SMASHING TANKS

Waihi Daily Telegraph, Volume XXXI, Issue 8840, 6 November 1942, Page 1

SMASHING TANKS

TACTICS OF THE RED ARMY CYCLISTS CAUGHT BY WIRE “ TANK-SMASHER ” I'LATOONS None of the Allies can know as much about the German Army as the. Russians have learned in the last year, and we must be grateful for a small book entitled “Strategy and Tactics of the Soviet-German War,” by officers of- the Soviet General Staff and Soviet War Correspondents, even though it bears all the marks of strict censorship and much official sub-editing. It consists of a series of short articles which were evidently written in the first instance for circulation among English-language newspapers; nevertheless, from this material an interesting, if incomplete, picture emerges of the Red Army and the Germany Army in action.

The tactics used by the Red Army to defeat tanks resemble those now being- taught in other Allied armies. If the enemy armoured forces penetrate the defender’s position, the infantry stands firm while artillery or defending tank forces attack one flank of the armoured spearhead. Detailed accounts are given of the exploits of “tank-smasher” platoons, which waylay tanks and attack them with Molotov cocktails and bundles of grenades: Changes In Tactics

Several of the writers observe that the slow progress of the German panzer forces in Russia, compared with their rapid success on other fronts, led to changes in tactics, notably the employment of tank forces in small groups “ranging from a company to a battalion.” If these chapters had not been so carefully sub-edited, the authors would perhaps have suggested that the employment of small armoured groups coincided with the decision of the German High Command that they would be unwise to try to drive farther into Russia -before winter set inland that the small groups were in the nature of patrols, operating in front of the main German positions.

An example of the kind of force the German Army employs when it is attempting a break-through is given in the description in this book of the offensive against Bryansk, where the force employed at the outset comprised four panzer divisions-, four motor divisions and five infantry divisions.

Although the Red Army held and successfully counter-attacked this force and recovered considerable territory, the booty the Red Army claims for 10 days of fighting at Bryansk is on a very moderate scale —1525. lorries, 206 guns, for example, and “several thousand” rifles, A German force of such size would not be greatly incommoded by such losses. These, and other similar figures confirm the impression received from other sources that, where the Rus-

sians pushed back the German forces last winter, they seldom succeeded in seriously disorganising them. Motor Cyclists Caught Large-scale Cossack cavalry raids behind the German lines in the Ukraine and in forest and marsh country in unidentified districts are described. In one instance a cavalry detachment of unspecified size operated for 12 days in enemy-occupied country, destroying transport and occasionally fighting several pitched battles against forces as large as a battalion.

The Cossacks in this force caught motor cyclists at night by stretching wires across the roads. They claimed to have killed 2500 Germans and destroyed 115 lorries in the course of their 12-clay .raid. Red cavalry leaders are emphatic that the role of cavalry is not finished and that the ability of the mounted man to carry supplies with him, to move rapidly in the dark and in all weather through forest or marshland, gives cavalry big advantages over tank or mortorised troops on “vast stretches of the present front.”

One writer described how German tank crews, after occupying a position, often dig their tanks in so that only the turret is above the leve] of the ground. ' Helped by People

The Russian writer who deals with the air fighting declares that in the fighting against the R.A.F., before they invaded Russia, the Germans lost 12,000 skilled pilots and that in consequence the Luftwaffe is now manned by hastily-trained personnel. Questioning of,prisoners revealed to Russian Intelligence officers that a majority of German fliers had a record of two to eight months’ fighting service.

It is stated that, from May to-' September, 1940, the German aircraft industry could barely replace the Luftwaffe’s losses and that in the first two months of the war against the Soviet the Germans- lost 7200 aircraft, which seems a rather excessive figure, even if “the Nazis have sent four air fleets.to the eastern front, a fifth fleet being stationed in France and reserved for action against Britain.” Each German air army, one Russian writer states, comprises 1000 to 2500 aircraft.

All through the book is evidence that the Russian success in delaying or holding the German drive was often due to the determination of units of the Red Army not to give in when apparently surrounded, but to fight a way out through the encircling forces; due also to the loyal help the army received from the people of the occupied territory.

“ Not only the guerilla fighters, but also all village inhabitants helped ... in every possible way,” writes the Red Army commander of one encircled force which rejoined the Red Army. “Whether it was provisions or clothes, or information about the enemy—the peasants invariably found us to deliver these essentials.”

This Red Army force was behind the German lines for 45 days before it finally broke through the German line from the rear and reached the main Russian army again.