NON-INTERVENTION.

Westport Times, Volume II, Issue 199, 20 March 1868, Page 3

NON-INTERVENTION.

(erom the chronicle.) International law is based upon two (premises : —Birst, that individual nations and States constitute independent and sovereign powers ; secondly, •that a communion exists between them, •the results of which are rights and •duties common to all. Both conditions are equally important, and a •defect in either of them is fatal •to international law. If individuals •nations and States were subjected to •a supreme .power like the members of •a federal State, internationallaw would •cease to exist.; it would become •the' •law of the state, and lose its •distinctive character. And on the other hand, if ■the idea of a communion of nations were lost, international law would •fall to the. ground, and universal lawlessness prevail. It is necessary, therefore, that both the independence •and the communion of nations should be equallyupheld. But it is evident ■that the two ideas, considered in themselves, tend-in different, and eventually in opposite directions ; for absolute independence would make communion impossible, and absolute communion would preclude independence. Neither idea, therefore, can be unconditionally sustained; they must ■mutually counterbalance each other. Jt has been the custom for centuries •to promote the independence and •sovereignty of the State, and to neglect ■international interests. The former (points .are considered p r i ma ry and ■essential, and the latter as merely •secondary and.accessory. The science of international law has of late been ■advancing in this direction, and is •decisive at the present day both in 'theory and .practice. It accords •entirely with the .practice of exalting •the individual and by depriving the: ■rights of the body politic from the •wish of the individual, giving them a ' 'relatively minor importance. The soverignty and independence of each State in an international system corresponds to the persanal rights of the individual in a State ; and it 'is by out two branches of one and; the same principle that the personal rights of the individual are made the 'bases of an international system. The ■connection of the-two tendencies is indisputable, and they support and •corroborate eaeh other. It would ■carry us ! too far at present to investi- ' :gate the propiuety or impropriety of \ ■this system ; but it is clear that, in -doth cases Plurality is considered the 'one primary and esential thing; and amity is 'only regarded as secondary and accidental. These views are Oai'gely defective-; but they are the I ;prevailing views of the time fand re- ; present the authority of the law as it \ 'exists. And, however defective they, ' 'may be, they contain some share of truth. Moreover, -as even the most ■extreme individualism does not assert ' the rights of the individual to be ab-' ' solute, but allows the State a certain latitude of authority, so it is admitted ; 'that certain international rights and - •duties must to some 'extent Kmit and ■control the independence and severagnty of the State. This has never , been, and cannot be, denied, except by : those who, like Spinoza, reject the law of nations entirely, by identifying right with might, and attributing to a State only so much right, as it has might. It is admitted, then, that , States have certain international rights and duties it must be admitted that they are justified in asserting them by force, if need be, and that at times. : they are even under an obligation to! ! do so. This gives rise to what is> called the right of intervention, which ] consists in individual States being put to some extent under the control of \ the rest; for the right of control con- J fers the right of active intervention ; when circumstances demand it. There are two kinds of intervention ; —one affecting the internal affairs of a State, and the other affecting its disputes with its neighbors. Ancient l and modern history furnishes us with numerous examples of bnth; and we hold that circumstances may warrant both. If, for instance, a country is suffering under a Government which tramples on the principles of justice and morality, and has so completely mastered the people that they cannot Weak off its yoke, other nations have aright to interfere; and sometimes, as Grotius says, intervention becomes : *i duty of humanity. The intervention

of the Christian Powers in Turkey is a result of this principle, and an entirely , justifiable one. Indeed, now that Turkey has been admitted into the councils of Europe, this principle is supported by a positive right; for she was only admitted upon the express condition that the rights of the Christian population should be secured. If she is unable to comply with this condition, she must be placed inward, however prejudicial this may be to her sovereignty. The rights of humanity are more ancient and sacred than the sovereignty of the Sublime Porte. The other kind of intervention of which we have spoken, namely, intervention between conflicting states, finds its first expression through the hona ojjicia of diplomacy, which are offered -in the hope of accommodating difficulties and preventing war. In this way it may be said that a general and permanent intervention is going on among the States of Europe. The whole system of modern diplomacy is based upon it.; and it cannot be denied, so long as resident embassies and diplomatic corps exist. In this way an influence is exercised which is at times very effective, and, no doubt, prevents many acts of injustice. Where it fails to produce an effect, the question of resorting to force arises. The intervention of force is justifiable when treaties are concerned, which not only affect the relations of single States, but constitute a fundamental law of the whole system of Europe. And so again when a State overpowers a weaker neighbor, and aims at a dangerous preponderance of power, thus constituting itself an enemy to general liberty. Even the humane Eenelon has enunciated this principle in his "Examen de la 'Conscience sur les Devoirs de la Boyante," and it is admitted by all authorities on international law. Eor centuries, every coalition which has been made in'order to secure the balance of power—the last example being furnished by the Crimean Tvar —has been established in accordance with this principle. Intervention always comes back to the question which we have already called the knot of all the difficulties that arise both in theory and .practice —the question, that is, of the balance; between the independence and communion of nations. One interest limits, and controls the other, and the point is, how far it should do so. And since it is impossible to fix a standard, the. right of intervention is clearly a dangerous one, only to be exercised with great caution. Unfortunately it has been often abused. But the right use remains nevertheless; and as there have been cases of intervention ~which posterity has condemned, so there have been others which have always commanded its admiration. Each case must be judged according to circumstances, and the practical wisdom of statesmen must be left to decide, in the first instance, whether in any particular conjuncture intervention is or is not necessary. To deny that circumstances may not only justify but demand intervention is to deny the first principle of international law. To proclaimuniversalnon-intervention is, in fact, to proclaim international anarchy, for if it were once established as a rule that a State must take care of itself, and that no state should take any thought for the fate of another, all guarantees against injustice and wrong would disappear. This would be to pronounce the doom of all small States with powerful neighbors. They would become a prey for which the great military Powers would soon be at war, since aggrandisement feeds the desire for aggrandisement, and there would be no check to this when right was confused and identified wit'h might.' How far the power of the mighty should extend would then be a question to be decided only on the field of battle.