THE LAW OF LIBEL.

West Coast Times, Issue 908, 20 August 1868, Page 4

THE LAW OF LIBEL.

(FKO3I THE OTAGO DAILY TI3IES.)

We refer once more to the amendment of the Law of Libel, in order that we may redeem our promise to treat of that branch of the subject which we have already denominated "Original Discussion." In discussing " Communicated Intelligence," we brought under the notice of our readers the series of reports which journalists are in the habit of publishing. The publication of such reports in no sense implies participation in any of the views which thus obtain currency through the medium of the Press. In treating to-day of " Original Discussion," we allude chiefly to editorial or contributed articles, or letters in which passing events are openly criticised. To secure the protection of such publications when not engendered in a spirit of malice, or from any sinister motive, is the object of our present effort. So lorjgias the public critic confines himself $». -the discussion of abstract theories or material themes, the Law of Libel will not prc?s hardly upon him. He may discuss the downfall of empires, the progress of the arts aud sciences, and a thousand and one other topics, and live in dread of no attorney. " The proper study of mankind is man," Pope tells us : neatly epigrammatic, but scarcely an established axiom in the experience of some newspaper proprietors. In truth, it is only when the public writer happens to select this very "proper study" for*his animadversion, that the gaunt presence of the much, dreaded attorney makes it.-? unwelcome appearance. For the publication of newspaper essays — always harmless — often innocuous — no extended privilege is required. But if newspaper writing is not (o be confined within such narrow limits, the necessity which demands that passing events of public importance to a community should be discussed with freedom and candor alike demands that such discussion should be protected. As a general rule it is sivpposed that every species of " Original Discussion " must have truth for its foundation, and justice for -its superstructure. That is to say, facts assumed to exist must have an existence, and comments made upon or inferences drawn from them, must be fairly and reasonably sustained. But this general rule, from its very strictness, perhaps, has been made subject to a number of important exceptions. The statesman, the judge, the general, the-] public writer, the man of art or science, are not allowed to complain if the critic miiHfl takenly exceeds the'strict bounds of truth,! so long as malice is wanting. In such casesj the question is not whether an article is true or false, but whether it be fair or unfair. Of course the assertion of a series of falsehoods would be very strong evidence of unfairness. In all these and similar cases the public possesses a very deep interest in the conduct and proceedings of their servants, and in testing the reality of the pretensions made by those whose aims and callings invite criticism. To stifle an honest expression of opinien, however mistaken, in such cases, would ensure misgivings in the public mind. The boasted freedom of our institutions would soon languish, because the feeling would gain ground that they were too feeble or too corrupt to bear free handling. The rationale of the protection afforded to the critic in the cases which we have been discussing appears to spring out of (i) the nature of the subject discussed, (ii) the interest of the public in it. and (iii) the fairness aud- candor of the writer. It is not, we think, too demoralising to suggest that a rule So wholesome, "and based upon such self-evident principles of justice, should be extended in its application to all original critiques. The man unjustly assailed by some malignant foe would have no very great difficulty in establishing a want of fairness or candor on his part. Nor do we ask that the journalist should go scot free merely because, from a too lively imagination, he made assumptions which neither reason nor justice would warrant. Dealing in a crude way with a very difficult subject, we would say that, in all cases of " Original Discussion,, it should be open to a defendant in an action for libel, to contend that the matter treated of by him was one of public comment, that thp public had an interest in it, and that it was treated with fairness and candor. This standard would exclude the question of truth or falsehood except as a test of fairness, and manifestly it would have no application to a purely personal attack. But passing from this branch of the subject, we come to one of a narrower limit, but certainly not of less importance. The Luv of Libel, as it effects original discussion, .«hould in a great measure be a corolmiy to the law relative to communicated intelligence. If it be permissable to publish the proceedings of a Court of Justice, it should certainly be allowable to the public to comment upon the facts elicited durii g the course of" the reported trial. Yet one can see that this very awkward phase of the Law of Libel might appear. A newspaper publishes a privileged report of the proceedings of the Court of Justice, for which no action lies. The Editor takes up the subject of the trial, and treats of it in a leading article. He states as facts what the evidence certainly warrants him in assuming 10-be true. If these statements arc to be the ground of an action for libel when found in* the columns of a leading article, although admittedly it would not bo so when found in the report, the law is certainly in a very anomalous state. This anomaly lias been [felt by the Lord Chief Justice of England, who, to make the law "the perfection of reason," has laid it down at 'Nisi Prius that where tho publication of a report of tho proceedings of a Court of Justice, or of Parliament, is privileged, an article founded on the report, if in other respects unobjectionable, is also protected. This is only fair, but the question is new, and by no means free from I difficulty ; and if the Legislature \& to '

amend the law, this curious phase of the matter should not be lost sight of. It would follow from this reasoning that, if the Legislature should think" proper to clothe with a statutory protection reports of public bodies or meetings other than Courts of Justice, it should also extend the privilege to original discussions founded upon such reports.

The Egyptian Government and the Negkoes of the Nile. — Less dubious than Mr Baker's views concerning native nego anthopology, are his views on a political question of more immediate practical importance— the question of the duty of the civilised world, and of Britain in particular, as respects the present custody and stewardship of the negro. Those necro populations of the Nile and its sources which Mr Baker visited, are at present — so far as they are under any stewardship at all — under that of the Egyptian Government, a branch of that Turkish power which grasps also so many of the fairer lands of the East. The Egyptian Government is the agency at present deputed by the sufferance of Europe to manage the negro slavery accessible from the Nile ; and only by the permission or assent of this agency can the haunts of this savagery be reached. According to Mr Baker, this stale of thiugs is a monstrosity and a crime. The Egyptian Government have done nothing for interior Africa but infiltrate into it the virus of the slave trade. If Africa is ever to be made a partaker iii the civilization of the world, the beginning of the work must be the abolition' of the slave trade, and, so long as the Egyptian Government sits at the gate this is impossible. Sooner or later the Nile negroes must be under another stewardship than that of the Egyptian Government or of any Turks whatsoever. In this we. cordially agree with Mr Baker. Not the least merit of his book to our mind is, that it is likely to give a powerful specific stimulus to two convictions already making way in the British mind, but the furtherance of which is most desirable — the conviction, in the first place, that the Turkish dominion, wherever it exists, is an anachronism, and that all attempts to bolster it up are bad policy ; and the conviction, in tho second place, that our great national doctrine of non-interference, though kept in honor of late by the hosannas of public meetings, and perhaps provisionally useful for many practical purposes, is essentially a doctrine so base, so inconsistent With either the sound indistinctive sense or the proper scientific theory of human duty, that the soul of Britain cannot long rest in it and live. — " Macmillan's Magazine."

A little four-year-old child in Port land told father he was a fool. On beiug reprimanded by his mother and required to say he sorry, he toddled up to the insulted parent and exclaimed — " Papa, I'm sorry you's a fool.' 1

, The "Chicago Tribune" nominates Train, the talkist, for President, and Weston. the walkest, for "Vice-Prcsident. Lungs and legs— how potent in politics !