BRITAIN’S "SUREST SHIELD."

Wanganui Herald, Volume LIII, Issue 15754, 28 February 1919, Page 5

BRITAIN’S "SUREST SHIELD."

WHY IT MUST BEMAIJT SUPREME. ADMIRAL PERCY SCOTT’S WARNING. HIDDEN DANGER OF LEAGUE OP NATIONS. Admiral Sir Percy Scott, K.C.8., K.C.V.0., is one of the greatest men in the Britieh Navy. No man alive haa done more to .maintain Britain’s supremacy on Hie seas, for his, genius has produced many of the improvements that have placed the Fleet far above that of any other . ion. During the Boer War he invented. Jie gnu carriages which enabled 6-iuch and 4.7-inch guns to be used in land warfare, as they were with deadly results to the enemy. He is the inventor of the night-signalling apparatus now in use in the Navy, and of many appliances for improving big-gun shooting. Admiral Scott, who is 65 years of age, entered the Navy in T866, and is a veteran of the Ashanti, Congo, Egyptian, South African, and China wars. The high esteem in which his capabilities are held in England is shown by his selection to take charge of the defence of London against aircraft during the recent war—a defence which, it has just been announced, developed under his direction resources which compelled the Germans to abandone the raids. (By Sir Percy Scott, in the London Chronicle.) The role of a prophet is usually a thankless one, and I derive but melancholy satisfaction from the fact that three months before the war I uttered an unheeded warning of what the submarine would do in the event of liostilities. The possibilities of its destructiveness were little understood and even less appreciated in those days, even in circles which should have been better informed; but four years of submarine warfare have tragically as well as conclusively demonstrated the truth of my warning. Our escape from overwhelming disaster in the early days of the war was due rather to good fortune than to foresight. It was due primarily to the fortunate circumstances that even Germany, notwithstanding all her elaborate and carefully prepared plans, overlooked or failed to realise the deadly power and immense possibilities of the weapon within her grasp. POTENTIALITIES OF SUBMARINE OVERLOOKED. Ifi other words, if, at. the outbreak of war, Germany had had a couple of hundred submarines ready for active service on the ocean trade routes which converge on the British Isles she would certainly have defeated the Allies and practically conquered the world. The Kaiser's dream of world-dominion would have been realised. Fortunately for the Allies, Germany had not made this provision ; still more fortunately, she did not delay the declaration of war until she had established well-organised submarine bases in her colonic® in Africa and the Pacific. Had this been done, her submarines would have dominated every ocean trade route in the world.; no water highway would have been safe from these deadly craft; and the task of the British Navy in protecting onx sea-borne commerce and supplies, and of convoying troops from Australia, New Zealand, India, Canada, and South Africa would have been multiplied a hundred-fold. It might well, indeed, have proved insuperable. Thanks, however, to Germany’s implicit faith in the invincibility of her array and her confidence in a speedy, overwhelming victory on land, she miscalculated or overlooked the part that sea-power was to play. The War Lords expected confidently to be in Paris by September, 1914, and the war to be over by the following Christmas. The “Old Contemptibles’’ and the British Navy upset their plans. By holding the Channel, Britain was enabled to pour millions of troops into France; by holding the trade routes she was enabled to bring millions more as well as vast supplies of food and material to these shores from overseas. QUR NAVY WON THE WAR. Without disparagement of the splendid achievements of the men in the trenches on a scattered, wide-spread front, it may be affirmed that the war was practically won by, the British Navy, bo long as it held command of the sea defeat was impossible. It had no spectacular part to play; few opportunities such as it enjoyed in Nelson s day; there was nothing picturesque in that prolonged, grim watch in the grey North Sea. To maintain a close blockade, to exercise a silent, ruthless, ceaseless pressure which first curtailed, and eventually stopped, the enemy’s overseas supplies— this was the Navy’s exacting, monotonous task. It was the bulldog grip. How Germany made frantic and persistent attempts to free herself from this strangiehofd is now a matter of history. Fearing to risk her High Sea Fleet in a second Trafalgar, she had recourse to the submarine. At the instigation of Von Tirpitz she began an unrestricted warfare against unarmed merchantmen, her avowed object—pursued ruthlessly, regardless of humanitarian considerations being to starve Britain into surrender, and, by Hie indiscriminate use of the torpedo, a sink at sight’’ policy, to prevent her from obtaining food supplies, raw materials, munitions, and men from overseas. Von Tirpitz and other German War Lords boasted proudly that this would be done. The submarine, they declared, would speedily bring Britain to her knees. Food restrictions and slightly diminished rations gave the British public an inkling of the seriousness and partial success of that campaign. WHERE TtlE NAVY SCORED HEAVILY. Let me emphasise my next point. Had our Navy failed us at this critical juncture, had the submarine campaign been successful, Germany would have gained the advantage which, with more foresight, she might have enjoyed at the outset; and not Great Britain alone, but her Allies also, who were so largely dependent on her for essential supplies —the very necessaries of life—must have been forced to haul down the Flag. No victories on land, however brilliant, would have compensated the Allies for our loss of sea supremacy. The Alliance, unquestionably, must have collapsed. Neither troops nor supplies could have reached the Western or other theatres of war from the overseas Dominions. America would have been unable to enter the arena, for the simple hut reason that her troops could not have crossed the Atlantic, except at appalling risk, and probably with immense loss of life and shipping. FREEDOM OP THE SEAS. extremely importiuEt to- 'wttwi {.

ouaeeives of these facte whenever we hear airy proposals and glib discussions respecting the “freedom of the seas.” This somewhat indefinite phrase, it should be remembered, originated some years ago in Germany, then the greatest military Power in the world aatd jealous of Britain’s naval supremacy. The phrase has never been strictly defined ; no one seprns to know exactly what it means. But two things at least are plain: First, it was promulgated as an insidious attempt to overthrow our command of the sea; and, second, we know from recent experience the interpretation Germany, at any rate, placed upon it in war time. Now, let us guard against being misled by events. The Central Powers, it is true, have been thrashed. The Austrian Empire has ceased to exist; the German Empire has split into fragments; Prussianiem has been crushed. It is even confidently predicted that the world will know war no more. That may be. Let us hope so. Nevertheless, Great Britain’s naval supremacy must remain unchallenged. To my mind this admits of no argument, no discussion, no compromise. From Hie days of the Armada to the present time our Navy has bee® our main bulwark, the sure safeguard, not only of these isles, but of our farflung, ocean-sundered Empire. In peace, as in war, it has policed the oceans, protected sea-borne commerce, ensured our safety and our very existence. THE KEYS OF EMPIRE. Some years ago Admiral Lord Fisher remarked that there are five keys to the world—the Strait of Dover, Hie Strait of Gibraltar, the Suez Canal, Hie Strait of Malacca, and the Cape of Good Hope; and, he added, “we hold Hie live keys.” We must continue to hold them. But we can do so only by maintaining our supremacy on the seas, and preventing any Power establishing submarine bases in Africa, the Pacific, and other parts, from which it could dominate the world’s trade routes. Great Britain, therefore, can never agree to any arrangement, whether proposed by a League of Nations or any other representative or international organisation, which would _jnvolve such a reduction of her Navy, such a curtailment of its power and efficiency, as would mean, her relinquishing the control and command of the seas. WE DARE NOT TAKE RISES. The Empire is unanimous on this point. Britain’s supremacy is vital to herself; it is not less vital to the Empire; it may possibly happen in years to come that it will again be vital to the safety of civilisation and the security of the world. We cannot—we dare not—take any risks in so grave a matter. It is dangerous to gamble with an unknown future, Human nature does not change. A League of Nations may be founded on the most rational basis; the most sacred and binding obligations may be entered into by all the civilised Powers, new as well as old; but no League can offer an absolute guarantee that these obligations will be faithfully and permanently observed, or even ensure the continuance and enforcement of its own authority. There is no assurance on these points. The sudden creation of several new European States and the marvellous and radical constitutional changes introduced into others, add a very large element of uncertainty to the situation and outlook. Victory has crowned our arms; we can afford to be magnanimous to the vanquished; but in the days when the terms of peace are being discussed let us be careful not to fall into another German trap, each as a League of Nations with “freedom of Hie aeae’’ in the forefront of its programme, The freedom of the seas has in the past been assured to all nations in times of peace by Great Britain’s naval supremacy. This supremacy has saved Britain, her Allies, Hie Emipre, in war. Are we to throw aside or weaken our “sure shield,” and expose ourselves and the overseas Dominions to attack? Are we to relinquish Hie power and supremacy which all our great seamen, from Drake to Nelson, helped to win and bequeath as a priceless heritage to our race? If we consent, at this stage of the world’s history, to sacrifice our supremacy, wo shall grasp at the shadow and lose the substance of victory. To all such overtures, however plausible, however specious, our one reply must be; What we holfl, we hold!