THE BRITISH ARMY.

Wanganui Herald, Volume XXXV, Issue 10390, 13 July 1901, Page 2 (Supplement)

THE BRITISH ARMY.

M. Germain Papist publishes a leading article in the Figaro entitled "The British 'Army." v The Paris correspondent of the TTimes transmits the subjoined extracts from the article to giro English readers the pleasure of perusing an article by a representative French,journal Who is not afraid of according to England full praise for the valorous qualities of her soldiers, and tho energy and perseverance of her national character, nnd feels himself sufficiently master of his subject to say exactly what he thinks. "England is n nation that is faithful to precedent and dislikes changes. In the army, more than anywhere else, there is a refusal to make innovations, ' and an endeavour to keep to the old linos. The English Army is, therefore, an old army, whose traditions as to the staff, armament, manoeuvres, and recruiting arc out of date. So it has always been in history, but, at the same time, whenever things, have become serious, and demanded change, English tenacity has dono its to draw up the reforms' required, and has carefuly carried Jhem out. Tho Transvaal war wilL show us once more how speedily and clearly the English Army modifies its organisation and tactics. The armament of the troops, especially the artillery, is not equal to that of other countries. In the Transvaal, for instance, the English guns were much inferior to those of the Boers. There was no reconnaisanee department, no advance guard, and few or no outposts at the beginning of the war. How many battalions we have seen surprised, surrounded, and made prisoners at one blow! An advance guard at the Bloemfontein reservoirs would have saved General Broadwood's artillery, which was caught as in a mouse-trap. The generals who originally commanded have been superseded by experienced men who have previously fought on battlefields like those in South Africa, and, whether in Afghanistan or tho Soudan, had been able to overcome the difficulties of maintaining long lines of communications amid deserts nnd in terrible climates. These new chiefs soon changed the tactics, and with British _ perseverance they have succeeded in reversing the situation. The Boers no longer surprise British columns. The officers have studied the habits of their adversaries, and have borrftwed their best quality, mobility. Under Lord Kitchener's command flying columns, composed of mounted troops almost entirely drawn from the colonial contingents, trnVerse enormous distances without baggage, pursue the commandos uninterruptedly, frequently forco them to accept combat against their will, inflict losses, and defeat their projects. "The .British Army now in the Transvaal numbers 200,000 men, 60,000 of whom, nearly all colonials, form these flying columns. The remainder, the infantry recrnitod in England, now guard tho lines of communication. In this latter force we see the English soldier, who has been in the Transvaal, what ho was at Waterloo or in the. Crimea. He has borno an unheard-of amount of fatigue and privation, such as professional soldiers of long service can only endure. Under fire he has been steady and calm. In several engagements, Spionkop among them, tho Iniskillings and the Dublin Fusiliers, to cite only these two regiments, lost 60 per cent, without giving way or losing spirit. But, if the regiments may be considered first-rate when massed in battle, it must be acknowledged that in isolated detachments they have faltered terribly. How can wo explain these constant capitulations of small garrisons and posts which still continue? An inquiry has been demanded on this point, but whether it will ever be made is doubtful. In our Algerian wars, which exhibit some analogies to tho Transvaal, we had only one -case of this kind in 18 years. And how many were tho combats in which all succumbed to the very last man! Need I recall SidiBrahim and the affair of Sergeant Bladin. "With regard to tho plan of campaign, there have been, as in every war, failures and also great conceptions. It is not my purpose to write the strategic history of the Transvaal war, but I may point out its great moral features. Two of these are especially striking — the tendencc that is never discouraged by failure, and tho decision which can assume responsibilities and go straight, to its goal without hesitating for difficulties or qpeident. Accordingly, Sir Rcdvers Buller, who has been loaded with sarcasms, has remained popular in London, and, it must be said, justly so. The Kn^-Hsli popular raijicl ollorishos tliO ideal of the man who is bout. on Ju's tnsk and does not let himself be discouraged. ... As to the decision which a general ought to possess, "we may cite the case of General French, who rode to relieve Kimberloy when it

was at its last gasp, and did not hesitate to lose half his" cavalry to attain his object, knowing well that the stake was worth more than a thousand horses. "The transport services were ably managed from the spring of 1900 by Colonel E. Ward, now Permanent Un-der-Secretary for War. Thanks to him, 200,000 men, moving over a territory more than twice the size of Franco, have been supplied with food and munitions without any appreciable mistakes. Yet Capetown, his revictualling base, is as far from Pretoria ns Amsterdam from Lisbon. The sanitary organisation was at first inadequate, but hns be?n remodelled; and, since June, 1900, everything has been in good working order. . . . These are a group of° facts which enrinot be brought too forcibly before thosp among us who were charged with preparing nnd orgnnising our Madagascar expedition. Eng-1-id alone cnn"transter 200,000 men to a point asross the ocenn and maintain them there for several years. She alone has a merenntile mnrine large enough for such an effort. In the Transvaal war commercial transports — that is, to say, one-twentieth of her mercantile marine — have sufficed for such an enterprise. Thanks, moreover, to her industry and dockyards, she can double her fleet iii an emergency, as she did in the Crirocnn war. ''Tilts material power is rendered^ still more effective by Englnnd's exceptional geogrnphicnl position, for she is nt once protected neainst any invasion nnd capable of making a descent on any point of the world thnt she may choose. Hitherto her .statesmen, from tho commencement of the century at lenst, hnd disclaimed any idea of aggression, and the Government had been only anxious to possess an nrmy for the defence of the soil- The Transvaal war and the contemplated military reforms seem to prove that this state of mind is undergoing a change, and thnt there is nn idea, not of intervening in Europe, but of acting far off in the colonies or nt sea with a military strength which could not be equalled by any other nation. Mr Brodrick's scheme seems to us explicit on this point. . . .If to those 120,000 men of the Mother Country we ndd the contingents of mounted colonial troops which have just proved their strength in tho Transvaal, we soe what n powerful nnny England will in future have at her disposal. Couple with this fact the demnud constantly made by nil parties, Conservative or Radical, for the increase of the fleet, which is always so lurge, and we may nsk for what object except conquest England is accumulating such forces. We certainly do not believe thnt the British Government is light-heartedly seeking n conflict, but it ivants to enforce its will upon the people They do not take the trouble to discuss matters irit)i men whom they know to be incapable of reBisting them. With those whom they deem of equal strength they finally agree to treat. To those who nro stronger than themselves they yield. This should be n wnrning to the statesmen at the head of our country. Si vis paecm, para bellum."