NOTES ON THE WAR

Waihi Daily Telegraph, Volume XXXII, Issue 8873, 19 February 1943, Page 3

NOTES ON THE WAR

JHE WAR IN THE PACIFIC HOW TO BEAT JAPAN ATTACK DIRECT FROM ASIA The Casablanca decision of the recent Anglo-American War Council, announced by Mr Churchill in the House of Commons recently, to concentrate the main Allied effort this year on the theatre of war in order to knock out Hitler, without at the same time neglecting the Pacific front against Japan, will be recognised by most people as the soundest military policy to achieve the earl- * iest possible victory of the United Nations in the whole world war.

The position was neatly put by Hanson Baldwin in the New York Times, in a passage quoted in recent news: "It is a sound principle in war and the boxing ring to leap for the kill when -the opponent is groggy ■ • • The events of the past two months have reached their climax in the capture of Kursk and have presented the Allies with an opportunity to shorten the war." In regard to the Western Pacific Mr Baldwin said: "The next Allied step (after Guadalcanal-) in this area will be far harder because new reinforced Japanese bases dot the northern Solomons and surrounding islands."

• From this it may be concluded that he does not accept the suggestion of the U.S. Secretary of the Navy, Colonel Frank Knox, that the Japanese might evacuate the entire Solomons group. In a series of articles on the Pacific campaign, published in the New York Times towards the end of December, Mr Baldwin reviews the whole situation of the war with Japan. Avenue of Attack In the first place he discounts the view held by many observers, including Australians and Americans, that Allied Pacific strategy is vague and inchoate. "Just as the North African campaign," he says, "revealed the existence of an Atlantic strategy, so will some future offensive action in the Pacific reveal the existence of a Pacirfic strategy." Discussing this "offensive action, Mr Baldwin points out that "the long, slow and painful process of 'islandstepping,' of reconquering that vast area Japan has conquered, is viewed by many as the longer and more costly way to the objective—Tokio." He defines the position and the task thus: Japan is both a great continental Power and a great sea Power. She derives her strength both from the s€a —the myriad-dotted islands of the South Pacific—and from the land, the land of Asia and the land of Japan. To deprive her of her power she must be separated from her sources of power—or those sources rendered useless to her.

Taking first the continental field he says the first step is the reconquest of Burma. How difficult this is overland is shown 'by the slow progress of the Anglo-Indian approach to Akyab. Then, even if Burma is reconquered ►•and the Burma road reopened, there is the problem of supplying China with the necessary weapons and material of war. Baldwin says it may well be necessary to fight a gargantuan laud campaign in China to secure the areas Japan now holds and to establish bases *"or a concentrated air attack on Japan itself.

Then there is the alternative continental plan of an attack on Japan from Soviet territory, if Russia were to enter the Pacific war. The preliminary to this must be the liberation of European Russia from the invader and the destruction of the Nazis.

Baldwin sums up on this continental aspect: It does not appear probable that Russia will enter the Pacific war (unless attacked by Japan) for some time to come, and the difficulties of reconquering Burma and supplying China are so great that there is no hope of quickly severing Japan from her continental sources of power. Alternatives By Sea Returning to the sea front Baldwin suggests two alternatives to an advance through the islands from the South Pacific. One, he says, is a direct westward move from Pearl Harbour and Midway and Johnston Islands to•■\V%ds Wake and Marcus and Guam ■and the Marinas (Pacific Islands). The objections to this approach, he argues, are that its first "step"—from HaAvaii and Midway to Wake and the eastern fringe of the Marshalls — ■would be "too long to permit our naval forces to receive the protection of

land-based airpower." Yet, he adds, given an adequate number of carriers, this is not an insuperable objection " particularly since we have seen the old shibboleth that carrier-based fighters cannot successfully oppose land-based fighters exploded by recent events." Another objection is that the_ little atolls in this area of the Pacific are too small to be used effectively as bases. But, says Baldwin, it is easier, as Guardalcanar showed, to hold a small island than a large one. He points out that a direct drive westward would greatly simplify America's supply problems with a much shorter supply line than that to the New Guinea-Solomons area. As it is, Pearl Harbour is still the naval base for the South-west Pacific and damaged ships have a long way to get there for repairs. Adverse Factors The other alternative 'by sea is an attack on Japan from the north via the Aleutians. Mr Baldwin for many reasons—one of them the execrable weather in the Par North Pacificdoes not think it feasible without Russian co-operation from Kamchatka and Eastern Siberia.

He sums up: "The more one studies the map of the Pacific the more difficult the approach to Japan—protected by distance and shielded by a rampart of islands —appears. Yet she is by no means impregnable; positions are no better than a nation's ability to exploit them, and Japan to-day is nowhere near as strong in war potential as we are.

"Yel it is to prevent her from increasing her strength that we must fight offensively in the Pacific. And to accomplish Japan's destruction and to do it at least cost and greatest speed the approach from the Solo-mons-Australia-New Guinea area will probably not be enough. The main drives, or at least major additional drives, may have to come eastward from the continent of Asia and westward from the Hawaiian Islands towards the feudalists citadel of Japan."