The Wanganui Chronicle. Friday, January 7, 1949. ENGLAND AND FRANCE

Wanganui Chronicle, 7 January 1949, Page 4

The Wanganui Chronicle. Friday, January 7, 1949. ENGLAND AND FRANCE

'HE austerity of the British, which we admire, but cannot imitate seems to make the British Press inclined to be severe towards Prance as having failed to make sufficient efforts for recovery,” declares M. Paul Devinat, Secretary of State and a member of M. Quelle’s Government of France. “These factors are creating a certain glumness between our two countries which could and should be got rid of by a few explanations.” The attitude of Britain generally towards France is conditioned in large measure by what the French have already done. The British have not been able to forget their wartime association with France. That association was unsatisfactory notwithstanding the excellent work done by many splendid French patriots; But this memory of the past does not go back to 1939, it goes far beyond that. During- the 1914-18 war it came to be appreciated that the French Army in the field was not as good as it should have been. Liddle Hart’s study of Foch, the Man of Orleans, goes a long way to destroying- the legend that was built up during the war period that Foch was a military genius. Hart presents him as something of an audacious showman. Following the first world war when the indications were clear that the issue would have to he refought it did not appear that the French were willing to accept the role for which historically and geographically they were cast. The Maginot Line was not completed and seemingly no effort on the part of Britain could induce any French Government to finish this defensive measure. When the second world war did commence it was again felt that the French had no will to fight and that the allurements of collaboration were too strong for too many Frenchmen.

France was herself distressed at the extent of the treachery from which she sintered from so many of her own sons, but such men as Admiral Darlan did go a long way to confirm the already existing distrust entertained by British minds concerning the whole of France. Incidents occurred in North Africa when the liberation effort commenced which even now hurt British minds when they are recalled. Now France wants security from a recurrence of the German menace, but British minds contemplating the past realise that Frenchmen want Englishmen to guarantee a security for which France cannot be relied on to fight or even to contribute much.

Since the war the work of General de Gaulle has been to aggrandise himself and to deprecate the parliamentary regime of France, claiming that it has outlived whatever limited usefulness it ever had. If France is unwilling to operate a Parliamentary regime and is prepared to place herself under De Gaulle then the future prospect of co-operation on anything like a satisfactory basis is not an encouraging one. It is very unfortunate for France that De Gaulle remains so prominent for nowhere is he loved and in few countries possibly is he respected. His formula for success seems to be simple enough, to assert that you are the man who alone can save France, and sa’y it often enough until people come to believe, or at least accept it, for a proved statement. Kenneth Pendar, American Vice-Consul at Marrakech in his book “Adventure in Diplomacy” retails the following after General de Gaulle’s arrival at Casablanca to meet Churchill and Roosevelt: “President Roosevelt told de Gaulle that France was in such military straits that she needed a general of Napoleonic calibre. ‘Mais, je suis cet homme,’ said de Gaulle. She was, went on the President, in such a had financial shape, that she also needed a Colbert. ‘Mais?’ said de Gaulle simply, ‘je suis cet homme.’ Finally, said the President, controlling his amazement, she was so devitalised politically that she needed a Clemenceau. De Gaulle drew himself up with dignity and said, ‘Mais, je suis cet homme.’ It was this interview that made the President realise the full extent of the psychological problem de Gaulle presented.” De Gaulle would not be so dangerous to the prestige of France were it not for the persistence with which the French Parliament plays politics in the face of a national crisis. When aGovernment goes down the fall usually is reported in a short message signifying that the vote of “no confidence” came on some insignificant issue. It is not unnatural for the world to view the scene on its superficial aspect and ask: “When are the French going to wake up and face their problems?” It is an accepted axiom outside of France that the average Frenchman is so good a private financier that he is not interested in the public finances of his country, hence the recurrence of financial scandals. It is believed that the French peasant is not only unwilling to pay his fair share of taxes, but that the Government is both unwilling and unable to make the effort to force him to do so. This general impression may be quite unfair to the riench people, but to the English people in their privations it does appear that the French are prepared to be the carping passengers on the European coach. It is a very good sign that „ - vl ” at sees . tlle necessity for interpreting France to the people . ot Britain. It is to be hoped that he will continue in his effort because it is sorely needed. It is desirable that the Entente Gorctiale be recreated, but it can only be built up if the British people come to have a greater measure of confidence than they have today in the people of France. lhe strength of the French Communist Party probably does not disturb the people of Britain as much as many Frenchmen would think. It is believed no doubt that Frenchmen having suffered many tribulations would naturally turn for a time to the most extreme doctrine offering at the moment. It is as well to be reminded, however, as M. Devinat reminds the British people that Communism which was so strong that it could place representatives m the Cabinets of France is slipping back and now the Communists have no immediate internal influence with the Government. France has succeeded in getting rid of the Communist I arty in the Government. It is to bp hoped that this phase ot the matter will continue and now that the control of the Ruhr’s output is m the hands of the Western Powers the fear of Germany arising to threaten France once again should diminish; while the community of interest which exists between France and the West of Europe should strengthen the rational political elements in the Republic and diminish the importance of de Gaulle as a political personality of which the world will take notice.