NOTES ON WAR NEWS

Waihi Daily Telegraph, Volume XXXXI, Issue 9640, 27 June 1941, Page 3

NOTES ON WAR NEWS

HITLER HIS MADE HIS CHOICE

THE ATTACK ON RUSSIA

POSSIBILITIES OF CAMPAIGN

Hitler has cliosen his next mo\ e

sooner than was expected, and it is

Russia, not Britain, that is the immediate objective. In the usual man-

ner of the blitzkrieg-, Germany has at-

tacked Russia without warning, but with the full military strength available, assisted by the Finnish and

Rumanian armies, on a front stretch-

ing from the Arctic Ocean to the Black Sea. The ' specious reasons given by Hitler for war on Russia are condemned by Molotoff as a lie; the real reasons are fairly clear at first sight. Why did Hitler choose Russia for his next objective rather than Britain or the Middle East? There are several reasons. The attack on Britain had become obviously hazardous in the extreme. After the conciuest of Crete there was a considerable sea gap to be surmounted before an attack on Egypt could be resumed from Syria and Libya, and the British Navy covered that. The Allied move into Syria, following the failure of Rashid Ali’s rebellion in Irak, rendered any German advance in this direction risky, except with the grant of a free passage through Turkey,- and this was refused by Turkey. Turkey in itself and for itself was not worth attacking. Russia offered not only what seemed the line of least resistance, but also the maximum quantity of booty. The Ukraine in south-western Russia is the Soviet’s richest province. Its black-soil plains are one of the world’s greatest wheatfields. Its Don Basin coal is Russia’s best and most easily won. Rfissia’s largest hydroelectric plant at Dniepropetrovsk is in the heart of the Ukraine and round it are gathered Russia’s chief aluminium.iiulustry and much of her most important heavy industry. Further, the Ukraine includes the northern shores of the Black Sea and forms the highway to the Caucasian oilfields, of which Baku is the centre Southern Russia is a prize always coveted by the Germans.

USING THE NAZI ARMY

The second reason that must have influenced Hitler is that Russia is the only field in Europe where he could deploy and use Germany’s military strength to the full under ideal conditions of terrain for a blitzkrieg on the grand scale. The German army, according to the best information obtainable, comprises at least 2GO divisions, or about 4,000,000 men. Prior to the decision to concentrate on Russia the location of. these divisions appears roughly to have been this: English Channel invasion force, 60 divisions; southern France, Gibraltar attack force, 10 divisions; Balkans. 30 divisions; Libya, 12 divisions; North Sea ports and Scandinavia, 20 divisions; central reserve, 30 divisions. On the principle, followed by Hitler so far, of one job at a time, it would be simple to reduce the divisions in the west from attack to defence strength, and the same with Libya. The Scandinavian force could be transferred to Finland or East Prussia and the Balkans divisions could be brought up into Rumania, for Italy has been entrusted, pro tern., with the policing of Greece. Hence it would be safe to assume that at least 100 divisions, possibly 120, are available for the attack on Russia. These might be enlarged by the Rumanian and Finnish armies to as many as 150 divisions. This would, furnish more than the. 2,000,000 men deemed by the Germans adequate for the conquest of European Russia. It will be a fully-equipped army, with a vast air force and a horde of tanks and other armoured vehicles, with the parachute troops, “fifth columnists,” and other accessories that the Nazis regard as indispensable in their methods of warfare. The Germans have had full experience in the different theatres of war in every variety of tactics, and Poland, in September, 1939, will be the model for this effort.

RUSSIA’S UNKNOWN STRENGTH

What can the Russians oppose to such a mighty war machine? Russia’s total population is nearly 170,000,000, of which over 140,000,000 are in European Russia, 32,000,000 being in the Ukraine itself. Germany’s population —Germans under German rule at this time —is at least 80,000,000, and if Italy, Rumania and Finland are added, . the numbers are nearly equal to those of European Russia. Statistics about the Russian army to-day are not very reliable, but the actual numbers Should be greater than those Germany could mobilise on the Russian frontier. It has been stated that Russia lias at least 140 divisions or. the frontier already. As to their quality, equipment, air force, mechanisation, and leadership there is little evidence on. which to base a conclusion. The divisions which occupied Eastern Poland in September. 1939, did not impress observers, except in the tank divisions and the Cossack cavalry. In the Finnish war of the winter of 1939-4 0 the Russians failed badly in the northern sector, but impressed observers with their skilful and resourceful handl-

ing of the Mannerheim Line, the reduction of which, mainly by artillery. compelled the Finns to make peace. The general impression is that the front-line troops, the elite of the Red Army, are good, as good as any troops anywhere in discipline, physique, training and equipment, but that a large proportion of the army is not up to the sample of thp Red Square November and May parades. But one thing is certain —the Russians fight magnificently in defence of their own soil. This was shown against Napoleon in IS 12,

again in the Great War, and above all. in the expulsion of the White Armies in the Civil War of 1919-20. No invader has ever succeeded in staying long on the soil of Russia. EASY TERRAIN

The territory everywhere is easy —part of the European plain—and at this time of the year, with the soil dry and firm, yet not too dusty, there are few natural obstacles to movement. The three natural objectives 'ar. invader would aim at would be: Leningrad in the north, a gr®Al, industrial centre with a population of nearly 3,000,000; Moscow in (lie middle, an even greater centre with nearly 4,000,000 inhabitants, the fifth city of the world in population; and the Ukraine in the south with its capital, Kiev. Communication in

Russia is not good. Roads in I lie main are simply dirt roads, and railways are not numerous. They do not, except in the far north —the lino from Murmansk in the Arctic, to Leningrad—generally parallel the frontier, so transport and supply will lie difficult. As the gauge is wider than the rest,of the European system, the invaders will find this a handicap themselves, when, or if, they penetrate far into Russia. It is possible that air transport of troops will play a greater part in this campaign than it has yet doiie elsewhere.