LORD FRENCH’S STORY.

Wanganui Herald, Volume LIII, Issue 15836, 5 June 1919, Page 3

LORD FRENCH’S STORY.

MB ASQUITH’S REPLY. Australian and N.Z. CabU Association LONDON, June 4. Mr Asquith, speaking at a complimentary luncheon, replied to statements in Lord French’s book, Mr Asquith complained that Lord French had been given access to o - cial and confidential documents to build up a case against men whose lips were closed, some by death, others by official restraint. It was a flagrant breach of the best traditions of the public service. None knew better than Lord French that his charge against the Liberal Government of callousness in failing to supply sufficient guns and shells was without foundation. Documents which would be published shortly would prove Lord French’s account of Lord Kitchener’s visit to Paris in September, 1914, was a travesty on the real facts. Prior to the despatch of Lord Kitchener to Paris, Lord French’s intended movements had filled Cabinet with consternation, and the Parisian Government feared the French army was going to be left in the lurch. Mr Asquith flatly denied Lord French’s , assertion that he advocated high explosives instead of shrapnel before the war. Mr Asquith quoted a document showing that headquarters asked the Government in November, 1914, to reduce the percentage of high explosives from 50 per cent to 25 per cent. Mr Asquith quoted Lord Kitchener’s letter, written on the eve of the famous Newcastle speech, in which he said Lord French had told him that with the

present supply of ammunition he would have as much as the troops would he able to use for the next attack. Mr Asquith accepted full responsibility for Lord French’s recall, which had no more to do with shells than the eclipse of the moon. A FURTHER ARTICLE. LONDON, May 23. Lord French, in a further article in the Daily Telegraph, states: “In September I formed the opinion that it was extremely desirable to push towards the coast and northward and drive the Germans from the sea. Mr Churchill enthusiastically supported and promised absolutely devastating naval support. Lord French anticipated that Joffre and the French Government would oppose the plan. Mr Churchill, on December Bth, wrote stating that Lord Kitchener fully agreed with the plan, promising to send the Twenty-Seventh Division. Cabinet next day strongly urged the plan upon the French Government, which referred the question to Joffre. He rejected it as he had another elsewhere, ‘which, ’ says Lord French, ‘proved a very feeble substitute.’ Mr Churchill continued to press the matter, urging Lord French again to put the , Admiralty’s views before Joffre. Lord Kitchener, in a memorandum of 9th January, 1915, showed that the \v ar Council had abandoned the coastwise advance on the grounds that it would be too costly, and would extend the line too far. Heavy reinforcements could not be furnished without disorganising general arrangements, and ■ a sufficient supply of ammunition was not available to ensure carrying the project through to a conclusion, though every effort was being made in all parts of the world in order to obtain an unlimited supply. The War Council also anticipated a strong German attack in the near future, which could be better resisted in the existing prepared ■ position. Lord French disagrees with those objections seriatim, and mentions that large train-loads of ammunition traversed France a few months later bound for the Dardanelles. He considers these reasons for rejecting the plan for the coastal attack illogical. Probably the true explanation is to be found in the War Council’s memorandum of January 9th, in which the view was expressed that operations on the West front would probably develop into stalemate, and it would be necessary to find another theatre of war where decisive results would be obtainable. Lord French replied discussing all possible theories, including Gallipoli. He said uie attack on Turkey would be devoid of decisive result. The only decisive theatre was Germany itself. Lord French added: Tt is quite feasible to break the German lino with a sufficiency of guns and high explosive shells. Tn any case, it would be unsafe to withdraw troops from the Western front, which is vital, and where alone decisive results are obtainable.’ Joffre expressed his final opinion on May 11th, 1915, that it was necessary to be prepared for a, German offensive in the near future. The front must be ’ made absolutely secure. The Allies must be ready to assume the offensive. Reserves were absolutely necessary, and all secondary operations, including the Flanders coast attack, must give way thereto. Lord French concludes with the=e views, and remains convinced that bis plan should have been accepted and tried, whereas those actually nmo’oyed only resulted in feeble unsuccessful attempts to break the German line, and absolute failure at the Dardanelles.” SOME PERTINENT QUESTIONS, LONDON, June 3.

The Westminster Gazette recalls Lord French’s eulogy of Lord Kitchener in the House of Lords on June 20th, 1916, “yet persecution has again lifted its ugly head.” The Gazette asks whether Lord French did not intend to retire on his base and leave the French army in the lurch; whether the French Government did not protest earnestly Lord Kitchener to personally convey to Lord French their decision feat he should not retire as proposed. LONDON PEESS TIEWS. LONDON, June 3. Apart from anti-Kitchener and fee Northoliffe press, newspapers generally consider Mr Asquith has dissipated Lord r xenoh’s accusations. They ©specially draw attention to Lord French’s eulogy of Mr Asquith three days after fee Liberal Government’s fall, whereas Lord French now states that he engineered the fall in order to save the country from ruin, J