"Myth Of Munich" Destroyed Once And For All; Britain Urged Czechs To Capitulate

Wanganui Chronicle, 18 February 1949, Page 5

"Myth Of Munich" Destroyed Once And For All; Britain Urged Czechs To Capitulate

Chamberlain Government Sought To Appease The Might Of Germany

LONDON. Feb. 17 (Rec. 6 pm).—Any lingering doubts that may remain about the course of British foreign policy prior to the Munich Agreement will be removed by the publication of the latest instalment of official Foreign Office documents covering the period 1919 to 1939.

The documents make it plain that the British Government, under Mr. Neville Chamberlain, supported by the strongest representations from its Ambassador in Berlin, Sir Neville Henderson, brought increasing pressure to bear upon the Czechs to capitulate to German demands.

These papers, as the "Manchester Guardian” points out this morning, should once and for all, destroy the myth that Munich was a blunder into which the British Government stumbled unawares.

The official records show that it was the result of deliberate British policy. This policy, it is disclosed, developed immediately after the German annexation of Australia

Very soon after this took place, the then British Minister in Prague, Mr. Newton, wrote to the Foreign Office: “Nothing we or France could do could save Czechoslovakia from being overrun. Therefore, Czechoslovakia should be encouraged to adjust her position to the circumstances of post-war Europe ” Sir Neville Henderson supported this point of view, and at different times wrote strongly to the then Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, urging to use his own words, that “Dr. Benes must be made to swallow a disagreeable pill.” In one of his communications Sir Nevillle Henderson described the Czechs as "incorrigibly pig-headed people.” The records show that although the Foreign Office and Lord Halifax did not unreservedly approve Sir Neville Henderson’s recommendations, their main preoccupation was that Sir Neville Henderson should restrain German aggressiveness until the Czechs wer e willing to give way peacefully. This attitude was apparently dictated by Mr Neville Chamberlain’s belief that France and Britain were not strong enough to oppose German designs. . At a meeting of French Ministers which he attended in April, 1938. .he British prime Minister saia rrankiy that he did not consider Britain and France had the necessary strength to do this. About this time Mr Newton in Prague and Sir Neville Henderson in Berlin reiterated their arguments that the Czechs should be urged to give way to Hitler’s demands. "If Czechoslovakia wants to survive at all she must come economically within the orbit of Germany,” remarked Sir Neville Henderson. Later he suggested that in order to force the Czechs to admit this point of view Britain should support a plebiscite

which would have the effect of detaching from Czechoslovakia the Sudeten German areas on the frontier between Germany and Czechoslovakia. The records show that in face of this pressure the Czechs agreed to invite Britain to send th e abortive mission, headed by Lord Runciman in the hope that if they made ’some concessions Britain would give them stronger support Sir Neville Henderson at this stage placed considerable faith in what he termed "moderate elements ’ around Hitler and represented to Lord Halifax that if the Czechs gave way they would receive fair treatment from the Germans. In order to appease the German demands the British Government irged the Czechs to disarm and made it plain it was not prepared to give them any security guarantees. At the same time Mr Chamberlain was urging the French Government to adopt the British line. It was realised Mr Chamberlain said that the French were committed by treaty obligations to assist the Czechs, but he made’ it plain that th e British Government did not consider itself similarly committed. Later, Mr Chamberlain urged the French to repudiate their alliance with Czechoslovakia unless Dr. Benes made further concessions.

The archives do not disclose whether or not the British Embassy in Moscow was kept in touch with these developments or whether any step was taken to ascertain Russian reactions. This is important in view of subsequent Russian assertions that the Soviet Union was prepared to give guarantees to the Czechs.