WESTERN OFFENSIVE.

Wanganui Herald, Volume LI, Issue 15135, 1 February 1917, Page 4

WESTERN OFFENSIVE.

the course of his comments on the internal conditions of Germany, and of the livelihood of her striking a hard Wow at the, earliest opportunity. Lieutenant Puaux, of General Foch’s staff, rejects the supposition that there will ue' offensives at Salonika, Italy, or towards Retrograd, and says that certain indications suggest the employment of all Germany’s available troops in a supreme effort to break through the Western front. Coincident with this opinion is the declaration of a French correspondent- who asserts that the French preparations for the offensive are so. complete that they are able to attack on a big scale wherever and whenever they choose. The same remarks apply to • Britain, whose forces are ready for any emergency. The only question is, will an offensive on a,' large scale be commenced before the summer? The advent of hard frosts has enabled The Allies within the last week to move forward some of their big guns which the soft nature of the country hitherto prevented, but it is unlikely there will be A Wg move just now. It is worth Understand why an offensive by ejther side op the Western front is not to ff be expected until as near summer as if is safe to leave it; why winter weather constitute so great a handicap to the attacker. It is not only the difficulty of getting big guns forward in the mud, though that, of course, is a big element. An army which is blasting its way forward moves always across country the face of which has been blown to pieces by its own and the enemy’s shells. This is bad enough when the weather is dry, and in wet weather it is infinitely worse. And wjhile every move forward has to be preceded by the rebuilding of roads and light railways and the laying of water supply pipes and telephone wires across the morass which lies immediately behind the justwop front, the ground behind, the enemy only a section of which has been exposed to shell-fire, and that only for a time, remains comparatively haref and level, apd the bulk of his communications more or less intact. It must be remembered that ground won in a progressive advance has received a double bombardment, from the attackers when tfie defenders held it, and from the defenders afterwards, whereas ground still ip the possession of the defenders has received only one bombardment. Then, quite apart from difficulties in the way of movement, the co-operation of the artillery with the infantry in the actual assault is always liable in winter to be interfered with by rain and mist, which make things awkward for the "spotting” airmen. Indeed, the low visibility of winter handicaps in scones qf ways the observation and communication work of various sorts, which is so necessary to a successful advance. It might seem that at anyrate in a counter-attack the enemy would be under the same disadvantages as those who were conducting the offensive. Bnt in the Somme offensive the Germans are believed to have deliberately chosen wet days whenever possible for their'counter-attacks; if they didn’t, then some strange coincidences occprred. They deliberately submitted to a slight handicap themselves because there would be involved a very much greater handicap upon the Allies. They would be at a disadvantage in such important matters as the consolidation of newjy-won positions, the movement of reserves, and the observation of artillery fire. The objective being limited, there would be no need for the German guns to change position, while trenches which had recently changed hands would not need , much alteration. The counter-attacking troops would have the advantage of moving to their points of assembly under the cover afforded by communication trenches, while the Allies’ reinforcements would suffer disproportionate Joss in their slow and laborious advance across the blasted morass.