The Wanganui Herald. [PUBLISHED DAILY.] MONDAY, FEBRUARY 6, 1903, AFGHANISTAN.

Wanganui Herald, Volume XXXIX, Issue 11476, 6 February 1905, Page 4

The Wanganui Herald. [PUBLISHED DAILY.] MONDAY, FEBRUARY 6, 1903, AFGHANISTAN.

There have been several very significant items in' our cable news during the pasi few days relating to Afghanstan.- - One message stated ithat the Ameer of Afghanistan had applied to Mr Lotus Dane (Secretary to the Government of India, and the leader of a British mission at present in Cabul) for a strip of land to the sea for the purposes of a railway' to an Afghan eeajporfc, "considering this, preferable to a subsidy, and would testify to Britain's friendship." Another 'cable explained that if the Atneor was allowed to acquire that strip of Baluchistan territory starting at the south-west corner of Afghanistan ancl terminating at a port on the Arabian Sea, he was willing that ' a railway should be constructed throngh it to Kandahar and Cabul. What docs Afghanistan wdnt with an outlet to the sea? Is it sought for the purpose. of encouraging legitimate commercial enterprise and .trade? We think not. The request reveals Russian duplicity, and it is clear that the influence of the Muscovite is far from dormant in Afghanistan. Furthermore, -it would appear that the British mission recently despatched to Kabul ostensibly for the purpose of improving the relations v between the Ameer and- the • Government of India has not been over-successful.' The contemplated visit to India of the heir to the Afghan throne was seized upon as an excuse by that astute diplomatist Lord Curzon to ask- that* a British 1 mission should be received at Kabul to

.arrange the preliminaries of the visit. The request was granted, and of course the mission? did not fail to introduce other matters, including a suggestion that tho Indian railway and telegraph system should be extended into Afghanistan. This modest . request was politely declined by the, Ameer on the ground that the. Afghans were not sufficiently civilised. Observe, then, the cunning underlying the application for a strip of land to connect Afghanistan with the sea through Baluchistan ! To understand the position thoroughly the reader should remember that ever since the accession of the present Ameer, who came to the throne about 'three years ago, the relations betweeu Britain and Afghanistan have not .been so cordial as they were during the reign of Jiia predecessor. The latter, notwithstanding the fact that he had" spent a great portion -of his younger days as an •exile at the court of Russia, nevertheless displayed more friendship for Britain than Russia. .The late Ameer never wavered in his - faithfulness to ■, Britain, and ho advised his nominated" successor to persist in following a. similar policy and avoid "Russian influence.. The Ameer at present is subsidised by Britain to the extent of some ,£40,000 annually to help him to strengthen the passes, provide modern implements of war, and generally "provide against Russian aggression, but the Ameer is. quite willing that this grant shall be cancelled provided he has access to . the Arabian Gulf. ' A year or two ago the present Ameer seemed inclined to permit the presence of a" Rus.sian agent at. Kabul, but British remonstrances . had a counteracting effect, and the Ameer is now undecided. During the last century the presence ,of M ,a Russian agent at Kabul has twice brought about a British invasion of. Afghanistan. . The first, ended \in disaster to. the British arms; the second resulted in the complete conquest of Afghanistan and tho deposition of its, ruler. In 1838 the, Russian envoy Yickovitch completely deceived -the Ameer Dost Mahomed, and led up to the invasion by General El'phinstonc, whose army was cut to pieces in the, passes. Then, in 1878, the Russian envoy Stolietoff played upon Shore Ali, the then Ameer, whp had to abdicate and fly to Russia on a threatened invasion by. Sir Frederick Roberts; an' invasion carried into effect shortly afterwards. „All these , incidents should cause the Ameer of Afghanistan to see that Britain will not tolerate the establishment of Russian influence in Kabul. And yet, until lately, he has at times been suspected of a disposition to toy with Russia. His country has all to gain and nothing to lose by following "British advice ; all to lose ,and nothing to gain by the encouragement of Russian influence. All Britain wants is that Afghanistan shall remain an independent buffer State between India and the Russians, and so promote peace. She could annex Afghanistan readily enough if she" wished, but that, so far, has never been her policy, though it might become her pplicy if the Ameer does . not take a more decided course in repelling 'Russia and all her works. On -the other hand, it is the one great object of Russia in that part to gain a. permanent footing in the hill country overlooking India, either as an ally and an instructor or aB a- conqueror. If Russia- could succeed in establishing herself in the coveted land she "would probably bide her time' and await her opportunity. Afghanistan, would >form, her advanced base, and she would probably try and ingratiate herself with the people and utilise them by and by in the hill fighting. She would yield commercial advantages and spend money freely. Several of the various invader 3of India have first made a" horne — sometimes a new kingdom — in Afghanistan, prepaid to sweep down when an opportune moment arrived. As a modern writer put its — "The way to India through the Khyber Pass' lias been a beaten track trodden by many adventurers." Russia would not hurry; her policy during more than a hundred years has been slow and steady advance. Her mission is to conquer and civilise the world, but such an undertaking is not the work of a day or a year, or perhaps of a century 6r a few centuries. Her scheme is advancement — physical advancement — and until lately she has had ib'very much her own way. Her near presence, if not a constant menace to India, at least, keeps the latter constantly on. the alert, and a large 'standing army is a heavy expense and a' continual tax on a nation whose masses are none too well off. The position on the' Indian and Afghan frontiers is none too satisfactory, and this is plainly indicated by the reorganisation of the Indian army and the strengthening .of the frontier by Lord Kitchener, the commander-in-chief, who is reported to- have expressed the opinion that war would ensue in the spring.