The Wanganui Herald. [PUBLISHED DAILY.] MONDAY, JULY 10, 1911. "THE POLICY OF COLIATH.”

Wanganui Herald, Volume XXXXVI, Issue 13423, 10 July 1911, Page 4

The Wanganui Herald. [PUBLISHED DAILY.] MONDAY, JULY 10, 1911. "THE POLICY OF COLIATH.”

Tremendous significance attaches to the Loudon cubic published last week concerning ship-building i a the British Navy. According to the message, the Ball Mull Gazette has high authority for stating that the ‘ Director of Naval Construction contemplates the abandonment of the Dreadnought type of warship, hut, the now typo is kept, a clow secret. In is believed it approximates the Lord Nelson, of 17,000 tons, and is suitable for shallow water, with a primary armament of six 10-inoh guns and anti-torpedo armament. Tlic cable significantly adds:

“Many experts are opposed to pulling all the eggs into one basket.” As a matter of fact, many naval oxjierts have long held the opinion that the construction of lingo Dreadnoughts is a mistake, and such an authority as Sir William ’White, who until a few years ago held the office of Director of Naval Construction to the Admiralty, gravely questions the alleged superiority of the big ship, and expresses doubt of its fighting efficiency as compared with the previous class represented by tho lung Kdward VII. (16,Ti1) tons). Sir William stigmatises the policy which resulted in the 'construction of Dreadnoughts as “the policy of Goliath,” a sinister allusion which it is devoutly to lie hoped cannot bo justified. Ho states that tho Dreadnought policy is based on the assumption that tho concentration i’l each “capital” ship of an exceptionally powerful armament in association with strong defence, high speed, and great ooal-cndnranco is essential to success in future naval campaigns. And ho sots himself to show that it involves im-mensely-increased expenditure on each unit, while it fails to provide safeguards against some of tho most serious risks incidental to modern naval warfare. It is perhaps natural that Sir William. White should devote the most penetrating criticism to the design of his successor in the office of Director of Naval Construction, but in his paper he goes on to state that his opinions arc shared by many naval officers of great experience and high authority. And ho makes a grave charge against the Special Committee on Designs when he affirms that the official report of the work done by that committee shows that tho inquiry made was not exhaustive nor marked by the. deliberate investigation essential to the solution of a problem of great difficulty and supreme importance. The attack on the big ship theory coming from such an expert as Sir William Whits has a significance which would be entirely lacking if it came from a loss authoritative source, and is particularly interesting in view of the statement now made on the authority of the Dali Mall Gazette, From tho mass of technical criticism poured forth by Sir William White it is possible to select a few of the principal disadvantages which lie alleges against the

typo of battleship, to the efficiency of which tho British notion Ims pinned ite lailh. in tho first place, he urges thaf the cost is so great that if. will lie difficult to provide the number of ships required for (he protect ion of the Ilrifisl Umpire. Next, lie says Unit the draught of fho first Dreadnoughts, when fully loaded, is HI ft (iin, or Hit more than that o l ' the King Edward, and Hit Din mor than that of file liew American ships which have a displacement of 22,10(1 tom when fully loaded, as against the Dread 'enght’s displacement, of 22,200 tons mder similar conditions. The extra Iranght, he says, is a heavy hand! cap which must interfere with effeetivi manoeuvring, especially in Hie comparatively shallow waters of the Baltic, and which must necessitate heavy additional expenditure on docks and dredging, lit admits that the Dreadnoughts can steam it least. 21 knots, as against the 1!) knots of the King Edward, but lie holds that tho. tactical and strategical advantage ol the higher speed does not compensate for the enormously increased cost and the liawhacks incidental to an exceptionally leep draught when loaded. The armament of the first Dreadnoughts, consisting of ten 12-inch guns, mounted in pairs in five armoured positions, as against fom 12-inch guns, .supplemented by t).2-ineli and G-incli guns on the King Ednard, is held to he unsatisfactory, on various grounds. This authority contends that I-’-inch gnus are only necessary foi piercing armour. Jint in every hatlleshi| there ore considerable areas not covered by the armour boll, and perforation either above that belt or below it, when (he vessel is exposed by roiling, may be effected just as well by the smaller-ealibre ;nns, of which a ship can carry a. large number. Siir William White says that at Tsushima more damage was done by the smaller projectiles perforating the thin steel [dales and admitting the sea than by the heavier projectiles breaking through the, armour-plate. In tko Dreadnoughts the armour-plate, when Die shi[ is loaded, rises only four feet above the water-line. The tost of the area is unprotected, and may be knocked to pieces hv 6-inch quick-firers. Then when the stability is altered the ship heels over, the sea comes in, and she founders. That is what happened to the heavily-laden Russian battleships at Tsushima. Then, again, it is put that the size of the Dreadnoughts make them an easier target, for under-water attack by submarine mines and torpedoes, and the aut.ihig ship school point out that the debates which took [lace at The Hague Conference make if, certain that extensive use will ho made of submarine mines in future naval campaigns. Sir William White will net admit that the Dreadnought is adequately protected against damage from mines and torpedoes. ‘Tlomembering the fact," he writes, “that on one day tho Japanese lost two out of their six battleships by the explosion of submarine mines, it cannot he disputed that an immense concentration of lighting power in single shipis et enormous siz-e and cost, may he accompanied by large relative losses.” Apparently the Dreadnought is held to embody tho dangerous principle of carrying too many eggs in one basket, as the cable indicates. And in discussing the armament of ten 12-inch guns, Sir William White suggests that tho tire from one pair of these monsters may, under certain circumstances, wreck one of the .other gunturrets, owing (o tho wide are. which they command. Another unpleasant suggestion is that the magazines must he under each pair of guns, and therefore, in the ease of some guns, cannot he kept sufficiently far from (ho heat of the engine-room to ensure safely. White, perhaps, the gravest charge is that, the heavy guns and their [noted ing barbettes and turrets are carried at such a great height, above the water that the centre of gravity is raised correspondingly, and the capability of the ship, to maintain her stability when the thin sides are damaged in action will he materially reduced. The catalogue of <lefoefs alleged by this authority is sufficiently comprehensive. According (u him the new type of battleship is inordinately costly, so unhandy to manoeuvre as to lie a danger to the rest of tho squadron, so top-heavy as to ho liable to capsize, and so badly planned in reference to the magazines as to he apt to explode spontaneously. Considering the vast amount of money already expended by Britain and other Towers on cruisers and battleships of the Dreadnought type, tho change in policy is very significant.