The Wanganui Chronicle. WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 23, 1949 NORWAY REJECTS

Wanganui Chronicle, 23 February 1949, Page 4

The Wanganui Chronicle. WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 23, 1949 NORWAY REJECTS

NORWAY has rejected the proposal advanced by the Soviet Union, that a non-aggression treaty be signed by these two countries. By .so doing, Norway has refused to open the door to the Big Bad Wolf. A non-aggression pact would no doubt be used as an instrument by Russia to investigate Norwegian territory to see that such non-aggression pact was being kept and gradually an infiltration of the Norwegian position would be attempted. The Norwegians have been able to see what has happened to the countries adjacent to Russia that had pacts of non-aggression or treaties of friendship with Russia; they have suffered the fate of the young lady of Riga who went for a ride on a tiger. They returned from the ride with the lady inside and a smile on the face of the tiger. Norway has no desire to occupy an internal position. Her war experience, however, has taught the Norwegians at least one thing of importance and that is neutrality invites attack from the aggressor. Germany planned to attack Norway prior to engaging upon her second Viking adventure; neutrality made Norway an easy victim. Had she been part and parcel of an organisation larger than herself for the purpose of providing regional defence there are several possibilities that might have operated. In the first place Germany might have refrained from attacking Norway, deeming the adventure too risky. Having been attacked, Norway, with outside aid, might have been able to have offered a stronger resistance and so contributed, to a valuable degree, to the ultimate defeat of the aggressor. A delayed attack or a stronger defence effort would have reduced the period of enemy occupation of the country and that, too might have been an advantage to the Norwegian people. The greater co-operation with other countries in the resistance effort against aggression would have also given to the Norwegians a stronger claim for reeompence in the post-war settlement. For a country which is in the path of an aggressor to seek the flimsy protection that legal neutrality provides is unintelligent unless it be possible to make a violation of neutrality a very costly business. The Swiss are aware that their traditional policy of neutrality is not much of a protection and they take very careful preparatory measure to ensure that any violator of their territory gains no material advantage by such action and pays very dearly for such a step. It is not legal neutrality that has kept Swiss territory inviolate for over a century, it is the fact that violation of neutrality in that mountainous terrain would not be inviting to the violator. In how far Norway can follow Switzerland is hard to 'say, but the population of some four million spread over a much larger area of land makes the problem increasingly difficult, much more so than the Swiss defence problem. It is not surprising therefore to learn that the Norwegians have abandoned the policy of neutrality. It has been proved by a bitter and recent experience to be unsuited to Norway’s needs. The adherence to a policy of neutrality decided on by the neighbouring* country of Sweden can be sympathised with by reason of that country’s more fortunate experience in the recent conflict and by the faint hope that such a policy may prove to be helpful in another conflict. But it is not to be denied that Sweden’s policy throws upon the Norwegians a much greater burden in respect to their own defence than would be the ease were the Norwegians and the Swedes to co-operate for mutual self defence. A neutral Sweden throws upon Norway the task of defending a long land frontier against a numerically stronger opponent. This is a hopeless task in which Norway could not but fail. It follows then that Sweden’s neutrality throws upon Norway the obligation,to seek support elsewhere and it would be idle to leave the seeking of such support until the country was actually invaded. The difficulties of landing a force upon the Continent of Europe should not be minimised simply becase it was achieved on the Nty'mandy coast. There was a very large measure of luck accompanying that effort which could not be expected to be present in any attempt to land a large force on Norway. The landing of a large military force on Norway after the country had been occupied by an invader can be written off as impossible for all practical purposes. The Norwegians must seek their succour before they are attacked and in entering into the North Atlantic Pact they are certainly making the only provision for their survival that is now open to them. For them to do otherwise than they are now doing is to fly in the face of necessity and to thereby invite disaster to overtake them.