THE WAR IN NEW ZEALAND.

Wellington Independent, Volume XVI, Issue 1501, 1 March 1861, Page 4

THE WAR IN NEW ZEALAND.

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[to the editor of the times.]

Sir, — Although the following remarks are of a purely professional nature, you will not perhaps oonsider them misplaced in your journal, which, in its wide- spread circulation will, with your permission, bear them even to the antipodes, where they may perhaps be of some use. Every mail from New Zealand biiugs accounts of the difficulties encountered by our brave countrymen in their war with the Maories. Having been engaged some years ago in a war with a similar enemy, in the same sort of country as New Zealand, under the oommaud of an able officer who showed a particular aptitude for that sort of warfare, I trust I shall not be thought presumptious in recommending to the consideration of those now fighting the Maories some lessons whioh I learnt in Caffreland fyom the late Sir William Eyre. In attacking an enemy strongly posted, the first line of assailants at least should be in skirmishing order, and the skirmishers should, while advancing, take all possible advantage of cover and endeavour to turn the flanks of their adversaries. This advice appears at first sight unoalled for, as one would suppose that any man of common sense, without, having reoeived a military education would if commanding under the above mentioned circumstances, adopt of his own accord the course recommended ; and every officer in the army, whether gifted with common sensa or not, must have had such doctrines instilled into his mind. "*No ensign of the present day could pass his examination for a lieutenancy without knowing so much at least of the military art. Yet soenes whioh I have myself witnessed or heard of in South Africa, and what we now read in correspondence from New Zealand, prove to me that such advice is needed. lam happy to see, however, that it has already occurred to our friends at the seat of war that a soldier is not intended to be a mere human target, and that something may be learnt even from the Maories. But when regular troops inexperienoed in warfare of this nature,

have suffered losses, some commanders are apt to attribute their reverses, not to having gone the wrong way to work, but to the supposed faot that regular soldiers are unequal to savages in their own wild ( country. Suetoan idea was prevalent at one time at the Cape of Good Hope ; it was thought useless for the "rothe budj6 " (red jacket) to venture into the bush, and our native auxiliaries were ' used to draw the covert, while the British troops remained in the open. Under Colonel, afterwards LieutenantGeneral Sir William Eyre, all this was changed. That great soldier saw at once, with the true instinct of a general, how the savage should be encountered in his fastnesses ; he, like the great Charles Napier, recognised the fact that in mountain warfare especially will discipline and combination, if properly used, triumph over the badly combined efforts of irregulars, He dressed and aocoutred his soldier's as lightly and practically as possible; he taught them, that wherever the naked savage could penetrate, there the English soldier in his red coat could follow ; that the savage never dreamt of pluuging headliug through the priokly bush, but made for himself paths, often so slight as to be imperceptible to an inexperienced eye. By using these paths the most (apparently) impracticable thickets could be peuetiated and were penetrated by British troops, and we made our way, in some cases even with pack-horses, carrying provisions, &c, into fastnesses which both friend and enemy had hitherto considered inaccessible to us, aud which the Caffres had therefore till then always found safe plaoes of retreat. Oar loss when actually in the bush was very trifling ; when we did suffer, it was if accident, or want of caution in the open, to fire from an enemy under cover. This determination to peuetrate everywhere, together with a system of constaut surprises, was the means made use of byCol. Eyre to bring the last Caffre war to a successful issue. The great difficulty usually met with that sort of enemy is to get at him and oblige him to fight, as from his superior knowledge of a difficult country he has great facilities for esoape and is only inclined to fight when he can take you at a great disadvantage. Colonel Eyre rightly judged that attacks on Caffres should be made principally at dawn of day after a long march. Many attacks of this nature answered well, and eve.n when the enemy succeeded in discovering our approach in time to elude us, and the flying columns of the " great chief," as Eyre was called by the Caffres kept them in such a constant state of hot water that they eveutually evacuated their so-called " inaccessible " fastnesses, in which we build forts and made roads — the next step toward the subjugation of the country. To carry on successfully a war of surprises of this description, a commander must have good guides, good spies, and good hardy troops, inured to fatigue. Such our African soldiers soon became^ and doubtless the material for such is in New Zealand ; let it only be properly used, I imagine that the same .system which Colonel Eyre carried out so successfully in Caffraria would answer agaiust the Maories. It may be summed up in a few words :— Dress and acooutre your men as most convenient for the country in whioh they are to act. Teach them that where the savage penetrates, there the white man can surely follow. Make much of your intelligence department. Carry on a war of surprises by means of flying columns unencumbered with baggage and moving much by night. I oould write much more on this subject, but fear that I have already exceeded the space which you, Sir, will be inclined to allow for a letter of this nature. 3 will therefore conclude. I am, Sir, Your obedient servant, Dec. 14. L. G.