HITLER ORDERED INVASION OF ENGLAND, ACCORDING TO RAEDER

Wanganui Chronicle, 6 October 1947, Page 5

HITLER ORDERED INVASION OF ENGLAND, ACCORDING TO RAEDER

N.Z.P.A. Special Correspondent. Copyright. London, Secret German naval document., published by the Admiralty reveal that although the German naval staff drew up tentative plans for an invasion of Britain as far back as November 1939, Admiral Raeder, chief of the navy, regarded tile operation when finally ordered by Hitler with the greatest misgivings. A lengthy dispute developed b< - tween Raeder and the German Arm; Command over the form of the invasion and had finally to be settled by Hitler’s diect intervention. Raeder, conscious of Germany s naval inferiority, argued that adequate naval protection could be given only if the German invasion flee, crossed the Channel by day on a narrow front. The Army Command demanded a night crossing on a broad front between Folkestone and Selsey Bill, with a feint in the direction of Newcastle, on the north-east coast. OOMPBOMISE REACHED Eventually, after a complete deadlock, a compromise was reached, but meantime exaggerated German intelligence estimates of the strength of the British defences, losses inflicted on tile Luftwaffe by Hie R. A. F. and successful British air and naval attacks on Channel invasion ports apparently reinforced Hitler's growing conviction that an invasion would prove too lyIt was not immediately called oft', but ostensible preparations were continued for some time in an attempt to hoodwink the British and apparently with the intention of making an attempt if favourable conditions presented themselves. By this time, however, Hitler had decided to attack Russia, and gradually the German invasion forces were redistributed in readiness for the eastern campaign. D-Day for the German invasion armies was to have been September 15, 1940. Landings were to take place in four main areas —between Folkestone and Dungeness, Dungeness and Cliff's End, Bexhill and Beachy Head, and Brighton and Selsey Bill—with the object of establishing a line from Southhampton to the mouth of the Thames.

A force of 13 divisions (260,000 men) was to be landed with sufficient artillery for their protection. The dropping of parachute troops also was discussed.

The dispute between the army and navy leaders was still proceeding when the Luftwaffe launched its "softening” attack on Britain early in August Colonel-General Halder, Chief of the Army General Staff, declared at one meeting that he "might as well put troops through a sausage machine" as land them on a narrowfront and Admiral Schneiwind, Chief of the Naval Staff, retorted that if the army demanded naval protection over a wide front it would be "suicidal.” HOAXED BY SUBTERFUGES The inadequacy of the German intelligence reports plainly had an important bearing on the invasion plans. One German agent in Britain reported early in September that very strong disguised defences existed between Tunbridge Wells and Beachy Head and in the vicinity of Hastings, while 1 other German intelligence reports assessed the number ot divisions available for defence at 39, of which 20 were believed to be fully operational.

Both estimates were much exaggerated and confirm the fact that the German Secret Service was largelyhoaxed by various British subterfuges. Raeder, in several notes on his conversations with Hitler during September, complained that in spite of the Luftwaffe's claims to have established air superiority over British fighters, R.A.F. bombers were inflicting heavy damage on barge concentrations. Raeder emphasised that a prerequisite for success from the naval point of view was that all British air interference with the invasion fleet be eliminated. He pointed out with some acerbity that this had not been done.

He further pointed out that Germany could not afford to fail in an invasion attempt, once launched. Not only would the losses be very great, but the gain in British prestige would more than offset any losses inflicted on the defenders.

Raeder urged that the attacks on the civilian population of London should be intensified as he considered this might "induce an attitude in the enemy which would make an invasion unnecessary.” Hitler, however, refused to agree to this and reserved his decision about such attacks as a "final means of pressure and reprisal."

On September 19, with German air losses still mounting, the R.A.F. still unsubdued and the German invasion ports still subject to constant attack by the R.A.F. and the Royal Navy, Hitler ordered part of the invasion fleet to dispersal so as to reduce losses. From this point no serious attempt was made to revive the German plans for an invasion.