THE WAR IN GERMANY.

West Coast Times, Issue 337, 22 October 1866, Page 1 (Supplement)

THE WAR IN GERMANY.

(the articles op peace.) The Vienna "Gazette'" has published the preliminaiies of peace agreed upon between the two great belligerent Powers. We subjoin an exact analysis of these, omitting- articles merely formal :—: — Their/Majesties the Emperor of Austria and the King of Pru-sia, after declaring that they are animated by a desire to restore to their peoples the blessings of peace, appoint as their plenipotentiaries — his Apostolic Majesty, Count Karolyi and Baron de Brenner ; and the King of Prussia, Couut Bismarck, who have agreed upon the following points : — 1. The integrity of the Austrian monarchy, with the exception of Venetia, shall be maintained. The King of Prussia shall withdraw his troops from- the Austrian territory as soon as a peace shall have been signed, "under reserve of the arrangements to be made at the time of the definitive conclusion of peace for the guarantee of the payment of the war indemnity." 2. The Emperor of Austria recognises the dissolution of the Germanic Confederation as it heretofore existed, and accepts the new organisation of Germany without thft participation of Austria; he undertakes to vect\ r jnise the closer Federal relations ;'d ' .uyern Bundesbande) which the Ki'ig of Prussia shall establish to the north ot the line of the IMaine ; he also accept,- tho f urination by the States of the south by a separate Confederation, their connection w ith the north being reserved for future arrangement between the two parties. 3. His Apostolic Majesty transfers to the King of Prussia all the rights which he had acquired by the treaty of Vienna of the 30th October, 1864, over the Duchies of Schleswig and Ilolstein, with the reservation that the population of Northern Schleswig, if they should express such a desire by a free vote, should be reunited to Denmark. ! 4. The war indemnity is fixed at forty million thalers. From this sum fifteen millions shall be deducted as the equivalent of the amount which the Emperor of Austria, by virtue of the treaty of 1864, would still be entitled to claim from the Elfce Duchies, and five millions as tlie equivalent of the provisioning of the Prussian troops Avhich still continue' to occupy the Austrian provinces until the conclusion of peace. There will, therefore, remain a

inn of twenty million thalers to be paid n specio by Austria to Prussia.

5. The King of Prussia, at the request of Austria, consents to allow the Kingdom of Saxony to retain its present territoiial limits, but he reserves to himself the power of settling, by a special treaty to be concluded with the King of Saxony, the question of the war idemnities payable by Saxony, as well as the future position which Saxony shall hold in the Northern Confederation. Moreover, the Emperor of Austria will recognise the new territorial arrangements effected by the King of Prussia in" the north of Germany, and .also any territorial changes which he may complete in consequence. 6. The King of Prussia engages to obtain the adhesion of his ally of Italy to the preliminaries of peace, ' and to the armistice as soon as the Emperor of the French shall have declared that the kingdom of Venetia is at the disposition of the King of Italy.

TnK POLICY 01" PRUSSIA,

At a recent sitting of the committee of the Lower House upon the address, Count Yon Bismarck gave tho following explanations as to the policy intended to bepur.sucd In' Prussia :—": — " Little difference -exists between the authors of the various drafts of address, or between the Government and the Chambers, as to the object to which the policy of Germany ought to be directed. The question is only to discover by what methods that object shall be attained. Government has" been forced to confine itself to within the limits of possibility, /. c, of what can he realised without enormous sacrifices and without compromising tlie future. We should have run this risk if we had crossed the limits we have marked out for our policy. We must keep the engagement we have contracted in this respect, and, above all, confidence in our word. But we do not think it would have been useful at present (o go further. The Prussian Government is sufficiently animated by strong ambition to render it advisable to moderate rather than stimulate it. Accord in •» to the peace preliminaries, 'the North Germans will have the charge of regulating the national relations of the Southern Confederation. To carry out this task we shall have to examine whether tho want of this Organisation is felt more strongly by the populations of 1 South Germany than by their Governments, as it now happens that we see Prussian soldiers, who pass beyond the line of demarcation, exposed to the popular animosity. It i 3 for us next to impart solid foundations to the new union. I believe that in trying to extend them too far their solidify vrould be diminishcl. We could not, for instance, submit a State like Bavaria to such conditions as we intend now to impose upon certain States of the Forth. Let us try fiist to establish a powerful Prussia, a powerful Crown domain of the directing State. The tie of a close union by which we mean to form Northern Germany will not be so strong as an incorporation.* 1 Nevertheless, there are only two or three modes to prevent allied races constrained by their governments turning their arms against us. The first of these is incorporation and complete fusion of the populations with Prussia, and in especial of the hostile functionaries who will remain attached to the old governments. The Government does not consider that it ought to surmount these difficulties at a single leap, as is the custom of the Latin peoples ; but it will proceed in the German manner, by humoring the institutions suited to these populations, and accustoming them gradually to their new situations. The second course is the partition of the rights of sovereignly ; that is, the establishment of a military sovereign and a civil sovereign. Compelled by circnmstanccs, we must endeavor 'to apply this system in Saxony. 1 had at one ,time a marked preference for this method, but after 'tho impressions I have received from the reorganisation of Schles-wig-llolstein< I am afraid stich a system would become a source of collisions which might lead to a coolness of the annexed countries towards their new ma>ters. In reference to this point T have been met with the remark, "We don't wish to become second-class Prussians." But, independently of these impressions, this system possesses the inconvenience that one of the two masters, the military sovereign who is a'foreigner, always comes forward with distasteful requirements, while all the beneficent influences of civil action remain in the hands of tho old sovereign. ■ I regret, as I have said, that we are compelled to niake this experiment in Saxony. Lastly, the third method would be to cVvide the territories as they have been hitherto composed. We do not wish to make a much diminished Hanover and Saxony, We made unpleasant experiences with the system in Saxony in ISIJ. The portions of that country which were then given to Prussia have become completely fused with her, but in the portion that has preserved its autonomy a frank aversion is retained towards Prussia. For this reason we have now completely departed from this system, which was suggested to us. We have placed the interests of the populations above 'the interests of dynasties. It is true that this cour&e, perhaps, produces the impression of injustice; but the science (if politics has not the mission of Nemesis. Vengeance does not appertain to us. We must do what is a necessity for the Prussian State, and must consquently not allow ourselves to be guided by any dynastic sympathy. People have already learned to appreciate us, even in those very countries. Hanoverians have already said to me, ' Preserve our dynasty for us ; but, if 'that is not possible, then try at least not to parcel out our territory, But take it entire.' As regards our allies, they have only been few in numbers or weak, but duty, no less than prudence, ordains that we should keep -our word, even to the •smallest among them. The less hesitation Prussia shows in sweeping her enemies from, the map the more is she bound strictly to keep her word to her friends. It is precisely in Southern Germany that faith in our political loyalty will have great weight. "As for the Constitution of the empire of 1849, it will only be t)ne of the forms through which the problem I have just pointed out will find its solution. I admit that in theory, that Constitution proceeds with more strictness and consistency than our scheme of the union, because it makes, so to speak, of the different sovereigns the subjects, the vassals, of the future Emperor of Germany j but these sovereigns will be more disposed to concede rights to an ally, a functionary of the union, than to an emperor and su/erain. T shall have to enter more fully iuto the question during the debate upon

the bills I shall hive to lay before you today, and the bills for the elections' to the Parliament."

(Till: RESULTS TO TU,. GERMAN STATES.)

It is announced from Dresden that the King of Saxony' has given his consent to the three following points which form the basis of the convention for the regulation of the military question, the only one which appears to offer any difficulty, the King having alrerfdy resigned himself to renounce all diplomatic representation abroad : —1. Dresden shall have a garrison composed exclusively of Saxon soldiers, the number of which the King can augment or diminish at will, provided it does not exceed 4000 men of all arms. 2. Leipsic and Buntzen will have garrisons exclusively Prussian. The rest of the Saxon troops will form garrisons in the Prussian towns which the King of Prussia will determine. 3. This arrangement is only provisional, and for the term of three years. The Prince Royal Albert of Saxony will have the command of the Saxon and Prussian troops in garrison in the kingdom. A royal decree, published at Munich, convokes the Bavarian Chambers for the for the 26th instant, when a report of the peace negociations with Prussia will be iaid before the members. The territories to be ceded by Bavaria to Prussia comprise the districts of Ord, Gejsfcld, Hilters and Thann, situated in Lower Franconia. These districts contain in all 40,000 inhabitants. The " Etendard " publishes a" despatch from Berlin, stating that, Batavia will pay 3.0,000,000 florins toward.* the expenses of the war. It is stated that PmssiaAvill annex no portion of Hesse-Darmstadt. , ThutDu^hy will retain all its, present territory pjut the princes to the right of the Maine will form part of the North German Confederation. Prussia, it is believed, lias restricted her demands for territorial acquisitions in Bavaria to the Lichtenfcls and Culmi.i. *

A Frankfort letter in the " Augsburg Gazeite",givcs some details as to the sacrifices imposed on that city by the Prussian occupation. At a secret sitting of the legislative body of the city, a proposition from the Senate relative ' to a loan of 1, 200,000 florins was referred to a committee. The finances a"re in a very sad state. Tho budget presents a deficit of 17,000 florins, but in reality it amounts to a Sum twenty times as 'arge. The troops who are here are all in barracks, and cost the city 4000 florins a day. The cost of cigars for the soldiers and the" keep of the officers make up the largest part of the' eSpenseOne hundred thousand florins worth of cigars have been furnished, and tho o'fices have spent in the hotels 72,000 fjprins. The inhabitants have been required to supply the troops with 12,000 flannel waist belts. Only five deatb.3 have occurred here from cholera v ' /

The "Monitenr" says:— "lt now appears certain that, in accordance with the terms of peace negotiated at Berlin between Prussia, and the States of Southern German}', Wurtcmburg will be called upon M> pay eight million florins (twenty million francs), and Baden six million florins (fifteen' million francs). It is thought that the Grand Ducliy of Hesse will preserve the integrity of it's States, with the exception of some slight rectifications of frontier. The part situated to the north of the Maine will enter into the Confederation, which will be put under the direction of Prussia, while the portion 'to the south of the river will remain indepen- x dent." '

PRUSSIA AB TUB SOUTH GEItMVS- STATES,

The Berlin corresp r . ldent of the " Temps'' writes as follows from Berlin, under date of 23rd August : — " I have obtained to-day, from a perfectly reliable source, further news respecting the negotiations with tbe States of the South, which have just been brought to an end. This news is in contradiction with what has gone forth already, bnt r l can guarantee its entire correctness. I have then to inform you that it was Ilerr Von Bismarck who struggled with the King in obtaining for Hesse, and especially for Bavaria, com T paratively milder conditions. 'His Majesty resisted for a long time, and held absolutely to the annexation of Bayrrtth, Kissenjien, &c. Von Bismarck at length persuaded his Majesty of the advantage which 'would accrue from pursuing a moderate course, and his Majesty yielded. Ilerr von der Pfordten and his colleagues were much affected by the conduct of Count Bismarck, and on taking their final leave of him were moved even to tears.''

The following is the substance of the speech of Ilerr Jacob}', in opposition to the address of the Prussian Chamber of Deputies , — v Dr Jacoby said that the draft of the address exalted the army, and it hoped that out of it would come 'a united Germany. He was also rejoiced at the success of the army. But he could not join i:i the song of triumph which was, chanted by the Government party. The" popular party had no reason or motive for doing so — no reason, for the war was undertaken without their assent ; no motive, for it was not the people, but the power of the Crown that would derive advantage from the results. For twenty-five years he had been struggling for the rights of the people ; he was still true to the same cause, and all he could say was that the war undertaken against Germans with the assistance of a foreign ally was not made for the honor of the Prussian people, nor for the advantage of the German people, llistoiy will one day tAI whether the meeting at Biarritz has been more creditable than that of Olmutz. The exclusion of Austria from Germany, and the union of the other two-thirds of the Confederation to Prussia is' more remote from German unity than even the old Diet. Other people may arrive at unity by force ; but the German people have for a thousand years resisted all attempts of this kind. Unity without liberty is a unity of slaves which is perfectly worthless. The assertion of Ilerr von Bismarck that it is of importance to strengthen the power of the Prussian dynasty may be very weli from an exclusively Prussian point of view, but not from a German point of view. If the present system in Prussia is to continue, the unity of Germany would be, as compared with the old division, what death is as compared with disease. With regard to the bill of indemnity the representations of the people may grant an indemnity for some isolated acts, but not for a system which has been carried out for years, especially when the mainstay of ' that system continues to sit in the council of the Crown. The eternal principles

of right and liberty are those alone 0n which the prosperity of nations depends, and the national flag should never be raised except in the service of right and liberty."