the Maories, there remain still all the old difficulties experienced at Waitara. The progress there was slow; what ground is there 1 for supposing that in Waikato it will b« more rapid ? We have more troops, it is true, but in Waikato it is not unlikely that' the enemy will be more than proportionately increased. We have a new General, so have the Maories ; and their faith in Win. Thompson is as strong as ours in General Cameron. Lastly, the time for operations is short ; the Maories must not only be w crush.*d, but crushed within 7or 8 months. For military operations Waikato is now considered closed ; .we. may therefore assume that at this lime next year it will be closed again ; if the operations against the enemy are not by that time brought to a successful issue, they must be recommenced afresh in the following spring. The Southern Qross y the organ be it remembered of the Stafford Government, confirms the account (to a great extent) of the writer in the New Zealander , ana informs us that in the Waikato country, the difficulty which it is so desirable to overcome— that of bringing the Natives to bayr— presents itself as elsewhere. If any portion of the press, may- be sup- j posed to know the General's views it is tho Southern Cross, and that paper it will be seen states that he has ' not yet

decided' We had heard that the General's views had become considerably modified since his residence in New Zealand, and such is apparently tho .case. ,-„• „-•/-■"•> t- : '* There has been much discussion of latetts to the best manlier of dealing with .the "^natives, shaotd-stron^ine'asures become necessary. A r<iid into Waikato; has been 4 utjjedj' and the question; openly .discussed, . wlfeH^er •>ucli a step. would be s Hkelj tb be attend^dj;; with sneces. The Doctors differ \ and GerierW^ameron has not ye} decided. ( The difficuUies which rnWtJje ! encinmtereU in iuchanjpiision are on the one hand spoken "of so lightly t/iat one would imagine the speakers and the writers were talking of a military march through an open civilized country ; whilst, on the other, they art exaggerated to such an extent »3 to appear insurmountable, even to men who have surmounted difficulties by flood and field in every part of the-world.^Tiuih,.of course^liesrinvtbft^ middle. The Waikato present^, , formulate difficulties, no doubt, to an invadeV ; hitV fibt, we think, »bo gi f eat.assome-imagine,~*TtUey<i*»€B» to be overcome, but theyfnustbe faced wanly. It is a country in winch ij, wojtld, ,le glmgsjt impambte'to follow* up ah* enehtff'dn&vlhthij themjoa. decisive engagement. Trav ; eisejlrj>y ¥ bush;, swamps, and mountain ranges, a ,^tiv| enemy, with" their locaj knowledge arid'.;}tb,eir,., individjal independeace .i"n._action f inight.yJor <j months, if not years, harass., and evade, ihejr ; pursuers; and retreat from fastness; to ; fastness, s leaving nothing behind them worth taking but) deserted Qam ping- places. ; „...•'V i-,- \i lii an. article in/, the JSgtuthe^r.Crgss^ commenting on Fabius's -very able* letter } above quoted frbin [ the r/iV&tf, 4 ; Zealandef, the ' road ' iii preference Xq \ the ' rifle ? policy -is thus advocated., *.w New Zealani it must be allowed; is a ;diffi- ■ cult country to gQrern. , ; Our peculiar relations i to the. native, population, and their peculiar? character render it the easiest thing in , the« world to commence a quarrel with them,', or rather the most difficult thing to avoid being i.' drawn into one; the nature of the country is such, that few anticipate great results when ' at' ■ last hostilities become inevitable,- and' many •**• good judges believe that complete military success is not 1 to be'ldoked ; for j and' finally as "*- -we see at the present time a most anomalous state of things may be the result of hostilities.,? We have neither peace nor war: the country* is full of soldiers, and the natives have returned /r to their peaceful avocations for the winter 5 months, are possible sorry for what they have * done, but certainly do not act as if they were,"* and at all events show very few. signs, of fear. Subdued they are not. . ,* A very able letter appeared oh this subject in a letter addressed, to our coteuiporary, the New Zealander, which was pnblished in Saturday's number bi r ,tbat journal. It bears the signature, Fabius, Tue writer's, object appears to be to point out the difficulties to be ■* encountered, if hostilities are ever commenced"/ in the enemy's country, and the great sacrifices l ' which must be made ifjthey are to be effectually surmounted. At the same time^he refrains" from hazarding a suggestion, as to the. best manner of facing the present crisis, a line iv which we shall follow hisr- example ~\ but thoroughly convinced though, we are with many others in the ' community holding birailar opinions ; to.Apse ,.gf Fabius, 'that, jthe^wpfk. of;,* subduidg the native race by.foirce of arm's fa" one not lightly or thoughtlessly to be entered ■ upon, nor without a perfept "recognition of ..the losses and sacrifices which it must entairon a||^ in the country, 5 we hold it useful; to analyse" iWJt true nature of the circurastauces; which enaw^i a population of some fifty thousauil so!uls|ojii|ap deliimce for' so long a time to the Britis&^^CK vernmeht. - •'■; "' :!5 ' '" '" '.}*' ,''** It is not the high fdrii, nor the siiags iii. 'th^ rivers, nor tLe bushes, nor the. gullies, nor tlje^ tanges merely, which we have to contend with; it would be an insult to our soldiers to allege that they could not soon overcome" these. It is not the indomitable courage aud determination of the native, which some say would, cause him to die rather than surrender ad iuch ofland : for we believe that. there is no gieat difference between hjm and any other huina»i being; thatv he is a brave man enough, but like our jpeltipi? and Saxon, ancestors. to. be beaten, and. to. box forced tb give in— and yet able to suivive suclt'ri an event without any suicidal temptations.. The real obstacle iv our way .is a .different one. • It-» is simply to be found iv the Maori' system of' tenure of land. . It is comnmnisra in ; land "' amongst the uatives, which enables 1 theni r to'|' r carry the bold front which they they do, ' <r " .'I ' - *.'••-*■■■ ; .: *'■ ' : --*'- -\*'' :;.;';/!, We might possibly shoot the natives all dowi^ in a'fe/v years,— but it is only iii Fjiifjlish ns\yfc' it - papers that we Gml men disoussin H ' the possibility of an English community being desirous of seeing such a consummation, brought about: the utiiy real hoi 4 we sliull .ever have on^ the*' Mauri race will be through their lands. .f'We'jl do not suggest such a thing as general confiscation, but meicly say that the Government has a light to demind who are thereal posseJV sois ofland from which we have been. lhreaieued,,< „, and to impound il like uiiclai.nedsca.ttle.till.thft >j real owner shows hiihselii wbo! should then '")bb'"* mude to put his own brViid i upon it before it is x returned to him. VVe uiiiy tljen. , consider Itij^. —and he" will be— personally r^spoiftib^* for any further damage, so. far. as ; that (aJBalwL coucemed; In s.hor.t, .we shall .ha ve no b^ll^^P theV^^tives till they. individualised the ir, pros> l perty; till they have Crown Gfants" given them far what is j usljy tb.eir o wu ;— till their properly \ is brandf d. ' .*■■ li- ,:<-; •.*;■;*'/ It will be sni.l that this is the very- thing — which it is :so difficult to do,> and^'ftlft so^JSulf still it is a definite object to work for, an^op^ ? which may be attained by. means' even military point of view most judicious. -A^o'tfflF* through the country— no mere track werneani — would soon serve to individualiee tke owner*- :-■» ship pf the land abutting on it. .. As mile after 'f mile, was completed, the natives, would begin 1 appreciate the increased value of their properly, and .become anxious to' have their titles,^ portions recognized.- ' -l-hey would receive Ciown Grants, and every man with one would be a man lost to the enemy. ; It will take,inuoh, | time and labour' to' briug about, such a result, but we are not safe' in ' trusting to any half measures, and should never" be deterred bj^ difficulties from doing what must soon^^f^ la^er be ,done, but rather study how' best Jofstt^!^. mount them effeciualty. . . . ,v And in another article^ the n same ,pbl*cy *» is ' more pithily expressed ; tlius^The pick and shoVel?must f do the work of the rifle. The oountry must be sapped with a high' road, and if they wish to fight, the enemy imUsr" come out from their; .strppghulds and fight round the working -parties, they 'bjA beaten back there will be Jno necessityHfor fop -a lowing them up ; 'the road will gradually^pene" trate the country, and where there is a road, British soldjer,s,;pcoperly commanded, ought tobe able to hold their own. Law and the tights