NAVAL OPERATIONS.

West Coast Times, 7 September 1915, Page 3

NAVAL OPERATIONS.

THE GERMAN NAVY. | WHY IT WAS CONSTRUCTED. A .MISERABLE FAILURE. Per Dress Association. —Copyright. LONDON, Sept. 5. Mr. A. J. Balfour (First Lord of the Admii'. lty in the,course of a letter to a correspondent, states that Germany' first proclaimed the policy of building a fleet against Britain in 1900. From the standpoint of her own ambitions, the policy was perfectly sound. But she aimed at world domination against which tlie British Fleet had been the surest protection since the time of Queen Elizabeth. The Germans had every reason to he aware of the fact. Without the British fleet, Frederick the Great must have succumbed to his enemies and Prussia would scarcely have shaken off the Napoleonic tyranny. Whatever may be thought of the free"on of the seas, the freedom of the land was due in no small measure to The British Navy. German statesmen were too wise to suppose that they could call U navy into existence immediately, able to contend on equal terms with a power which was- the most formidable obstacle to their aggressive projects. But they ■ calculated that a powerful though inferior fleet would render Britain impotent, since the British Government did not dare risk a conflct which, however successful, might leave Britain’s naval forces inferior to a third Power. This policy was clearly, though cautiously, expressed in the famous preamble to the. Navy Bill. So far the German designs had not met with any measure of success. The British fighting fleet was relatively stronger than thirteen months ago. There was no reason to suppose that progress was likely to be arrested. It was plain that Admiral von Tirpitz and the German Admiralty had arrived at the same ttmelusion. When the old nolicy broke down, they.had thought that submarines might succeed where Dreadnoughts and cruisers had failed. The change was adopted with extreme reluctance and many searchings of heart. The most reckless Government does not desire to perpetrate nnneces""rv crimes and we can only conjecture the feelings of the German navy and German sailors, who, being gallant men In not like being, put to a coward’s job. Wo know well enough that in the old lays every privateersman would have bought himself disgraced if lie s»nt unresisting merchant ships to the bottom with all hands. It is not an agreeable reflection Hint the first notable performance of the Gorman fleet should resemble piracy rattier than privateering. We may safely assume that the only hopes of a decisive success induced the German Ministbrs to inflict a new' stain m the honour of their eonfitry. Do•isivo success does not seem to he. in iglit, while the losses inflicted upon German'submarines are formidable. The ■f'itisli mercantile tonnage is greater ’ban at the beginning of the war. It s true that many inoffensive persons, minding women and children, and neutrals as well as belligerents, have been "obbed and killed, hut’ the criminals lave also paid a heavy t(ill. Some were rescued, but the very nature of the submarines often drags the crews to destruction. Those who sent them to their mihonoured mission await their return in vain.

Heroin lies an explanation of the imazing change w Jiicfi has overcome the < Urdomatie attitude of Germany towards the Uni States. Meti ask rhy the sinking of the Lusitania was welcomed in Germany lith a shout of trumph while that of the Arabic was accepted in melancholy silence. It is not because the United -itntes has become stronger or Germany weaker, or the attitude of the President varied, ft is not because German opinion has revolted against lawless cruelty. The reason is found in the fact that the author of the submarine policy has bad time to measure its effects. Deeds which at first were merely crimes may seem to bp blunders in September..