DECLARATION OF LONDON
DEBATE IN THE COMMONS
SECOND READING CARRIED. Press Association.—Telegraph.—Copyright. LONDON, July 4. The Hon, A. J. Balfour, during the debate on the Declaration of London, said that the lion. 11. McKenna’s attack on the admirals would come ill from any man, but more particularly from the First Lord of the Admiralty. The interests of neutrals and belligerents were inseparable. He was unable to understand why so grossly unfair discrimination should be made between foodstuffs going to an island like Britain and foodstuffs going to a Continental nation. The Declaration precluded the Government from ever protesting against the illegal treatment of neutrals, everything being loft to the belated decision of an Imperial tribunal. Mr Balfour emphasised the value of diplomatic pressure and all it involved. His great objection to the Declaration was not that the Prize Court was a very inefficient method of compensating for wrong done to the individual, but the Declaration destroyed the existing remedy, which was immediate and powerful, and often proved effective. (Unionist cheers.) All the changes favoured military as against naval power, and Continental as against island power. Mr Balfour appealed for a closer examination by experts before the House agreed to ratification, which would never be revisable. Sir Edward Grey, amid loud Ministerial cheers, said the remarks in general opposition to the Declaration embodied a gross amount of misstatement and misrepresentation. He complained of Mr Balfour's and others' belated views, which were focussed, not on the most important points; hence they had a wrong •’erspcctivo and a false view of the whole Declaration. A most important matter was Iho effect of the agreement on the right of blockade. He felt- that if be could convince the Opposition members that our food supplies would be safeguarded when we were belligerents they would not demand a three days’ debate. As neutrals, it was clear we would be the gainers under the free list. The late Government protested against Russia sinking a neutral, but four neutrals were sunk afterwards, and no remedy was offered except the Hussion Prize Court, No compensation was obtained for the sinking but only, because there wa.s probably an insufficient ease against contraband. (Ministerial cheers.) Since then the majority of (he great Powers objected at The Hague against the prohibition of sinking. It was therefore hopeless to seek acceptance of Iho principle that no sinking should be allowed. Although the Internationa! Prize Court would not be perfect, the great Powers having a majority over all minor neutral Powers, wc, in the last two arbitrations, bad constant and willing recourse to the home representatives of minor Powers in arranging the Court’s decision. Regarding food, he robed on the broad proposition that if we are able to keep the sea free to the British flag in war time we will be able to keep it free from neutrals. (Cheers,.) If we failed to keep the soil, starvation would not be prevented by a neutral flag. An enemy's efforts would lie devoted to attacking British, not, neutral, vessels. Members opposite tried to prove that without the Declaration there ■was no Tear that food would be declared absolute 'contraband, and there was no danger regarding our food supplies. Lord Beresford had said that if he and other officers saw 20 vessels with the enemy’s food supply they would put them down if they hanged for’it. (Laughter.) Thus one sentence blew out of the water the whole structure which the opponents of the Declaration were building. lie would not pretend that the Declaration was a substitute for cruisers. He would not suggest any paper instfument for sudh a purpose. Every Government was aware of the intention of the Declaration to prevent all food being treated as contraband of war. Anybody treating as if it were all contraband of war would violate the clear intention, An underwriter would be aware that under the Declaration food cannot be legallv treated as absolute contraband and if the cargo was illegally seized compensation would follow. Regarding the treatment of neutrals, the only difference the Declaration made was that if the Denver against whom wc were at war sank a neutral coming to Britain ho would be compelled to prove the emergency before a. Court, whereon ho would have only one representative instead of a Court of his own nationality. 'Hie only great neutral Dower interested in the supply of food lor Britain, and with a fleet strong enough to interfere effectively, was the United Slates, who were parties to (lie Declaration. If the United States wished to send us food in war time she could convoy it under Articles fit and (12 of the Declaration. Sir E. Grey attached the greatest importance to the concession made to ns of utter blockade. The weapon we particularly retained unimpaired was blockade, with which essential neutrals could not interlcro. This was why two naval delegates signed (ho report. Wc secured conditions essential, in the Admiralty's opinion for effective use and right of blockade. Under the Declaration we, as belligerents, avoid (he risk of one or more Dowers interposing in the doctrine of blockade, making a blockade under modern conditions useless for our purpose. Sir E. Grey emphasised that the increasing dependence of every belligerent in future upon the consent of neutrals was a certainty, as, with the growth, of shipping, peoples would be more closely connected. and there would be a. tendency to restrict belligerent action, 'flic Government had dealt with blockade from the standpoint of high policy, and in this matter the Government did not intend (o devolve its responsibilities to any commission of experts. (Cheers.) As belligerents, we would do our best to destroy converted merchantmen. Hie fact that these would be few and all known made the, question comparatively .unimportant. Moreover, a. neutral’s obligation to prevent such leaving port was positively enjoined in the Declaration. If the Declaration was not ratified, we would increase the risk of interference from neutrals in wav time. Wo would he doteating the keen desire of Continental nations and tho United States to have some international agreement on the points mentioned. If it could ho shown there was anything in the Declaration vitally endangering ns he would bo prepared, even at the eleventh hour, to say wc ought to draw hack. He hoped ho” had proved that where we had not gained by the Declaration wo were uot making things worse than before. Wc, on the other band, bad mads some undesirable practices more difficult, and where we wanted to be assured, we had got an assurance we had uot go before. Refusal to ratify would cause other Dowers to enter into an agreement among themselves for arbitration on tho basis of this Declaration. The
Qovsrnment did not wish Britain to be omitted from the agreement, whereinto it was perfectly safe for us to enter. After Mr Bonnr Law had criticised the Declaration as, falling far short of the Government's aspirations, the Right Hon. H. H. Asquith summarised the points gained. He admitted that regarding the right to sanction the destruction of neutral ships a comprise had boon effected, hut it was a compromise which did not injure us. Mr J. G. Butcher’s amendment to refer the Declaration to a commission of experts was negatived by 301 to 230. The result of the division was received with cheers, though there were some. Opposition cries of “Traitors!” Tlie Bill was read a second time without division.
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Bibliographic details
Wanganui Herald, Volume XXXXVI, Issue 13419, 5 July 1911, Page 5
Word Count
1,240DECLARATION OF LONDON Wanganui Herald, Volume XXXXVI, Issue 13419, 5 July 1911, Page 5
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